基于港口城市广义利益下的港口投资行为研究

发布时间：2018-02-27 18:14

本文关键词： 港口投资同质化竞争货主选择行为港口广义利益　出处：《大连海事大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国改革开放后,我国的港口管理体制发生了重大的变革,从中央直属的完全集权式模式的管辖,到中央与地方联合管理的半集权模式,最终到完全下放到地方管理的分权管理模式。在分权管理模式下,政企分开,实行现代化的企业管理制度,在政府的监督下受到市场机制的调控,港口的运营效率得到显著的提高。随着我国经济发展,中国的贸易需求也不断的增长。而港口作为联结海路运输和陆路运输的节点,具备吸引资本的天然优势。发展港口不仅可以提高城市的综合运输能力,同时可以提升城市的魅力度间接提高城市的整体实力。在这种刺激下,政府支持建设港口的热情空前高涨,许多城市提出“以港兴城”的口号,港口的建设得到了城市政府在宏观政策上的支持,港口规模持续的扩大,世界10大港口中包括了7个中国港口,但正是由于这种分权体制的管理模式,城市政府以及港口仅从所属城市利益最优的角度进行决策。由于我国港口分布比较密集,腹地范围交叉,港口出现了重复建设的现象,由此带来了环渤海港口群的同质化竞争问题。本文用理论分析和实例仿真相结合的方法,在理论分析方面,从中国港口的特质出发,分析港口投资建设的内因以及中国港口在地方政府激励下的竞争模式,并基于港口间的竞争模式深入分析政府激励下港口的投资行为。在实例仿真方面,从供需关系出发,模拟货主的随机选择行为,建立双层规划模型,上层是基于港口城市利益最优的目标函数,下层是基于货主随机选择港口的交通方式划分模型。通过saga地理信息系统平台仿真出城市政府和港口的停止投资的临界点,进而分析中国京津翼港口的投资规模。
[Abstract]:After China's reform and opening up, great changes have taken place in China's port management system, ranging from the jurisdiction of the completely centralized mode directly under the central authorities to the semi-centralized mode of joint central and local management. Finally, to a decentralized management model that is completely decentralized to local management. Under the decentralized management mode, the government separates the government from the enterprise, implements a modern enterprise management system, and is regulated by the market mechanism under the supervision of the government. The efficiency of port operation has been greatly improved. With the development of China's economy, China's trade demand is also increasing. As a link between sea and land transport, the port is the node. Having the natural advantage of attracting capital. The development of ports can not only enhance the comprehensive transport capacity of the city, but also enhance the charm of the city indirectly enhance the overall strength of the city. The enthusiasm of the government for port construction is unprecedented. Many cities have put forward the slogan "rejuvenate the city with Hong Kong." the port construction has been supported by the city government in the macro policy, and the port scale has been continuously expanded. The world's top 10 ports include seven Chinese ports, but it is precisely because of this decentralized management model that the city government and the port only make decisions from the perspective of the best interests of the city to which they belong. The overlapping of hinterland and the repeated construction of ports bring about the problem of homogeneous competition of port groups around the Bohai Sea. In this paper, the theoretical analysis and simulation are combined with the method of theoretical analysis. Starting from the characteristics of Chinese ports, this paper analyzes the internal causes of port investment and construction and the competitive mode of Chinese ports under the encouragement of local governments. Based on the competition model between ports, this paper analyzes the investment behavior of the port under the encouragement of the government. In the aspect of example simulation, the stochastic selection behavior of the cargo owner is simulated from the relation of supply and demand, and the bilevel programming model is established. The upper layer is based on the optimal objective function of port city interests, and the lower layer is based on the model of port traffic mode partitioning based on the random choice of cargo owner. The critical point of the city government and port stopping investment is simulated by saga GIS platform. Then analyze the investment scale of Beijing-Tianjin-wing port in China.
【学位授予单位】：大连海事大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F552

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