国际竞争视角下的产权制度与大国兴衰——一个新古典政治经济学的分析框架

发布时间：2018-03-25 15:58

本文选题：官商博弈　切入点：产权制度　出处：《世界经济研究》2012年11期

【摘要】：本文试图为解释大国兴衰提出一个基于非中性产权制度的新古典政治经济学分析框架。经济学现有的国家兴衰模型大都是内生增长模型。我们将国际竞争环境这一关键的外部变量引入到理论框架中。本文的分析假定:在开放条件下,民族国家为基本竞争单位,长期经济增长是实现国家利益的首要目标,大国兴衰在很大程度上得益或受制于外部环境。我们尝试从商人集团与统治集团的合作方式入手,阐释大国在国际竞争中的得失。本文认为,以长期增长为核心的国际竞争,其实质是大国非中性产权制度之间的竞争。在开放世界中,特别在大国经济"起飞"阶段,商人集团和统治集团之间形成"收买型"合作,并由此建立倾向于生产性集团的非中性产权保护制度对大国崛起至关重要。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to put forward a new classical political economic analysis framework based on non-neutral property rights system for explaining the rise and fall of great powers. The existing models of national rise and fall of economics are mostly endogenous growth models. A key external variable is introduced into the theoretical framework. The nation-state is the basic competition unit, the long-term economic growth is the primary goal to realize the national interest, the big country rise and fall to a great extent benefit or be restricted by the external environment to a great extent. We try to start with the way of cooperation between the merchant group and the ruling group. This paper expounds the gains and losses of large countries in international competition. This paper holds that the essence of international competition with long-term growth as the core is the competition between the non-neutral property rights systems of large countries. In the open world, especially in the stage of "take-off" of the economies of large countries, It is very important for the rise of a great country to form a "buyout" cooperation between the merchant group and the ruling group, and thus to establish a non-neutral property right protection system which is inclined to the productive group.
【分类号】：F014.1;F091.33

【相似文献】