产权性质、税收规避与现金持有研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 03:07

本文选题：税收规避 + 现金持有水平　；参考：《河南财经政法大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：税收规避自税收产生以来,税收规避一直是学术界研究的热点,关于税收规避方面的文献也是非常的多,现有研究认为税收规避对企业主要有两方面的影响:一方面税收规避有助于减少企业的税收支出,增加股东财富;另一方面税收规避增加企业信息不透明性进而增加管理层的机会主义行为。现金是企业流动性最强的资产,最容易被管理层操纵和转移,根据代理理论和信息不对称理论,现金最有可能成为管理层行使自利行为的工具。本文对税收规避对企业现金持有的作用进行研究,有助于人们了解税收规避为什么会对企业现金持有产生作用,同时有助于人们发现税收规避通过哪些路径影响企业价值。此外,考虑到国有与非国有企业在公司治理上存在的天然差异,根据产权性质将全样本又进一步分为国有和非国有两部分分别进行研究,对比发现在非国有企业中完善的治理机制是否能够抑制管理层的避税寻租行为,抑制税收规避对企业现金持有的负向影响。本文将以2011-2015年沪深A股上市公司为样本,首先研究税收规避对企业现金持有水平和现金持有价值的影响。其次,再在国有和非国有企业中分别进行研究,研究结果显示税收规避与现金持有之间呈负相关,并且这种负相关关系在国有企业中更强,表明在非国有企业中较完善的公司治理机制有助于抑制管理层的机会主义行为,抑制税收规避对企业现金持有的负向影响。
[Abstract]:Since tax evasion came into being, tax evasion has been a hot topic in academic circles, and there are also many documents on tax evasion. The existing studies believe that tax evasion has two main effects on enterprises: on the one hand, tax evasion helps to reduce the tax expenditure of enterprises and increase the wealth of shareholders; On the other hand, tax evasion increases the information opacity of the enterprise and then increases the opportunistic behavior of the management. Cash is the most liquid asset, which is easy to be manipulated and transferred by management. According to agency theory and information asymmetry theory, cash is the most likely tool for management to exercise self-interest. This paper studies the effect of tax evasion on corporate cash holding, which is helpful for people to understand why tax evasion has an effect on corporate cash holding, and to find out through which ways tax evasion affects enterprise value. In addition, considering the natural differences in corporate governance between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, the whole sample is further divided into state-owned and non-state-owned parts according to the nature of property rights. It is found that the perfect governance mechanism in non-state-owned enterprises can restrain the behavior of tax avoidance and rent-seeking, and restrain the negative influence of tax evasion on the cash holdings of enterprises. Based on the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011-2015, this paper first studies the influence of tax evasion on the cash holding level and cash holding value of enterprises. Secondly, in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the results show that tax evasion and cash holdings are negatively correlated, and this negative correlation is stronger in state-owned enterprises. The conclusion is that the perfect corporate governance mechanism in the non-state-owned enterprises is helpful to restrain the opportunistic behavior of the management and the negative influence of tax evasion on the cash holdings of the enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：河南财经政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】