民营银行准入监管的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-20 04:28

本文选题：民营银行 + 寻租　；参考：《上海经济研究》2017年09期

【摘要】：放开银行牌照,对希望纵深参与综合性金融业务的民营企业有着划时代意义,然而当监管权力下放地方监管部门时,民营企业为抢占银行牌照很可能会选择向地方监管部门寻租取得银行牌照。该文引入寻租理论,以中央监管部门监管为约束条件,构建民营企业与地方监管部门间的演化博弈模型,运用数值仿真得到民营企业和地方监管部门博弈行为的演化规律和不同条件下的稳定策略,分析民营企业与地方监管部门策略选择的影响因素。研究结果表明:在中央监管部门的不同监管力度下,申办者和地方监管部门的初始状态影响演化稳定策略,增加寻租成本可以有效阻止寻租行为。由此提出减少或杜绝寻租行为的政策建议是加强监管制度建设、加大惩罚力度以及鼓励公信力组织加入监管等。
[Abstract]:Liberalizing banking licences is epoch-making for private companies that want to engage in comprehensive financial business, but when regulation is decentralized to local regulators, Private companies are likely to choose to rent-seeking from local regulators to secure banking licences. This paper introduces the rent-seeking theory and constructs an evolutionary game model between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities with the supervision of the central regulatory department as the constraint condition. The evolution law of game behavior between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities and the stability strategy under different conditions are obtained by numerical simulation, and the factors influencing the selection of strategies between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities are analyzed. The results show that the initial state of the applicant and the local regulatory department influence the evolutionary stability strategy under the different supervision intensity of the central regulatory department and the increase of the rent-seeking cost can effectively prevent the rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, the policy suggestions to reduce or eliminate rent-seeking behavior are to strengthen the construction of supervision system, to strengthen punishment and to encourage public organizations to join the supervision.
【作者单位】：上海大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“基于RFID的生鲜农产品供应链运作优化理论与方法”(编号:71431004) 上海市教委科研创新项目“基于网络的非正式学习模式研究”(编号:13YS015) 教育部人文社科研究项目“网络学习动态过程发散与收敛状态实证研究”(编号:17YJA880014)资助
【分类号】：F224.32;F832.3

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