银行特许权对贷款价格的影响研究:兼论我国商业银行的议价能力

发布时间：2019-01-17 17:37

【摘要】：本文建立讨价还价博弈模型分析银行特许权对贷款价格谈判的影响,并采用双边随机边界模型和2005-2013年我国104家商业银行的数据,测度银行的议价能力大小及其对贷款价格的影响程度。研究发现:(1)特许权使银行具有更低谈判成本,表现出较强的议价能力,并使谈判达成较高的交易价格;(2)凭借特许权形成的垄断和经营优势,银行能获取近3倍于企业的剩余,并使贷款成交价格高出公允价格约0.70%;(3)样本期借贷双方的议价能力均未呈现出与银行业市场结构相一致的变化规律,银行业市场化改革没有显著改变借贷方在价格谈判中的不对称地位。研究表明,降低企业融资成本需要持续优化银行业市场结构,进一步改善银行治理结构,并着力提升企业的议价能力。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a bargaining game model is established to analyze the influence of concession on loan price negotiation, and the bilateral stochastic boundary model and the data of 104 commercial banks in China from 2005 to 2013 are used. Measure the bargaining power of banks and their impact on loan prices. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the concession makes the bank have lower negotiation cost, show stronger bargaining power and make the negotiation reach a higher transaction price; (2) by virtue of the monopoly and management advantage formed by the concession, the bank can obtain nearly three times the surplus of the enterprise, and make the transaction price of the loan higher than the fair price about 0.70; (3) the bargaining power of both borrowers and borrowers in the sample period did not show the same changing law as the banking market structure, and the market-oriented reform of the banking industry did not significantly change the asymmetric position of the lenders in the price negotiations. The research shows that to reduce the financing cost of enterprises, we need to continuously optimize the banking market structure, further improve the governance structure of banks, and focus on enhancing the bargaining power of enterprises.
【作者单位】：重庆工商大学财政金融学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(13YJA630018)
【分类号】：F832.4

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