高管薪酬与盈余管理幅度对会计稳健性影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-20 03:09

本文选题：高管薪酬 + 盈余管理　；参考：《中南林业科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着资本主义经济的发展,现代企业制度逐步确立,所有权和经营权的分离产生了委托代理关系。基于信息不对称理论,高管有动机为获得较高的薪酬而进行盈余管理,从而产生代理人的道德风险和逆向选择,严重影响到信息使用者的决策和社会资源的优化配置。委托人为了减轻代理人的道德风险和自利行为,便在企业会计和薪酬制定方面引入了会计稳健性。会计稳健性作为公司治理的一种有效机制,它能有效地缓解信息不对称的问题,可以为董事会进行有效的监管提供确证的信息,对于降低企业的代理成本具有重要作用。特别是2006年以后,我国颁发了全新的企业会计准则,会计面临着全新的变化,会计稳健性和高管薪酬问题被推上了风口浪尖。在这种制度背景和经济背景下研究我国上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理幅度对会计稳健性影响,有助于全面化、多元化发展薪酬激励的方式,帮助促使我国上市公司订制出一种既能够持续维持稳健的会计信息,又能够具有高管薪酬最大化激励作用的薪酬契约。同时,也能减轻公司职业经理人的委托成本,维持经济市场的运行,对高管人员规范化的盈余管理行为进行监管。本文以实证研究与理论研究相结合的方法,同时注重创新研究和规范研究的结合运用,对上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理幅度与会计稳健性之间关系的影响进行探讨和分析。在理论研究部分,本文重点阐述了奠定理论基础的相关理论知识,归纳总结前人的研究成果,用委托代理理论、契约理论、信息不对称理论、人力资本理论等相关知识与方法,对会计稳健性、盈余管理幅度和高管薪酬之间的相关性进行理论上的定性分析。在实证研究部分,本文结合我国实际,选择了2010-2016年沪深交易所多家A股上市公司的财务数据作为研究对象,在借鉴前人理论成果与模型的基础上,加入本文研究所需的相关变量构建模型,通过SPSS统计软件对数据进行描述性统计、多元回归分析和稳健性检验,结合我国的国情与制度背景,对比经济现实对模型结果进行相关的解释、论证,得出实证结果。通过对数据回归分析,我们发现:上市公司高管薪酬越高,盈余管理的幅度越大;上市公司盈余管理幅度越大,公司会计稳健性水平越差;上市公司高管薪酬与上市公司会计稳健性水平呈负相关。
[Abstract]:With the development of capitalist economy, modern enterprise system has been gradually established, and the separation of ownership and management has produced principal-agent relationship. Based on the theory of asymmetric information, executives have motivation to manage earnings in order to obtain higher salary, which results in moral hazard and adverse selection of agents, which seriously affects the decision of information users and the optimal allocation of social resources. In order to reduce the moral hazard and self-interest of the agent, the principal introduces the accounting conservatism in the aspects of enterprise accounting and salary formulation. As an effective mechanism of corporate governance, accounting conservatism can effectively alleviate the problem of asymmetric information, can provide corroborated information for effective supervision of the board of directors, and plays an important role in reducing the agency cost of enterprises. Especially after 2006, our country issued the brand-new enterprise accounting standard, the accounting is faced with the brand-new change, the accounting conservatism and the executive compensation question has been pushed into the storm. Under the background of this system and economic background, this paper studies the influence of executive compensation and earnings management range on accounting conservatism of listed companies in China, which is helpful to the comprehensive and diversified development of compensation incentives. To help the listed companies to order a kind of compensation contract, which can not only maintain steady accounting information, but also can maximize the incentive effect of executive compensation. At the same time, it can also reduce the entrustment cost of professional managers, maintain the operation of economic market, and supervise the standardized earnings management behavior of executives. This paper discusses and analyzes the relationship among executive compensation earnings management range and accounting conservatism in listed companies by combining empirical research with theoretical research and focusing on the combination of innovation research and normative research. In the part of theoretical research, this paper focuses on the related theoretical knowledge, summarizes the previous research results, using principal-agent theory, contract theory, information asymmetry theory, human capital theory and other related knowledge and methods. The correlation between accounting conservatism, earnings management range and executive compensation is analyzed qualitatively in theory. In the part of empirical research, this paper chooses the financial data of several A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2016 as the research object, and draws lessons from the previous theoretical results and models. Add the relevant variables needed in this paper to build the model, through the SPSS statistical software to describe the data statistics, multiple regression analysis and robustness test, combined with our national conditions and institutional background, Compared with economic reality, the model results are explained and demonstrated, and the empirical results are obtained. Through the regression analysis of the data, we find that the higher the executive compensation, the bigger the earnings management, the worse the accounting conservatism of listed companies. There is a negative correlation between executive compensation and accounting conservatism of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：中南林业科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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