中国上市公司高管持股与企业投资行为关系研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 08:24

本文关键词：中国上市公司高管持股与企业投资行为关系研究　出处：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资是经济增长的重要拉动力量之一,根据《中国统计年鉴》的相关数据,2011年至2015年期间,投资对经济增长的贡献率平均已达46.9%。作为社会总投资的重要组成部分,企业投资的适当与否,不仅对企业自身的生存与发展意义重大,同时也决定了一定时期宏观经济的走势。现代企业制度所有权与经营权的分离,在支持企业快速发展的同时也派生了委托代理问题。代理人的自利行为恶化了企业投资决策过程,降低了投资机会敏感性并扭曲了企业的投资水平。为兼顾委托人与代理人利益,减轻对企业投资决策的负面冲击,实践中一些企业实施了高管持股计划。为检验实施高管持股计划对企业投资行为绩效的影响,本文以中国上市公司为例,就高管持股与企业投资行为的关系进行实证研究。文本由五部分组成,第一部分是绪论,概括性地交待了研究背景与研究意义,研究的思路和总体研究框架,确定研究方法以及文章的创新之处。第二部分是理论综述,介绍了委托代理轮、内部人控制理论、激励理论,以及国内外对此问题的研究状况。三种经典理论为本文指出企业投资行为的扭曲原因以及对提出解决方案提供了理论支撑。第三部分是研究设计,首先对文章内容做了清晰的界定,随后根据理论分析提出文章的研究假设,最后介绍了如何选取的样本数据并指出了研究模型的设计以及相关变量的衡量。第四部分较为重要,是文章的实证结果分析,首先以主板上市公司为样本,确定主要实证研究变量,设计满足高管持股与企业投资行为关系研究的实证模型;然后进行数据回归分析,一是对全部样本整体回归以检验高管持股是否影响企业投资行为,二是将样本数据分成国有与非国有两组以检验股权性质是否会对高管激励(持股)与投资行为的关系起到调节作用,三是引入股权结构因素分析其对高管激励(持股)与投资行为关系调节的影响。实证分析结果显示,总体上高管持股可以提高企业投资水平,抑制企业投资机会的敏感性。区别不同情况,则存在不同影响:从股权性质看,高管持股对企业投资行为的影响出现偏离,仅对非国有企业的投资水平产生了正向影响且对投资敏感性产生负向影响,但对国有企业无影响。从股权结构看,高管持股的激励作用也呈现分化,股权高度集中或者适度集中的企业因受到积极影响会提高投资水平,对股权高度分散的企业无影响;从投资敏感性角度,对股权高度集中企业的影响为负且显著,表示持股高管虽然有扩大投资的动力但决策时更加谨慎而趋于保守;对股权适度集中的企业无影响;对股权高度分散企业的影响由负变正且均显著。第五部分作为总结,主要介绍了研究结论以及根据结论提出的政策建议,同时也提出了论文的不足以及接下来需要努力的方向。依据研究结论,本文提出以下建议:一是严格规范并完善信息披露制度,二是适当扩大股权激励制度适用范围,三是强化投资项目内部审核管理,四是优化企业股权结构。
[Abstract]:Investment is one of the important driving force of economic growth, according to the relevant data China statistical yearbook >, during the period from 2011 to 2015, the contribution of investment to economic growth rate has reached an average of 46.9%. as an important part of total social investment, business investment is proper or not, not only the significance of the survival and development of their own major, at the same time also decides a certain period of macroeconomic trends. The separation of ownership and management of modern enterprise system, to support the rapid development of enterprises also derived the principal-agent problem. Agent's self-interest behaviors worsened the enterprise investment decision-making process, reduce the sensitivity of investment opportunities and distort investment for both the principal and the level. Reduce the negative impact on the interests of agents, investment decisions, in practice some enterprises implement executive stock ownership plan. In order to test the implementation of executive stock ownership plan of enterprises Effect of industry investment performance, this paper Chinese listed companies as an example, an empirical study on the relationship between managerial ownership and enterprise investment behavior. The text consists of five parts, the first part is the introduction, briefly introduces the research background and research significance, research ideas and research framework, determine the research methods and the innovation of the article place. The second part is the overview of the theory, and introduces the principal-agent, incentive theory, internal control theory, and the research status at home and abroad on this issue. Three classical theories of reason for the distortion of enterprise investment and provides theoretical support for the proposed solution is pointed out in this paper. The third part is the research design of this paper at first the contents of a clear definition, then according to the theoretical analysis, put forward the hypothesis, and finally introduces how to select the sample data and points out the research model. Measure meter and related variables. The fourth part is more important, is the analysis of empirical results, first of all to the main board listed companies as samples, to determine the main variable in empirical study, designed to meet the empirical model of relation between managerial ownership and investment behavior of the enterprise; and then according to the number of regression analysis, one sample of all the overall regression to test executive whether the influence of shareholding enterprise investment behavior, two sample data are divided into state-owned and non state-owned two groups to test whether the nature of equity incentives of executives (Holdings) and investment behavior play a regulatory role, three is the introduction of the shareholding structure factors on the influence of executive incentive (Holdings) and regulating the relationship between the investment behavior of the empirical. The analysis results show that the overall executive ownership can improve the level of corporate investment, business investment opportunities. The sensitivity of inhibition of different circumstances, there are different effects: from The nature of equity, effect of managerial ownership on corporate investment behavior deviation, only for non-state-owned enterprises investment level had a positive effect on the sensitivity of investment and have a negative impact, but has no effect on the state-owned enterprises. From the ownership structure, executive ownership incentives are differentiated, highly concentrated ownership or moderate concentration because the enterprise positively affected will improve the level of investment, the highly dispersed equity enterprise has no effect; from the investment angle of sensitivity, the highly concentrated ownership enterprise influence is negative and significant, said although there are power holdings executives to expand investment decisions but more cautious and conservative; the moderate concentration of ownership has no effect on the enterprise; highly dispersed equity enterprises affected by the positive and significant. The fifth part is summary, mainly introduces the research conclusion and puts forward policy recommendations according to the conclusions of the same. Also put forward the insufficiency as well as the next direction. Based on the conclusion of the study, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: one is to strictly regulate and improve the information disclosure system, the two is appropriate to expand the applicable scope of the equity incentive system, three is to strengthen the internal audit of investment project management, the four is to optimize the ownership structure of enterprises.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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