双边不对称信息下叫价显示质量机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 08:27

本文选题：双边不对称信息 + 叫价　；参考：《管理科学学报》2014年06期

【摘要】：资产交易前初始叫价(挂牌价)的确定一直是经济学家感兴趣的问题.现有研究认为该初始叫价反映了卖家的私人价值(如保留价格或生产成本),较少讨论其关于共同价值(如资产质量)的信号传递机制.本文在买卖双方存在双边不对称信息背景下,讨论初始叫价显示资产质量的可能性.研究表明:给定交易机会随质量上升而减少的市场条件,改变叫价对卖家存在相反的两种效应——价格效应和交易效应;低质量资产卖家的交易效应对于价格效应的边际替代率更高,使得该博弈的单交性条件成立;给定边界条件满足,博弈存在分离均衡;低质量卖家有动机以低价格向潜在买家显示质量水平,对高叫价待售资产的质量预期更高具有合理性;分离均衡下所有有效交易均能达成,克服了不对称信息下的市场失灵.
[Abstract]:The determination of initial bids before trading has been an issue of interest to economists. It is considered that the initial bid reflects the private value of the seller (such as reserve price or production cost), and its signaling mechanism on common value (such as asset quality) is less discussed. In this paper, under the background of bilateral asymmetric information between buyer and seller, the possibility of displaying asset quality by initial bid price is discussed. The research shows that: given the market conditions in which trading opportunities decrease with the increase of quality, there are two opposite effects of changing bid price on sellers: price effect and transaction effect; The transaction effect of sellers with low quality assets has a higher marginal substitution rate for price effect, which makes the unidirectional conditions of the game hold true, and given boundary conditions satisfy, there is separation equilibrium in the game. The low quality sellers have the motive to show the quality level to the potential buyers at low price, which is more reasonable to the quality expectation of the assets for sale with high bid price, and all the effective transactions can be achieved under the separation equilibrium, which overcomes the market failure under the asymmetric information.
【作者单位】：上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家重大社会科学基金资助项目(11&ZD142) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802037)
【分类号】：F062.5

【参考文献】