公正性、不对称信息与递增定价机制

发布时间：2018-07-11 21:50

本文选题：公正性 + 信息不对称　；参考：《世界经济》2012年09期

【摘要】：本文研究了追求效率和公正诉求的规制者在消费者收入信息不完备环境下的定价机制设计问题,着重探讨了公正诉求是否可能导致最优边际价格递增。信息不对称使得实现公正诉求须基于不损害消费者利益的前提上。在效率、公正诉求和市场完全覆盖要求下,紧闭类型域内的非端点类型消费者的边际价格超过边际成本,端点类型消费者按边际成本定价;更重要的是,如果概率分布均匀以及偏好和主观福利判断等因素满足一定条件,那么最优价格随类型先递增后递减。基于实例将类型域确定性上边界放松至正无穷,公正诉求将使递增定价机制全局最优。半福利主义诉求与类型域无上边界确实可能导致价格递增。连续递增定价机制的理论探索为探讨递增阶梯定价产生的理论依据提供了前期准备,也说明连续递增定价一定程度上能作为缓解社会不公正的一种手段。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the design of pricing mechanism in the context of imperfect consumer income information for regulators seeking for efficiency and justice, and focuses on whether the demand for justice may lead to the increase of optimal marginal price. Asymmetric information makes the realization of justice based on the premise of not harming the interests of consumers. Under the demand of efficiency, justice and complete market coverage, the marginal price of non-end-type consumers in the closed type domain exceeds the marginal cost, and the end-type consumers price according to the marginal cost; more importantly, If the probability distribution is uniform and the factors such as preference and subjective welfare judgment satisfy certain conditions then the optimal price increases first and then decreases with the type. The deterministic upper boundary of the type domain is relaxed to a positive infinity based on an example, and the appeal of justice will make the incremental pricing mechanism globally optimal. Semi-welfare claims and the supreme boundary of the type domain may indeed lead to price increases. The theoretical exploration of continuous incremental pricing mechanism provides a preliminary preparation for exploring the theoretical basis of incremental step pricing, and also shows that continuous incremental pricing can to some extent be used as a means to alleviate social injustice.
【作者单位】：中国社会科学院经济研究所公共政策研究室;江西财经大学规制与竞争研究中心;中国社会科学院规制与竞争研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“用非线性定价促进节能环保的理论与实证研究”(71173236)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F014.5;F224

【共引文献】