风险提示信息、分析师跟进与机构投资者持股

发布时间：2018-01-02 09:16

本文关键词：风险提示信息、分析师跟进与机构投资者持股　出处：《财经理论与实践》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：与先前主要研究机构投资者持股的影响因素及经济后果的文献不同,基于机构投资者群体的异质性,考察分析师跟进对机构投资者持股决策的影响及其企业风险提示信息的调节作用。研究发现:机构投资者整体持股比例随分析师跟进数量的增加而增加,但增加的程度因机构投资者类型的不同而产生差异,风险提示信息的加入会减弱分析师跟进的促进效应;进一步研究发现,风险提示信息产生的持股减弱效应显著改善了异质性机构投资者持股的公司治理效果。研究结果表明:机构投资者持股决策是否采纳分析师的跟进意见,既与机构投资者的不同类型有关,也与风险提示信息的决策价值相关,对风险信息的考量有助于异质性机构投资者持股的公司治理效果的改善。
[Abstract]:Different from the previous literatures which mainly studied the influencing factors and economic consequences of institutional investors' shareholding, it is based on the heterogeneity of institutional investors' group. The paper investigates the influence of analyst follow-up on institutional investor's stock holding decision and the adjusting effect of enterprise risk warning information. It is found that the proportion of institutional investor's overall shareholding increases with the increase of the number of analysts' follow-up. However, the degree of increase varies with the type of institutional investors, and the addition of risk warning information will weaken the facilitating effect of analysts' follow-up; Further research found. The stock holding weakening effect caused by risk warning information has significantly improved the corporate governance effect of heterogeneous institutional investors' shareholding. The results show that the institutional investors' stock holding decisions adopt the follow-up opinions of analysts. It is not only related to the different types of institutional investors, but also related to the decision value of risk warning information. The consideration of risk information is helpful to improve the corporate governance effect of heterogeneous institutional investors.
【作者单位】：安徽工业大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71572002、71272220)
【分类号】：F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言已有研究表明,机构投资者与证券分析师之间具有密不可分的关系[1,2],然而,在众多影响机构投资者持股的因素中,作为反映分析师整体评价指标的跟进数量却鲜有研究。虽然Bhushan(1989)等学者从不同角度论证了机构投资者持股与跟进数量间的关系[1],但该研究未从反面考察跟

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