业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择

发布时间：2018-07-04 10:31

本文选题：业绩型股权激励 + 可行权业绩条件　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文以2006-2012年期间实施行股权激励计划的A股上市公司为研究样本,对业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现,相对于"非激励性"股权激励计划的公司,"激励性"股权激励计划的公司实施真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理的程度更大;上市公司股权激励计划所设定的行权业绩条件相对于公司过去实际业绩水平越严格的,管理层实施真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理的程度越大;为了达到行权业绩条件,上市公司管理层会同时综合使用真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理两种方式。研究结果意味着,合理设定行权业绩条件对于股权激励有效性至关重要,过高或过低的行权业绩条件都难以实现股权激励的预期效果。本文主要贡献在于:根据行权业绩条件高低衡量股权激励强度,是基于中国情景对股权激励强度度量的一个创新;从真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理两种盈余管理方式选择的角度丰富有关股权激励与盈余管理之间关系方面的文献。
[Abstract]:This paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between the performance equity incentive and the choice of earnings management based on the A-share listed companies that implemented the bank equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2012. Compared with the "non-incentive" equity incentive plan, the "incentive" equity incentive plan has a greater degree of real activity earnings management and accrual item earnings management than the "non-incentive" equity incentive plan. The more strict the performance conditions set by the equity incentive plan of listed companies are relative to the actual performance level of the company in the past, the greater the extent to which the management implements the earnings management of real activities and accrual items; in order to achieve the performance conditions of exercising rights, The management of listed companies will use both real activity earnings management and accrual earnings management. The research result means that it is very important to set the performance conditions of exercise right reasonably for the effectiveness of equity incentive. It is difficult to achieve the expected effect of equity incentive if the performance condition is too high or too low. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: measuring the intensity of equity incentive according to the performance condition of exercise power is an innovation based on the Chinese situation to measure the intensity of equity incentive; From the perspective of real earnings management and accrual earnings management, the paper enriches the literature on the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学管理学院;南京审计大学会计学院;无锡太湖学院会计学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般资助项目(13BJY013) 国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71172190)
【分类号】：F275.5;F832.51

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