基于不对称信息的担保机构与协作银行风险分担数理研究

发布时间：2018-03-02 18:26

本文选题：信息不对称　切入点：担保机构　出处：《湖南社会科学》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对信贷担保市场上普遍存在的信息不对称现象,本文构建了一个中小企业、担保机构、参与银行在内的三方信贷担保模型,探讨不对称信息下银行与担保机构合作的内在机理。发现担保机构与参与银行合作时,仍然存在信息不对称现象,担保机构加强与银行合作分散风险是有条件的,且存在一个最优的风险分担比例,能够避免双方的信息不对称,达到合作的均衡。通过模型分析还发现,在降低企业获得贷款的门槛方面,政策性担保机构并不总是优于商业性担保机构,当担保机构与银行出现非合作时,以及担保机构与银行合作但担保机构必须承担较大风险时,政策性担保机构才对中小企业融资更有利。
[Abstract]:In view of the information asymmetry in the credit guarantee market, this paper constructs a three-way credit guarantee model, which includes small and medium-sized enterprises, guarantee agencies and participating banks. This paper probes into the internal mechanism of the cooperation between the bank and the guarantee institution under the asymmetric information. It is found that the information asymmetry phenomenon still exists when the guarantee institution cooperates with the participating bank, and it is conditional for the guarantee institution to strengthen the cooperation with the bank to disperse the risk. And there is an optimal risk-sharing ratio, which can avoid the information asymmetry between the two sides and achieve the equilibrium of cooperation. Through the model analysis, it is also found that, in reducing the threshold for enterprises to obtain loans, The policy guarantee institution is not always superior to the commercial guarantee agency when there is non-cooperation between the guarantee institution and the bank, and when the guarantee agency cooperates with the bank but the guarantee institution must bear the greater risk, Policy-based guarantee institutions are more advantageous to small-and medium-sized enterprises.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(编号:71473275)
【分类号】：F224;F830.5

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