高管激励对农村信用社绩效影响研究

发布时间：2018-08-20 12:13

【摘要】：2010年在相关股权改造指导意见的指导下,股份制的农村商业银行被确定为农村信用社产权改革的最终组织形式。随着农村信用社向股份制方向发展,完善农村信用社公司治理结构,提高农村信用社公司治理效率越来越受到关注。其中高管层激励作为公司治理的重要方面,对农村信用社的可持续发展至关重要。但目前研究农村信用社高管激励的文献较少,已有学者仅对农村信用社高管薪酬水平、持股比例进行研究,鲜有关于农村信用社高管在职消费的研究。本文在研究高管激励对农村信用社绩效的影响时,增加高管在职消费对农村信用社绩效的影响,研究其内在影响机理。并考虑到农村信用社长期以来股权结构分散,缺乏真正意义上的大股东以及制衡股东,分散的小股东缺乏监督农村信用社高管经营的意愿与动机,影响高管激励机制作用的发挥,本文引入股权结构作为调节变量,实证研究股权结构对高管激励与农村信用社绩效相关性的影响。首先,本文在相关文献综述以及委托代理、人力资本等理论的基础上,研究了高管货币薪酬、高管持股比例、高管在职消费对农村信用社绩效的影响机理,以及股权集中度和股权制衡度对高管激励与农村信用社绩效关系的调节效应,提出本文研究假设。其次,利用陕西省52家农村信用社2010-2015年的数据,构建层次回归模型进行实证分析。实证结果表明:高管货币薪酬与农村信用社支农效率和盈利能力显著正相关,高管货币薪酬起正向激励作用;高管持股比例与农村信用社支农效率显著负相关,与经营风险显著正相关,高管持股比例对农村信用社绩效产生负向影响;高管在职消费与农村信用社盈利能力显著正相关,与经营风险显著负相关,高管在职消费的激励效果较好。股权集中度和股权制衡度均对高管持股比例与农村信用社绩效的关系产生显著的正向调节作用,即有利于削弱高管持股比例对农村信用社绩效的负向影响。最后,根据实证结果,本文从加强股东对管理层的约束、完善农村信用社高管激励机制、加强内外部监督等三个方面提出对策建议。
[Abstract]:In 2010, under the guidance of relevant equity reform, joint-stock rural commercial banks were determined to be the final organizational form of rural credit cooperatives property rights reform. With the development of rural credit cooperatives to joint-stock system, more and more attention has been paid to perfecting the corporate governance structure of rural credit cooperatives and improving the corporate governance efficiency of rural credit cooperatives. As an important aspect of corporate governance, executive level incentive is very important for the sustainable development of rural credit cooperatives. However, there are few researches on the incentive of rural credit cooperatives. Some scholars only study the salary level and shareholding ratio of rural credit cooperatives executives, and there is little research on the in-service consumption of rural credit cooperatives executives. This paper studies the effect of executive incentive on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, increases the effect of in-service consumption of senior executives on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, and studies its internal influence mechanism. And considering that the ownership structure of rural credit cooperatives has been scattered for a long time, the lack of real large shareholders and counterbalance shareholders, the scattered minority shareholders lack the will and motivation to supervise the management of senior managers of rural credit cooperatives. This paper introduces the equity structure as a regulating variable and empirically studies the influence of the equity structure on the relationship between the executive incentive and the performance of rural credit cooperatives. First of all, on the basis of literature review, principal-agent, human capital and other theories, this paper studies the influence mechanism of executive monetary compensation, executive shareholding ratio and executive in-service consumption on the performance of rural credit cooperatives. And the effect of equity concentration and equity balance on the relationship between executive incentive and rural credit cooperative performance, this paper puts forward the hypothesis. Secondly, based on the data of 52 rural credit cooperatives in Shaanxi province from 2010 to 2015, a hierarchical regression model is constructed for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that: the executive monetary compensation and rural credit cooperatives agricultural efficiency and profitability significantly positive correlation, executive monetary compensation plays a positive incentive role, the proportion of senior management ownership and rural credit cooperatives agricultural efficiency significantly negative correlation. The proportion of executive ownership has a negative impact on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, while the in-service consumption of senior executives is significantly positively correlated with the profitability of rural credit cooperatives, and negatively correlated with operational risks. The incentive effect of executives'on-the-job consumption is better. The degree of ownership concentration and equity balance have a significant positive effect on the relationship between the proportion of senior management and the performance of rural credit cooperatives, that is to say, it is helpful to weaken the negative influence of the proportion of ownership of senior executives on the performance of rural credit cooperatives. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper puts forward some suggestions from three aspects: strengthening the restriction of shareholders on the management, perfecting the incentive mechanism of rural credit cooperatives executives, and strengthening the internal and external supervision.
【学位授予单位】：西安理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.35

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