关于欧盟航空碳税应对策略的Stackelberg博弈模型分析

发布时间：2018-02-13 05:45

本文关键词： 航空碳税碳排放博弈论均衡政策分析　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2014年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文首次应用非合作博弈方法研究了欧盟航空碳税的应对策略.将其他国家应对欧盟航空碳税的策略分为四种:不抵制、拒绝交纳、反制征税和可置信威胁,通过建立Stackelberg模型研究了航空碳税博弈中双方国家和航空公司的最优选择,并对这四种应对策略进行了比较.分析结果表明,"拒绝交纳"航空碳税比"反制征税"效果好,理论上验证了我国目前正在采取的应对策略是当前最优的.本文的创新在于研究了航空碳税这一新的重要国际问题,首次将航空碳税的应对措施归纳为四种,并且建立Stackelberg博弈模型对这一问题开展定量分析.
[Abstract]:In this paper, the non-cooperative game method is used for the first time to study the coping strategies of the EU Air carbon tax. The strategies of other countries to deal with the EU Air carbon tax are divided into four types: non-resistance, refusal to pay, anti-taxation and credible threat. Through the establishment of Stackelberg model, this paper studies the optimal choice of the two countries and airlines in the aviation carbon tax game, and compares these four strategies. The results show that "refusing to pay" air carbon tax is more effective than "anti-tax". In this paper, the innovation of this paper is to study the new and important international problem of aviation carbon tax, and to sum up the countermeasures of aviation carbon tax into four kinds for the first time. And establish Stackelberg game model to carry out quantitative analysis of this problem.
【作者单位】：中国科学院大学管理学院;哈尔滨理工大学管理学院;青岛大学数学科学学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71003057,71373262,71171120) 山东省自然科学基金(ZR2010GQ001)
【分类号】：F565;F205;O225

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