基于跨期排污权交易的最优环境监管策略

发布时间：2018-03-24 02:02

本文选题：排污权交易　切入点：政府监管　出处：《系统管理学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：政府有效监管是我国排污权交易市场顺利运行的一个关键因素。通过构建一个连续动态模型,讨论了跨期排污权交易条件下政府最优的环境监管策略,并对影响政府最优监管策略选择的因素展开进一步讨论。结论表明:企业选择不违法排放污染物时,政府应将监管水平设置在一个最低水平上,该监管水平受时间偏好率、排污税及补贴等因素影响,当时间偏好率较大时,政府最优监管水平应随时间呈先增加后不变趋势;当时间偏好率较小时,政府最优监管水平应随时间呈先减小后不变趋势;排污税及补贴水平越大,最优监管水平越高。企业违法排放污染物时,单纯依赖政府的监管并不能让企业守法排污,政府需选择一个合适的违法排污惩罚力度与监管相结合,并将跨期交易时长选在企业违法排污转折点处;此时,最优监管水平不仅受排污税和补贴水平的影响,还受违法排污惩罚力度和政府单位惩罚成本等因素的影响。
[Abstract]:Effective government supervision is a key factor for the smooth operation of emission trading market in China. By constructing a continuous dynamic model, this paper discusses the optimal environmental supervision strategy of the government under the condition of intertemporal emission trading. Further discussion is made on the factors that affect the choice of optimal regulatory strategy. The conclusion is that when enterprises choose not to discharge pollutants illegally, the government should set the regulatory level at a minimum level, and the regulatory level is subject to the rate of time preference. Under the influence of pollution tax and subsidy, when the time preference rate is large, the government's optimal supervision level should increase first and then remain unchanged with time, and when the time preference rate is small, the government's optimal supervision level should decrease first and then remain unchanged with time. The higher the level of pollution tax and subsidy, the higher the optimal supervision level. When enterprises discharge pollutants illegally, relying on government supervision alone can not make enterprises abide by the law. The government should choose a suitable punishment for illegal emission and combine it with supervision. At the same time, the optimal supervision level is affected not only by the pollution tax and subsidy level, but also by the punishment intensity of illegal emission and the cost of government unit punishment.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：基金项目:《胶州市排污权有偿使用和交易机制设计研究》(2014S060)
【分类号】：F832.5;X196

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