退耕还林生态补偿契约设计及效率问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-26 20:41

本文选题：生态补偿 + 退耕还林　；参考：《资源科学》2014年08期

【摘要】：退耕还林生态补偿政策一般通过政府和农户签订委托——代理契约的形式实施,设计最优的激励契约成为后退耕还林时期退耕还林生态补偿政策研究的重点。本文主要研究信息对称和不对称信息条件下不同类型农户退耕还林生态补偿契约的设计问题,探讨政府与高技术农户和低技术农户之间生态补偿契约的效率问题。研究显示,政府和农户经济收益信息的不对称会使高技术农户低报自己的收益以获得信息租金,获得高于标准支付的生态补偿支付,增加契约的激励成本;而低技术农户获得低于标准支付的生态补偿支付,影响农户退耕还林的意愿,增加契约的摩擦成本。最后讨论退耕还林生态补偿政策如何减少生态补偿契约效率损失的对策,提出退耕还林生态补偿契约的设计应根据当地高技术农户和低技术农户的比例和生态环境产品的关注度进行权衡和选择,以减少契约效率的损失。
[Abstract]:The policy of ecological compensation for returning cropland to forest is generally implemented through the form of principal-agent contract signed by the government and farmers. The design of the optimal incentive contract has become the focus of the study on ecological compensation policy of returning cropland to forest in the period of returning farmland to forest. This paper mainly studies the design of ecological compensation contract between different types of farmers under the condition of symmetrical and asymmetric information, and discusses the efficiency of ecological compensation contract between the government and high-tech farmers and low-technology farmers. The research shows that the asymmetry of economic income information between the government and farmers will cause high-tech farmers to underreport their income in order to obtain information rent, to obtain ecological compensation payment higher than the standard payment, and to increase the incentive cost of the contract. But the low-skilled farmers get the sub-standard ecological compensation payment, which affects the farmers' willingness to return farmland to forest, and increases the friction cost of the contract. Finally, the countermeasures of how to reduce the loss of efficiency of ecological compensation contract by ecological compensation policy of returning farmland to forest are discussed. It is proposed that the design of ecological compensation contract for returning farmland to forest should be weighed and selected according to the proportion of local high-tech farmers and low-technology farmers and the attention of ecological environmental products in order to reduce the loss of contract efficiency.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学经济与金融学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大攻关项目:“完善生态补偿机制研究”(批准号:12&ZD072)
【分类号】：F326.2;X196

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