非国有股的扩大对经营业绩和公司治理水平的影响

发布时间：2018-03-30 07:34

本文选题：非国有股的扩大　切入点：股权分置改革　出处：《浙江大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权分置是我国原始股票发行的遗留问题,这一现象带来了资本市场定价的扭曲。股权分置改革消除了流通股与非流通股之间转换的法律和技术壁垒,给国有股的减持带来了更加便捷的途径。本文通过研究改革前后国有股比例的变动,证实了改革后国有企业实现了部分国有股减持。本文采用双重差分模型,证明了现阶段国有企业国股减持能带来经营业绩和公司治理水平的提升;然后建立分位数回归模型,发现国有股比例越高的企业,其经营业绩提升越大。国有股减持作用下的公司治理水平提升,会促进经营业绩的提升。一方面非国有股的扩大使得董事会和股东大会次数增加,股东和董事参与公司管理的次数增加,为公司决策作出更多探讨。另一方面,非国有股的扩大给董事高管的激励增加(高管薪酬增加,董事会持股增加),让董事和高管更加有动力为企业经营发展努力。但关联交易的增加,被证实为不利于经营业绩的提升,这与关联交易阻碍市场竞争的理论一致。同时,本文发现股东和高管为企业发展作出资金投入的行为,也促进了经营业绩的提升。股权分置改革,统一了股东的目标,也使高管评价指标转向股价变动,股东和高管愿意为企业投入资金支持企业发展。这些资金的投入对企业经营带来了更多投资,提升了经营业绩。
[Abstract]:Non tradable shares is an issue left over from the original stock issued in our country, this phenomenon has brought the capital market pricing distortions. Non tradable share reform eliminated between tradable shares and non tradable shares transfer of legal and technical barriers to the reduction of the state-owned shares has brought more convenient approach. Through the study before and after the reform of state-owned shares the proportion of the change, confirmed after the reform of state-owned enterprises to achieve part of the reduction of state-owned shares. This paper adopts double difference model, proved that at this stage of the state-owned shares in the enterprise can bring business performance and enhance the level of corporate governance; then establish quantile regression model found that the higher the proportion of state-owned shares of the company, its business to enhance the performance of the greater. To raise the level of corporate governance under the effect of the reduction of state-owned shares, will promote business performance. On the one hand the expansion of non state-owned shares the board of directors and shareholders to increase the number of shareholders, and The number of directors involved in the management of the company, to make more study for the company decision-making. On the other hand, the expansion of non state-owned shares to directors and senior management incentive increase (executive compensation increase, the board of directors shareholding), let directors and executives have more power for business development efforts. But the increase of the transactions, are proved to be to enhance the performance management theory, which is consistent with the related transaction block market competition. At the same time, this paper found that the shareholders and executives made the investment behavior for the development of enterprises, but also promote the business performance. The equity division reform, unified by the shareholders of the target, the evaluation index of price changes to executives, shareholders and executives of companies willing to invest funds to support the development of enterprises. These funds bring more investment to enterprise management, improve business performance.

【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

【参考文献】