基于机构投资者视角的借壳上市企业绩效研究

发布时间：2018-01-04 19:26

  本文关键词：基于机构投资者视角的借壳上市企业绩效研究　出处：《延边大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 借壳上市 机构投资者 积极监督者假设 暂时投资者假设

【摘要】：20世纪80年代开始,西方发达国家资本市场中机构投资者在企业资本结构中的作用越来越受到了重视,政府也开始支持机构投资者的监督作用。随着我国机构投资者在资本市场中的地位不断提高,主动参与公司治理,对企业重大决策进行有效的监督和约束。目前很多非上市企业为了上市用借壳上市这种方法躲避了繁琐审批手续,达成了上市的目的。作为监督者,机构投资者是否积极参与MA决策或整合过程,或机构投资者的参与能否影响企业绩效。本文试图从借壳上市角度出发,通过实证分析研究机构投资者持股比例对借壳上市企业绩效的影响。通过上述研究本文得出以下结论,大股东持股比例与企业绩效存在显著的正相关。大股东通过借壳上市以后,直接得到了地方政府的扶持,可以直接在证券市场上融资,获取股票增值收益,大股东与企业绩效存在正相关。第二大股东至第十大股东持股比例之和与企业绩效存在显著的正相关。虽然第二大股东至第十大股东监督大股东的并购决策,借壳上市以后,企业形象提高、股价上涨、股东财富增加,因此第二大股东至第十大股东与大股东都希望借壳上市,他们追求利益一致,积极参与公司治理,进行了自身利益最大化。独立董事比例与企业绩效不存在显著的相关。独立董事的投票权可以影响借壳公司收购方案和收购政策,但是对借壳上市公司收购绩效影响不是很大。负债比率与企业绩效存在了显著的负(-)相关。负债越小,企业获得的利润就越多。社保基金与企业绩效(ROA EPS)存在显著的正相关。券商、基金、信托、银行、保险公司与企业绩效不存在显著的相关性。这可能是不同类型机构投资者的投资实力、投资策略、持股时间不同所致。社保基金为了减少投资风险积极参与公司决策,监督管理层,对企业绩效产生积极影响。基金、券商一般进行短期投资,所以他们一般不参与经营活动。银行、保险公司持股比例比较低、因此持股动机为投机性。这意味着因不同类型机构投资者持股比例不同,对风险承受程度不同,对企业监督力度不同,不同类型的机构投资者对企业绩效有不同的影响。在持股方面要鼓励各类机构投资者长期持股,一来可以监督国内所有投资者必须要遵守投资原则,实现资源的有效分配,保障具有可发展性的企业能够得到资金支持;其次要促进所有股份有限公司提高企业可实现的价值,保障企业的有效运营;最后长久控股能够保障股市的平稳发展,从而有助于国内资本市场的有效运营。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, more and more attention has been paid to the role of institutional investors in the capital structure of western developed countries. The government also began to support the supervision role of institutional investors. With the increasing status of institutional investors in the capital market, they actively participate in corporate governance. At present, many non-listed enterprises in order to go public with backdoor listing this method has avoided the cumbersome examination and approval procedures, has achieved the purpose of listing. As a supervisor. Whether institutional investors actively participate in MA decision-making or integration process, or whether the participation of institutional investors can affect the performance of enterprises, this paper tries to proceed from the perspective of backdoor listing. Through empirical analysis of the impact of institutional investors' shareholding ratio on the performance of backdoor listed enterprises, this paper draws the following conclusions through the above research. There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of large shareholders and corporate performance. After backdoor listing, the majority shareholders have been directly supported by the local government, can directly in the stock market financing, to obtain stock appreciation income. There is a positive correlation between large shareholders and corporate performance. The sum of the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. Although the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder supervise the M & A decision. After the backdoor listing, the corporate image is improved, the stock price rises, and the shareholder wealth increases. Therefore, the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder and the major shareholder want to be listed through the shell. They pursue the same interests and actively participate in corporate governance. There is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and corporate performance. The voting rights of independent directors can affect the acquisition plan and acquisition policy of backdoor companies. However, there is a significant negative correlation between debt ratio and corporate performance. The smaller the debt is, the smaller the debt is. The more profits companies get, the more significant positive correlation exists between social security funds and ROA EPSs. Brokers, funds, trusts, banks. There is no significant correlation between insurance company and enterprise performance. This may be the investment strength and investment strategy of different types of institutional investors. In order to reduce the risk of investment, social security funds actively participate in the company's decision-making, supervise the management, and have a positive impact on corporate performance. Funds, securities companies generally carry out short-term investments. Therefore, they generally do not participate in business activities. Banks, insurance companies hold shares are relatively low, so the incentive to hold shares is speculative. This means that different types of institutional investors have different shareholdings. Different types of institutional investors have different effects on corporate performance. In the aspect of holding shares, we should encourage all kinds of institutional investors to hold shares for a long time. On the one hand, it can supervise all domestic investors to abide by the principles of investment, realize the effective allocation of resources, and ensure that the enterprises with developability can get financial support; Secondly, it is necessary to promote all joint stock limited companies to improve the value that enterprises can realize, and to ensure the effective operation of enterprises; Finally, long-term holding can ensure the smooth development of the stock market, which is helpful to the effective operation of the domestic capital market.
【学位授予单位】：延边大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F275
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本文编号：1379787