混合所有制对高管激励与公司价值的影响

发布时间：2018-03-02 03:19

本文关键词： 混合主体多样性混合主体深入性高管激励公司价值调节作用　出处：《云南财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2013年党的十八届三中全会通过了《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》,该文件的发布将混合所有制经济的发展规划提到“以公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展”这一中国基本经济制度的重要实现形式的高度。中国企业改革进程的逐渐推进,使混合所有制已经在中国达到了良好的发展态势。截至2014年底,混合所有企业从2000年的7.21万户增至17.14万户。混合所有制改革的深化进一步引起公司内部结构的调整,高管激励机制及激励效率也会随之发生相应的变化,在混合所有制的影响下,即不同主体之间的混合方式以及不同的融合深入程度下,高管激励对公司价值的影响存在差异。本文旨在研究混合所有制改革对高管激励与公司价值之间关系的影响,选取2006-2014年期间实际控制人为国有的A股上市公司为样本,构建模型并回归,得出以下四个结论:第一,混合主体多样性在高管激励与公司价值之间发挥正向的调节作用,即,混合主体越多样,高管薪酬和高管持股越能有效促进公司价值的提升;第二,混合主体深入性在高管激励与公司价值之间所发挥的调节作用呈现倒“U”型,即,混合主体融合的深入程度并不是越深越好,而是在一定范围内,混合主体深入性发挥正向的调节作用,超过一定范围后,混合主体深入性将发挥负向的调节作用,并且混合主体深入性在高管薪酬与公司价值之间发挥调节作用的最优区间是15%-40%,在高管持股与公司价值之间发挥调节作用的最优区间是25%-60%;第三,国有持股比例越高的公司实行混合所有制改革,混合主体多样性在高管激励与公司价值之间发挥的调节作用越大。综合以上分析,提出相关的政策建议如下:一是在混改进程中应该引入多样化的混合主体;二是掌握好混合主体融合的深入程度,合理配置非国有混合主体的资本比例;三是继续全面加强混合所有制的改革力度;四是降低政府对混合所有制企业的干预程度;五是选择与自身混合特点相契合的激励方式。
[Abstract]:In 2013, the third Plenary session of the 18 CPC Central Committee adopted the "decision of the CPC Central Committee on comprehensively deepening several important issues of Reform." the release of the document referred to the development plan of the mixed ownership economy as "public ownership as the main body." The common development of multi-ownership economy "is the height of the important realization form of China's basic economic system. With the gradual advancement of the process of enterprise reform in China, mixed ownership has reached a good development trend in China." as of end of 2014, The number of mixed enterprises increased from 72,100 households to 171,400 households in 2000. The deepening of the reform of mixed ownership will further adjust the internal structure of the company, and the incentive mechanism and efficiency of executives will change accordingly. Under the influence of mixed ownership, that is, the way of mixing between different subjects and the different degree of integration, The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of mixed ownership reform on the relationship between executive incentive and corporate value. The following four conclusions are drawn: first, the diversity of mixed agents plays a positive role in regulating the relationship between executive incentives and corporate value, that is, the more diverse the mixed agents, the more diverse they are. The more effective the executive compensation and stock ownership can promote the promotion of corporate value; second, the depth of the mixed subject plays a regulatory role between executive incentive and corporate value, that is, The deeper degree of fusion is not the deeper the better, but in a certain range, the depth of the mixed subject plays a positive regulatory role, beyond a certain range, the depth of the mixed subject will play a negative regulatory role. And the optimal range between executive compensation and company value is 15-40, and the optimal interval between executive stock holding and company value is 25-60th; third, The higher the proportion of state-owned stock is, the more mixed ownership reform is implemented, and the more the diversity of mixed agents plays an important role in regulating the relationship between executive incentive and corporate value. The relevant policy suggestions are as follows: first, the introduction of diversified mixed agents in the process of mixing and reform, second, the better understanding of the depth of integration of mixed agents, and the rational allocation of capital ratio of non-state-owned mixed agents; Third, we should continue to strengthen the reform of mixed ownership in an all-round way; fourth, reduce the degree of government intervention in mixed ownership enterprises; fifthly, choose the incentive mode that is compatible with its own mixed characteristics.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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