企业集团控制、管理层权力与非效率投资

发布时间：2018-07-02 11:06

本文选题：企业集团 + 管理层权力　；参考：《东北财经大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国作为一新兴的市场经济体,随着外资企业进入,面临的竞争压力逐渐加大。为了增强我国企业自身的竞争力,进一步推动我国经济的发展,中国政府在借鉴日韩经济快速发展的基础上,开始加快企业集团的组建。而且据笔者整理统计,截止到2013年末,我国资本市场上受企业集团控制的上市公司占所有统计上市公司的比例高达66.2%,数量是独立公司的二倍。该数据足以表明企业集团在我国经济中的重要地位,企业集团的投资水平也衡量着我国企业整体的投资水平,更加表明研究企业集团投资效率必须性。现有文献研究表明,受集团控制的公司可以从集团母公司获得利益和补助。诸如,集团母公司利用自身优势组建的内部资本市场可以缓解来自外部资本市场的融资制约。但是,集团母公司内部资本的配置机制对成员公司使用配置资金效率的保证程度有多少?集团母公司构建的内部资本市场能给成员公司带来投资效率的提高吗?在现代公司制下,由于契约关系的存在,企业存在着多重委托代理关系。公司管理层拥有绝对权力,控制着公司的闲置资本。那么在进行投资决策时,企业管理层为了自身利益,是否对上市公司投资行为产生影响,导致企业出现过度投资行为或者投资不足行为?在此基础之上,本文选择20102013年沪深A股上市公司的经验数据作为研究对象,对共计8380个的数据样本进行观测。同时,笔者通过手工搜集并整理沪深A股上市公司的背景资料,对企业集团进行了界定。借鉴相关文献,构建公司非效率投资(投资过度、投资不足)的测量公式,设定相应的假设模型,利用多元线性回归的方法检验企业集团控制对非效率投资(投资过度、投资不足)的影响,并且考察管理层权力在这种影响关系中所发挥的调节作用。具体而言：在理论研究部分,本文通过梳理国内外相关领域以往的文献资料,在此基础上,从理论出发,分析企业集团控制、管理层权力以及非效率投资(投资过度、投资不足)之间的关系和作用机制,提出了本文的假设构想,组织了文章的研究路径与研究模型。在该理论模型当中,企业集团控制以及非效率投资(投资过度、投资不足)分别为自变量与因变量,并将可能发挥着调节作用的管理层权力作为调节变量,同时参照已有的文献选取了控制变量。在本文第四章,第一步进行描述性统计分析,用做探究变量自身的内在规律；第二步,对主要考察变量之间是否存在的线性关系,利用Spearman相关系数分析进行了相关性分析；第三步,为了检验本文假设的成立与否,进行了多元线性分析；第四步,出于检验本文结论的稳健可信性之考虑,本章通过对相关变量含义再次界定,变化样本的数量来再次实施检验。本文主要借助Excel以及SPSS19.0进行数据处理步骤,使用Eviews6.0进行实证分析步骤。研究结论证明：受企业集团控制的上市公司与独立公司在非投资效率(投资过度、投资不足)程度上存在着差异。由于代理问题的存在,上市公司的管理者通过向集团母公司进行寻租,这促进了上市公司的过度投资行为,缓解了其投资不足行为。而且上述现象在管理层权利越大的情况下越严重,加重了代理成本。具体而言,相比于独立上市公司,受企业集团控制对公司的投资过度行为有着促进作用,对公司的投资不足行为有着缓解或抑制作用；另外,在管理层权力越大的情况下,与独立上市公司相比较,企业集团控制与投资过度、投资不足之间的关系程度更强,最终的实证结果验证了管理层权力对上述关系具有的调节作用。基于理论分析与实证研究,本文认为我国的集团公司应当加强内部资金管理,重视企业集团控制对成员公司投资效率方面的影响。适度的利用企业集团的内部资本市场,可以缓解上市公司在资金方面的不足,提高内部资本配置效率、成员公司的投资效率。但是,若不恰当的利用企业集团母公司组建的内部资本市场,就会导致成员上市公司的非效率投资现象。另外,由于在一定情形下,股东与管理层存在着利益冲突,使得管理者为了自身利益作出非效率投资行为,并且隶属于企业集团的上市公司上述现象更为严重。本文结论也为隶属于企业集团的上市公司加强对管理层的约束或者激励,以降低代理成本具有一定的启示意义。
[Abstract]:As a new market economy, with the entry of foreign enterprises, the pressure of competition is gradually increasing. In order to enhance the competitiveness of China's enterprises and further promote the development of our economy, the Chinese government began to speed up the establishment of enterprise groups on the basis of the rapid economic development of Japan and South Korea. By the end of 2013, the proportion of listed companies controlled by enterprise groups in China's capital market accounted for 66.2% of all listed companies and two times the number of independent companies. This data is sufficient to show the important position of the enterprise group in the economy of our country, and the investment level of the enterprise group is also a measure of the overall investment level of the enterprises in our country. The current literature study shows that group controlled companies can obtain benefits and subsidies from the group parent company. For example, the internal capital market formed by the group parent company can ease the financing constraints from the external capital market. However, the internal capital of the group parent company. How much does the configuration mechanism guarantee the efficiency of the allocation of funds for a member company? Can the internal capital market set up by the group parent company bring an increase in investment efficiency to the member companies? Under the modern company system, because of the existence of the contractual relationship, the enterprise has multiple principal-agent relations. The company management has absolute power and control. In order to make the investment decision, does the enterprise management have an impact on the investment behavior of the listed company for its own benefit, which leads to the excessive investment behavior or the underinvestment behavior? On this basis, this paper chooses the empirical data of the 20102013 years A stock listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research object. The total of 8380 data samples are observed. At the same time, the author collects and collates the background information of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies by hand, and defines the enterprise groups. Methods to examine the influence of enterprise group control on inefficiency investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) and to examine the regulatory role of management power in this relationship. The relationship and mechanism of enterprise group control, management power and inefficiency investment (overinvestment, underinvestment), put forward the hypothesis of this article, and organized the research path and research model of the article. In the theoretical model, the enterprise group control and the inefficiency investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) are independent variables, respectively. In the fourth chapter, descriptive statistical analysis is carried out in the first step, and the second step is the linear relationship between the main variables, and the second step. The correlation analysis was carried out with the Spearman correlation coefficient analysis. The third step, in order to test the hypothesis of this article or not, carried out multiple linear analysis. The fourth step, in order to test the robust credibility of the conclusion of this article, this chapter redefines the meaning of the related variables and changes the number of samples to test again. The data processing steps are carried out with the help of Excel and SPSS19.0, and the empirical analysis is carried out using Eviews6.0. The conclusion is that there are differences in the degree of non investment efficiency (overinvestment and insufficient investment) between listed companies and independent companies controlled by enterprise groups. The parent company rent-seeking, which promotes the overinvestment behavior of the listed companies and alleviates the underinvestment behavior. Moreover, the above phenomenon is more serious in the case of the higher management rights, and aggravates the agency cost. In particular, the enterprise group control system has a promoting effect on the overinvestment behavior of the company compared to the independent listed company. In addition, compared with the independent listed companies, the relationship between the control of enterprise group and the overinvestment and the underinvestment is stronger than that of the independent listed companies. The final empirical results verify the regulatory effect of management power on the above relationship. On the basis of analysis and empirical research, this paper holds that the group company in China should strengthen the internal capital management and attach importance to the influence of the enterprise group control on the investment efficiency of the member companies. The appropriate use of the internal capital market of the enterprise group can alleviate the lack of funds in the listed companies and improve the efficiency of the internal capital allocation. However, if the internal capital market formed by the parent company of the enterprise group is not properly used, it will lead to the inefficiency investment phenomenon of the listed companies. In addition, there is a conflict of interests between the shareholders and the management in a certain situation, which makes the managers make inefficiency investment behavior for their own interests and is subordinate to the enterprises. The above phenomenon is more serious in the listed companies of the industry group. The conclusion of this paper is also for the listed companies affiliated to the enterprise group to strengthen the management constraint or incentive, so as to reduce the agency cost.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F275;F276.4

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