公共政策执行：以中央与地方政府利益博弈的视角分析

发布时间：2018-04-04 04:55

本文选题：中央政府　切入点：地方政府　出处：《中共黑龙江省委党校》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】：摘要:公共政策是规范各级政府行为的尺度之一。各级地方政府的公共政策执行力问题是公共政策理论研究的重要方面。公共政策的执行,关系到我国政府管理的效率,关系到党的执政能力建设,关系到我国深入贯彻落实科学发展观与社会主义和谐社会的构建,具有深远的理论和现实意义。从博弈的视角来看,公共政策执行过程也是一个博弈的过程。如何理解利益和博弈?怎样看待我国当前政策执行中中央与地方政府的利益差异?怎样找到中央与地方政府利益博弈的均衡解?怎样使中央与地方政府由零和博弈走向正和博弈?这些正是本文要解决的问题。本文建立利益博弈视角下中央与地方政府公共政策执行分析框架,从一个新的理论视角对中央与地方政府政策执行不力的深层原因提供解释。在承认双方利益差别的前提下,找到中央与地方政府利益博弈的均衡点,增大双方的策略空间。倡导一种由暗的向公开的博弈的转变,从零和博弈走向正和博弈。中央与地方政府在公共政策执行过程中存在时空的协调性,即时间上是历史纵深的推进过程,空间上是从中央向地方政府的政策转移过程,我们在时空中赋予一个双赢的框架,找到既对中央有利又能充分保护地方利益、调动地方积极性的博弈规则,是公共政策执行的最佳路径与选择。以山西省煤炭资源整合案例对我国中央与山西省的利益博弈进行实证研究,为我国公共政策执行带来启示:只有中央政府放权、地方政府不断探索创新,双方不断的妥协、谈判、沟通,做出利益让步,才能推动双方由利益冲突转向利益协调、走向利益共同发展。在中央与地方公共政策的不断协调过程中,中央政府实现对公共政策的不断完善创新,对上体现中央意图;地方政府实现对公共政策执行的不断深化,对下代表地方利益,从而使中央与地方政府走向双赢或共赢。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: public policy is one of the measures to regulate the behavior of government at all levels.The implementation of public policies at all levels of local governments is an important aspect of the theoretical study of public policies.The implementation of public policy is related to the efficiency of government management, the construction of the Party's ruling ability, and the implementation of the concept of scientific development and the construction of a harmonious socialist society, which has far-reaching theoretical and practical significance.From the perspective of game, the process of public policy implementation is also a game process.How to understand the interests and the game?How to treat the interest difference between the central government and the local government in the current policy implementation of our country?How to find the equilibrium solution of the game between central and local governments?How to make the central and local governments from the zero-sum game to the positive sum game?These are the problems to be solved in this paper.This paper establishes an analytical framework for the implementation of public policies between central and local governments from the perspective of interest game, and provides an explanation of the deep reasons for the weak implementation of policies between central and local governments from a new theoretical perspective.On the premise of acknowledging the difference between the interests of both sides, the equilibrium point of the game between central and local governments is found, and the strategic space of both sides is enlarged.Advocate a change from dark game to open game, from zero sum game to positive sum game.There is a space-time coordination between central and local governments in the process of implementing public policies, that is, time is a process of advancing in depth in history, and space is a process of policy transfer from central to local governments. In time and space, we have given a win-win framework.It is the best way and choice for public policy to find the game rules which can benefit the central government and fully protect the local interests and arouse the local enthusiasm.An empirical study on the interest game between the central government and Shanxi Province based on the case of coal resources integration in Shanxi Province has brought enlightenment to the implementation of public policy in our country: only the central government devolves power, the local government constantly explores innovation, and the two sides continue to compromise.Only by negotiation, communication and compromise of interests can both sides change from conflict of interest to coordination of interests and towards common development of interests.In the process of continuous coordination between central and local public policies, the central government realizes the continuous improvement and innovation of public policies, embodies the intention of the central authorities, and the local governments realize the continuous deepening of the implementation of public policies and represent the local interests.So that the central and local governments to win-win or win-win.
【学位授予单位】：中共黑龙江省委党校
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F062.6;F224.32

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