股权众筹回购条款理论分析及实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 13:17

本文选题：对赌协议　切入点：股权回购制度　出处：《电子科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：众筹(Crowdfunding)是人们、组织以及企业,包括初创企业通过在线门户(即众筹平台)筹集资本为其活动进行融资或再融资的一种方式。依据奖励模式的不同,可以分为捐赠众筹、产品众筹、债权众筹和股权众筹。股权众筹,顾名思义,就是筹资人通过在众筹平台上通过出让一部分股权的进行筹资,投资人在项目成功后依据获得的相应股份可以获得被投公司的股权分红作为回报。股权众筹,首先具有私募股权的特征,被投企业大部分是未公开上市的初创企业,缺乏完整的财务报表和可持续的现金流,投融资双方存在较为严重的信息不对称。其次这种信息不对称在互联网众筹的背景下近一步被放大,因为投融资双方距离较远,增加了与筹资方面对面进行尽职调查的困难,且众筹投资者人数众多,容易形成“免费搭车”现象,即个人进行尽职调查的收益被其他人免费分享,成本则自己负担,因而没有人愿意去采取行动。投融资双方的信息不对称放大了投资风险,投资风险提高了融资方的融资成本,融资成本的提高对融资群体的造成逆向选择,最终结果是好企业放弃在众筹平台上进行股权融资,坏企业充斥股权众筹平台,投资者也放弃对股权众筹项目进行投资。为了降低投融资双方的信息不对称,人们从多方面进行探索,从最早的Angellist的“领投+跟投”模式,到最近的将“对赌协议+股权回购”写入投资协议,再到360淘金的“远期定价”模式,都是从传统理论中不断挖掘适合放在互联网融资背景下的办法,以此实现弱化信息不对称,达到激励相容的目的。本文的研究正是基于这样的背景下,对股权众筹投资协议中“对赌协议+回购条款”的目的及有效性进行探究。本文首先分析了股权众筹存在的主要风险点,然后从金融契约的角度入手,探讨了金融契约的结构,并分析了金融契约的众多权利(赎回权、清算权和控制权)中赎回权在股权众筹行为中实施的有效性,最后建立简单的信号传递模型进行推导,验证了“对赌协议+股权回购”在互联网私募股权众筹的背景下,可以起到信号传递的作用,从而实现好企业和坏企业的分离均衡。最后通过收集了京东金融等114个数据进行实证分析,得到了“回购条款”的存在对筹资人出让股权份额存在显著影响的结论。
[Abstract]:Crowdfunding is a way for people, organizations and businesses, including start-ups, to raise capital to finance or refinance their activities through online portals, or crowdfunding platforms. Product crowdfunding, creditor's rights crowdfunding and shareholding crowdfunding. Equity crowdfunding, as the name implies, means that the fundraiser raises funds by transferring a portion of the equity on the crowdfunding platform. After the success of the project, the investor can get the dividend of the invested company in return for the corresponding shares. The stock raising, first of all, has the characteristics of private equity, and most of the invested enterprises are not publicly listed startups. In the absence of complete financial statements and sustainable cash flow, there is a serious information asymmetry between the investors and the financiers. Secondly, this information asymmetry is amplified one step further in the context of Internet crowdfunding, because the distance between the investors and the financiers is far away. This increases the difficulty of conducting due diligence face-to-face with the financier, and the large number of investors who raise money, which can easily lead to a "free ride" phenomenon, in which the benefits of due diligence by individuals are shared free of charge by others and the costs are borne by themselves. Therefore, no one is willing to take action. The asymmetric information between the investors and the financiers magnifies the investment risk, which increases the financing costs of the financing parties, and causes adverse selection to the financing groups. The end result is that good companies give up equity financing on crowdfunding platforms, bad companies flood stock crowdfunding platforms, and investors abandon investing in crowdfunding projects. People have explored from many aspects, from the earliest "lead and cast" mode of Angellist, to the recent "share buyback on gambling agreement" written into investment agreements, and to the "forward pricing" model of 360 gold panning. It is always from the traditional theory to excavate the suitable method under the background of Internet financing, so as to weaken the information asymmetry and achieve the purpose of incentive compatibility. The research of this paper is based on this kind of background. This paper probes into the purpose and effectiveness of the repurchase clause of the gambling agreement in the investment agreement of crowdfunding. Firstly, this paper analyzes the main risk points of the crowdfunding, and then discusses the structure of the financial contract from the angle of the financial contract. The paper also analyzes the validity of the implementation of redemption rights in financial contracts (redemption, liquidation and control), and finally establishes a simple signal transfer model to deduce. It is verified that "share buyback on gambling agreement" can play a signalling role in the context of Internet private equity crowdfunding. Finally, by collecting 114 data such as JingDong finance for empirical analysis, the conclusion that the existence of "repurchase clause" has a significant impact on the share of equity transfer by financiers is concluded.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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