股权众筹投资者羊群行为的仿真实验研究

发布时间：2018-05-08 00:43

本文选题：股权众筹 + 羊群行为　；参考：《华侨大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,众筹作为一种新兴的互联网金融融资模式,在中国可谓是迅猛发展。2015年,开展股权众筹融资试点工作被写入政府报告,而国家“十三五规划”更是在2016年3月16日将其正式纳入。根据零壹研究院数据中心统计,截至2015年上半年,经由众筹平台成功撮合的股权融资规模达到45亿元以上,惠及约900万家中小微企业和初创企业并诞生了一批明星企业,显示出其广阔的发展前景。然则,在股权众筹交易的过程中,由于信息不对称等问题,大众投资者很容易出现盲目的跟风行为。本文从计算实验金融学的视角出发,采用基于多拟体的复杂系统建模方法,构建了一个基于信息交互的多拟体仿真模型,同时借助仿真平台工具NetLogo 5.3.1,对股权众筹投资者的羊群行为进行仿真实验分析,实验结果表明:(1)由于信息不对称等问题,纵使不存在领投人机制,股权众筹投资者之间的信息交互也会导致大部分后期投资者选择跟风投资前期有更多投资者参与的项目,这种模仿式的羊群行为可能会致使项目提前快速超额完成融资目标,而这或许与项目质量的基本情况完全无关,故而最终可能使大众投资者损失惨重。(2)前期投资者参与人数的减少,或后期投资者自信程度的提高都会降低羊群行为发生的严重性;但是,随着投资者之间信息交互邻域的逐步扩大则会对从众投资趋势产生倒U型影响。(3)当前为多数股权众筹平台采用的“领投+跟投”机制并非良方和长久之计。领投人的积极投资态度或其决策信息的较高可信度都可能会引发大众投资者的盲从心理,导致更为严重的羊群行为的发生。为了缓解羊群行为的次优结果,保护投资者权益,促进股权众筹的良性有序发展,监管当局和整个众筹行业应当致力于完善投资者教育,适度分级披露信息,弱化领投人机制,加强众筹平台监管。
[Abstract]:In recent years, crowdfunding, as a new Internet financial financing model, has been developing rapidly in China. In 2015, the pilot project of crowdfunding was written into the government report. The country's 13 th-5-year Plan was formally incorporated on March 16, 2016. By the first half of 2015, more than 4.5 billion yuan worth of equity financing had been successfully brokered through crowdfunding platforms, benefiting about 9 million small and micro businesses and start-ups and a number of stardom, according to the one Research Institute data Center. Show its broad development prospects. However, in the process of crowdfunding trading, mass investors are prone to blindly follow suit due to information asymmetry and other problems. In this paper, from the perspective of computational experimental finance, a multi-quasi volume simulation model based on information interaction is constructed by using the modeling method of complex system based on multi-quasi volume. At the same time, with the help of the simulation platform tool NetLogo 5.3.1, this paper analyzes the herd behavior of crowdfunding investors. The experimental results show that because of the information asymmetry and other problems, even if there is no lead mechanism, The exchange of information among investors will also lead most of the late investors to follow the trend and invest in projects in which more investors participate. This kind of mimic herd behavior may lead the projects to exceed their financing targets quickly and ahead of schedule. And this may have nothing to do with the basic situation of project quality, so it may eventually make the mass investors lose a lot of money) the number of investors participating in the early stage will decrease, or the increase of investor confidence in the later period will reduce the severity of herd behavior; However, with the gradual expansion of the neighborhood of information interaction among investors, it will have a negative U shape impact on the trend of herd investment.) the current "leading and investing" mechanism used for the majority equity crowdfunding platform is not a good and long-term solution. The positive investment attitude of the lead investors or the high reliability of their decision information may lead to the blindness of the masses of investors and lead to more serious herding behavior. In order to alleviate the sub-optimal results of herd behavior, protect the rights and interests of investors, and promote the healthy and orderly development of crowdfunding, the regulatory authorities and the whole crowdfunding industry should devote themselves to improving investor education, appropriately grading disclosure of information, and weakening the mechanism of leading investors. Strengthen the supervision of crowdfunding platform.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

【参考文献】