非执行董事对超额薪酬影响研究——来自中国民营上市公司的证据

发布时间：2018-01-01 00:12

本文关键词：非执行董事对超额薪酬影响研究——来自中国民营上市公司的证据　出处：《证券市场导报》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2010~2015年A股民营上市公司为研究样本,考察非执行董事对管理层超额薪酬现象的监督效果。研究发现,相比于独立董事,非执行董事对管理层超额薪酬的监督抑制作用更为明显。从股权结构视角出发,研究股权制衡与机构投资者对非执行董事作用的影响,发现较高的股权制衡度反而会抑制非执行董事的监督效果,而在不具有稳定型机构投资者的上市公司中非执行董事的治理作用会更加显著。本文的研究可丰富董事会治理机制的学术文献,也可为完善我国上市公司治理机制提供新的启示,对有关政策制定部门也具有一定的意义。
[Abstract]:In this paper, 2010~2015 A shares of private listed companies as the research sample, to investigate the non executive director of the management supervision effect of excess compensation phenomenon. The study found that, compared to the independent directors, non executive directors to oversee the management of excess compensation the inhibitory effect is more obvious. Starting from the Perspective of ownership structure, the influence of equity structure and institutional investors the role of non-executive directors, found that higher degree of equity balances will inhibit the effect of supervision of non-executive directors and non-executive directors, governance role in a stable institutional investors in listed companies will be more significant. This study can enrich the governance mechanism of the board of the academic literature, but also provide new inspiration in order to improve the governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies, it also has a certain significance to the relevant policy-making departments.

【作者单位】：北京交通大学;中国北方车辆研究所;
【分类号】：F271;F272.92;F832.51
【正文快照】： 引言薪酬契约是企业一项极其重要的制度安排,其主要目的在于促使代理人行为与委托人目标相一致。然而,在现实世界中,薪酬契约往往是不完备的,背后更多地体现出高管自定薪酬的痕迹,使其本身反而成为代理成本的一部分。经理人往往利用手中权力寻租从而获取超额薪酬,得到超过公平

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