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基于投资者保护视角的博元投资财务舞弊博弈分析

发布时间:2017-12-31 17:16

  本文关键词:基于投资者保护视角的博元投资财务舞弊博弈分析 出处:《黑龙江八一农垦大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 博元投资 财务舞弊 投资者保护 博弈论


【摘要】:多年来,上市公司财务舞弊的现象一直存在,屡禁不止。各类上市公司的舞弊案例也经常在学术界引发深入的探讨和研究,希望能够分析上市公司舞弊动机,更好的预防上市公司财务舞弊,为财务舞弊的识别提供理论依据,但是财务舞弊一直存在。2014年11月,《关于改革完善并严格实施上市公司退市制度的若干意见》出台后,第一家退市的公司,就是号称A股“不死鸟”的博元投资,其主要退市原因就是财务造假与信息披露违规。然而博元投资退市整理期间依旧有很多散户怀抱着投机的心态,疯狂炒作,进而导致股票退市前的30个交易日,股票换手率高达368.72%,而造成这一现象的99%因素是个人投资者。而当大幕落下,受损的投资者依然需要为自己的冲动买单。为什么一个财务造假的公司依然能够受到投资者追捧?个人投资者的投资理念与投资习惯是否能够遏制上市公司的财务造假行为?本文在此背景下运用了案例分析法分析了博元投资的财务舞弊手段、以及信息披露违法行为,而后通过博弈论模型建立了投资者和博元投资的均衡分析,研究了在舞弊发生过程中,探讨投资者的专业分析是否会对于博元投资舞弊产生影响。最后文章分析得出了四点结论:博元投资的造假成本越高,其造假的可能性越小;投资者对财务信息进行专业分析的可能性越高,博元投资造假的可能性越小;如果博元投资因造假行为产生的收益越高,造假的可能性越大;投资者进行专业投资分析的成本越低,博元投资造假的可能性越小。并且提出了五点可行性建议和意见,希望可以有助于保护中小投资者的利益也可以进一步预防上市公司企业造假的问题。针对这些结论,笔者认为应该一方面进一步加大对财务造假公司的处罚,增加企业财务舞弊的成本;另一方面致力于提高投资者的投资分析能力与专业辨别技巧,通过“互联网+”教育的方式更好的普及投资理财知识。同时,应进一步严格和完善相关的监管制度与退市制度,也提高上市公司财务报表的信息透明度。从外界形成治理合力,让审计师切实的为保护投资者权益发挥作用。
[Abstract]:For many years, the phenomenon of financial fraud of listed companies has been existing, repeated prohibition. All kinds of fraud cases of listed companies also often lead to in-depth discussion and research in academia, hoping to be able to analyze the motives of fraud in listed companies. Better prevention of financial fraud of listed companies to provide theoretical basis for the identification of financial fraud, but financial fraud has always existed. November 2014. "on the reform and perfection and strict implementation of the delisting system of listed companies" after the introduction of the first delisting company, is known as A shares "undead bird" Bo Yuan investment. Its main reason for delisting is financial fraud and information disclosure violations. However, during the period of investment delisting, there are still a lot of retail investors with speculative mentality, crazy speculation. In the 30 trading days before the stock delisting, the stock turnover rate was as high as 368.72, and the 99% factor that caused this phenomenon was the individual investor. And when the curtain fell. Hurt investors still have to pay for their impulses. Why can a financial fraud still be sought after by investors? Can the investment ideas and habits of individual investors deter the financial fraud of listed companies? Under this background, this paper analyzes the financial fraud means and illegal behavior of information disclosure by using the case analysis method, and then establishes the equilibrium analysis of the investor and the Bo Yuan investment through the game theory model. This paper studies whether the professional analysis of investors will have an impact on the fraud in the process of fraud. Finally, the paper concludes that the higher the cost of fraud is, the higher the cost of fraud is. The less likely it is to fake; The higher the possibility of professional analysis of financial information, the smaller the possibility of investment fraud; If Boyuan investment because of counterfeiting behavior the higher the income, the greater the possibility of counterfeiting; The lower the cost of professional investment analysis, the smaller the possibility of investment fraud. And put forward five feasible suggestions and suggestions. I hope it can help protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors but also can further prevent the problem of corporate fraud listed companies. In view of these conclusions the author believes that on the one hand we should further increase the punishment of financial fraud companies. Increase the cost of financial fraud; On the other hand, it is committed to improve investors' investment analysis ability and professional discrimination skills, through "Internet" education to better popularize the knowledge of investment and finance. At the same time. It is necessary to improve the relevant supervision system and delisting system, and to improve the information transparency of the financial statements of listed companies, so as to make auditors play an important role in protecting investors' rights and interests.
【学位授予单位】:黑龙江八一农垦大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F832.39;F830.42

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