城市公共自行车系统的新制度经济学分析

发布时间：2018-06-28 00:22

本文选题：公共自行车 + 新制度经济学　；参考：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：公共自行车由于其具有低碳、高效、健康的绿色属性,使得它对于构建低碳交通、改善城市环境、缓解交通拥堵起到了举足轻重的作用,它的发展与普及也是构建资源节约型、环境友好型社会的必然需求。本文将公共自行车系统分为有桩公共自行车系统和无桩公共自行车系统两种,其中有桩公共自行车系统是指市政支持的公共自行车系统,无桩公共自行车系统指的是最近市面上出现的共享单车。有桩公共自行车系统与无桩公共自行车系统中皆存在信息不对称现象,且有桩与无桩两类公共自行车系统存在的问题有所差异,这里分别从新制度经济学中的委托代理与不完全契约的视角对二者进行分析。在有桩公共自行车系统中,公共自行车服务主要涉及到公众、政府和运营企业三个参与主体,他们之间存在着双重委托代理关系。在公众和政府的隐性委托代理关系中,公众由于群体过于分散没有监督政府的激励,而政府具有扩大规模占用更多资源的趋势。在政府与企业的委托代理关系中,由于二者的效用函数不同导致了他们之间对于补贴额的多少存在分歧。企业作为信息优势方具有“敲竹杠”的动机,以便向政府索取更多的补贴。针对这种信息不对称的问题,本文进行了分析讨论并提出了相关措施来加以解决。在无桩公共自行车系统中,企业自行融资,自负盈亏,独自承担风险。与有桩公共自行车系统不同的是此时三方委托代理关系消失,取而代之的是企业与消费者之间的直接市场关系,政府转变为市场秩序的维护者和调控者。公众不再是政府的委托人,政府也不再是公众的代理人,公众与政府之间的委托代理关系不复存在。同样,企业与政府间的委托代理关系也自然消失,政府不再给予企业补贴。企业在运营过程中,实质上是与消费者签订了短期租赁合同,消费者为信息优势方,企业为信息劣势方。消费者为了使得自身利益最大化具有违约的动机,而这会对企业的盈利结果造成影响。在对企业的利润进行分析之后发现,单车非正常损失率(消费者的违约行为所引起)严重影响了企业的正常运营。最后根据上述分析提出相关建议,企业和政府都需要采取措施来减少消费者对企业的损害,以促进共享单车行业更好的发展。
[Abstract]:Because of its low carbon, high efficiency and healthy green property, public bicycle plays an important role in constructing low-carbon traffic, improving urban environment and alleviating traffic congestion. The inevitable demand of an environment-friendly society. In this paper, the public bicycle system is divided into two kinds: the public bicycle system with a pile and the public bicycle system without a pile, among which the public bicycle system with a pile is the public bicycle system supported by the municipal government. The pile-free public bicycle system refers to the recent emergence of shared bikes on the market. The information asymmetry exists in the public bicycle system with and without piles, and the problems between the public bicycle system with and without piles are different. This paper analyzes the new institutional economics from the perspective of principal-agent and incomplete contract. In the public bicycle system, the public bicycle service mainly involves the public, the government and the operating enterprises, and there is a double principal-agent relationship between them. In the implicit principal-agent relationship between the public and the government, the public does not supervise the incentive of the government because the group is too dispersed, and the government has the tendency to enlarge the scale and occupy more resources. In the principal-agent relationship between government and enterprise, there are differences on the amount of subsidy between them because of their different utility functions. As an information advantage, companies have an incentive to "rip off" in order to demand more subsidies from the government. This paper analyzes and discusses the problem of information asymmetry and puts forward some relevant measures to solve it. In the pile-free public bicycle system, the enterprise self-financing, bear the risk alone. What is different from the public bicycle system is that the tripartite principal-agent relationship disappears and is replaced by the direct market relationship between enterprises and consumers, and the government turns into the maintainer and regulator of market order. The public is no longer the principal of the government, the government is no longer the agent of the public, and the principal-agent relationship between the public and the government no longer exists. Similarly, the principal-agent relationship between business and government naturally disappears, and the government no longer subsidizes business. In the process of operation, the enterprise actually signs a short-term lease contract with the consumer, the consumer is the information advantage party, the enterprise is the information inferior party. Consumers have the incentive to default in order to maximize their own interests, which can have an impact on corporate earnings. After analyzing the profit of the enterprise, it is found that the abnormal loss rate of bicycle (caused by the default of consumers) seriously affects the normal operation of the enterprise. Finally, according to the above analysis put forward the relevant recommendations, enterprises and governments need to take measures to reduce consumer damage to enterprises, in order to promote the sharing of bicycle industry better development.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F572

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