“三角螺旋”制度变迁模型及其应用

发布时间：2018-08-12 12:29

【摘要】： 从十一届三中全会召开至今,中国的改革开放已经进行了近31年的时间。30多年来,我国的国民经济和社会发展在取得巨大成就的同时,也积累起诸多不容忽视的问题。对这些成就与问题,显然不应该仅仅局限在宏观经济运行的层面进行解释,而必须从制度安排的层面和制度变迁的角度去探索一个合理的答案。对后续改革的方向和趋势的把握,也需要从制度以及制度背后的利益集团入手,进行有深度的梳理。正是基于上述考虑,本文综合运用马克思主义制度分析方法和新制度经济学的制度变迁理论,构建了“三角螺旋”制度变迁模型,并以此为工具,对中国转轨的成就与问题进行了解释。 “三角螺旋”制度变迁模型将制度、增长与分配三个要素整合到同一个分析框架中,并在厘清三者之间的作用机制的基础上,将制度变迁的过程拆分、细化,详细描述了制度变迁路径在动态中的决定机制。综合来看,制度变迁并不是始终遵从“帕累托改进”的原则,从某种意义上说,而是恰恰相反,制度变迁与利益调整及经济增长三者之间的互动关系,会使后续制度变迁步入“强者恒强、弱者恒弱”的恶性循环,在初次制度变迁中受益的集团将会推动制度向更有利自己的方向发展,而在初次制度变迁中受到损害和削弱的利益集团,在后续的改革中仍将处于被剥夺的地位。只有在政府的强力调控下,才可能走出这一困境。这一模型不仅解释了我国转型期的经济增长特征,而且指出了转型期利益分配失衡的制度根源,对我国的转轨实践有着很强的解释力。在模型构建后,本文还以此为工具对我国国有产权变革和房地产市场发展的制度逻辑和利益关系进行了分析,指出了后续改革的重点。同时,本文还特别强调了政府在转轨中的重要作用,政府既是参与制度变迁的利益集团,同时也是调控制度变迁的根本力量,只有科学把握政府定位、加快推进政府转型、不断提高政府能力,才能将改革进一步推向深化。
[Abstract]:Since the third Plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee was held, China's reform and opening up has been going on for nearly 31 years. Over the past 30 years, China's national economic and social development has made great achievements, but also accumulated many problems that can not be ignored. It is obvious that these achievements and problems should be explained not only at the level of macro-economic operation, but also from the perspective of institutional arrangement and institutional change. To grasp the direction and trend of the follow-up reform, we also need to start with the system and the interest groups behind the system. Based on the above considerations, this paper uses the Marxist institutional analysis method and the institutional change theory of the new institutional economics to construct a "triangular spiral" model of institutional change, which is used as a tool. This paper explains the achievements and problems of China's transition. The "triangular spiral" model of institutional change integrates the three elements of institution, growth and distribution into the same analytical framework, and on the basis of clarifying the mechanism of action between them, the process of institutional change is divided and refined. The mechanism of determining the path of institutional transition in the dynamic process is described in detail. To sum up, institutional change does not always follow the principle of "Pareto improvement". In a sense, it is on the contrary, the interaction between institutional change and interest adjustment and economic growth. The subsequent institutional changes will lead to a vicious circle of "the strong are strong and the weak permanent and weak", and the groups that benefit from the initial institutional changes will promote the development of the system in a more beneficial direction. The interest groups damaged and weakened in the initial institutional changes will still be deprived of their position in the subsequent reforms. Only under the strong control of the government, can we get out of this dilemma. This model not only explains the characteristics of economic growth in China's transition period, but also points out the institutional root of the imbalance of benefit distribution in the transition period, which has a strong explanatory power to the practice of China's transition. After the model is constructed, this paper analyzes the institutional logic and interest relationship of the reform of state-owned property rights and the development of real estate market, and points out the key points of the follow-up reform. At the same time, this paper also emphasizes the important role of the government in the transition. The government is not only the interest group participating in the institutional change, but also the fundamental force of regulating the institutional change. Only by constantly improving the government's capacity can the reform be further deepened.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F091.349

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