道路交通客运企业产权博弈分析与产权制度改革研究
发布时间：2019-03-25 17:38
【摘要】：道路交通客运作为一个为旅客提供服务的产业,是一个特殊的物质生产部门,与工业、农业相比,除具有一般共同特点外,还有自己的特点,表现在：其产品只有通过位移才有可能成为商品,在产品的位移过程中,运输消耗了大量的人力和物力；道路交通客运投资大,建设周期长,往往具有公共设施的性质,对国家经济社会发展有较大影响；道路客运行业具有自身高危、高风险,点多面广战线长的特性,导致企业安全监管工作困难等。 产权明晰是建立现代企业制度,提升企业绩效的关键。道路交通客运企业效率不高的原因,很大程度上在于车辆、班线经营等产权不明晰。由于历史原因和资金限制等因素,我国道路交通客运企业中挂靠车辆在运营车辆中占很大比重。挂靠经营模式在一定程度上是行业安全事故频发、道路运输市场混乱的诱因。车辆产权改革涉及道路交通客运企业和车主的经济利益,关系到乘客接受客运服务的质量和水平,意义十分重大。因而,道路交通客运企业的改革应当以明晰产权为中心,通过产权改革提高资源利用率,进而提高企业效率,建立现代企业制度。 通过对相关文献的查阅发现,国内学者对客运企业车辆产权研究的文献更多的是经验总结和政策建议,缺乏理论和实证分析；而由于体制不同等原因,国外道路交通客运企业似乎没有出现车辆、班线经营等产权问题,目前没有此方向的国外研究文献。 本文基于导师的研究项目“道路交通客运企业现代管理体系及创新机制建设研究”——昭交集团产权制度改革子课题,构建昭交集团产权结构优化方案。本文以产权相关理论为基础,分析道路交通客运企业涉及的相关产权和产权博弈现象,着重分析客运企业亟待改革的车辆产权问题及车辆产权制度改革可能面临的障碍；利用博弈理论分析车辆产权改革涉及的相关行为主体及其利益取向,分别构建博弈方具有完全理性假设条件下的完全信息动态博弈模型和博弈方具有有限理性假设条件下的演化博弈模型；在案例分析中根据昭交集团车辆产权的实际情况估算演化博弈模型中涉及的相关参数,得出产权改革方案中客运企业与车主的利益分配比例范围。据此,设计符合昭交集团实际的车辆产权改革方案,包括：融资提成方案、产权转移方案、八年过渡期满解除挂靠方案,希望为其他客运企业的车辆产权改革提供有益借鉴。
[Abstract]:Road traffic passenger transport, as an industry providing services to passengers, is a special material production department. Compared with industry and agriculture, it has its own characteristics in addition to the common characteristics. Its product can be a commodity only through displacement, in the process of product displacement, transportation consumes a lot of manpower and material resources; The road traffic passenger transportation investment is big, the construction cycle is long, often has the public facility nature, has the great influence to the national economic and social development; Road passenger transport industry has its own high-risk, multi-faceted and long-term characteristics, leading to the difficult work of safety supervision of enterprises and so on. Clear property right is the key to establish modern enterprise system and improve enterprise performance. The reason for the low efficiency of road traffic passenger transport enterprises lies in the unclear property rights such as vehicle, line operation and so on. Due to historical reasons and capital constraints, the hanging vehicles in our country's road traffic passenger transport enterprises account for a large proportion in the operation of the vehicles. Depend on the business model to a certain extent is the industry safety accidents occur frequently, road transportation market chaos inducement. The reform of vehicle property rights involves the economic interests of road traffic passenger transport enterprises and vehicle owners, and it is of great significance to the quality and level of passenger service accepted by passengers. Therefore, the reform of road traffic passenger transport enterprises should focus on clarifying the property rights, improve the utilization rate of resources through the reform of property rights, and then improve the efficiency of enterprises and establish the modern enterprise system. Through the review of the relevant literature, it is found that the domestic scholars' research literature on vehicle property rights of passenger transport enterprises is more empirical summary and policy recommendations, lack of theoretical and empirical analysis; However, due to different systems, there seems to be no property rights problems in foreign road traffic passenger transport enterprises, such as vehicle, line operation, etc. At present, there is no foreign research literature in this direction. Based on the tutor's research project "Research on the Construction of Modern Management system and Innovation Mechanism of Road Traffic passenger Transport Enterprises"-the sub-topic of property right system reform of Zhaojiao Group, this paper constructs the optimization scheme of the property right structure of Zhaojiao Group. Based on the theory of property rights, this paper analyzes the related property rights and property rights game phenomena involved in road traffic passenger transport enterprises, and emphatically analyzes the problems of vehicle property rights which need to be reformed in passenger transport enterprises and the obstacles that the reform of vehicle property rights system may face. The game theory is used to analyze the related actors involved in the reform of vehicle property rights and their interest orientation. The dynamic game model of complete information under the assumption of complete rationality and the evolutionary game model of game party with finite rationality are constructed respectively. According to the actual situation of Zhaojiao Group's vehicle property right, the relevant parameters involved in the evolutionary game model are estimated in the case analysis, and the range of benefit distribution ratio between passenger transport enterprise and owner in the property right reform scheme is obtained. According to this, the paper designs the vehicle property right reform plan which accords with the actual situation of Zhaojiao Group, including: the financing profit scheme, the property right transfer scheme, the eight-year transition period, and the unattached scheme, hoping to provide useful reference for the vehicle property right reform of other passenger transport enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：昆明理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F512.6
本文编号：2447177
[Abstract]:Road traffic passenger transport, as an industry providing services to passengers, is a special material production department. Compared with industry and agriculture, it has its own characteristics in addition to the common characteristics. Its product can be a commodity only through displacement, in the process of product displacement, transportation consumes a lot of manpower and material resources; The road traffic passenger transportation investment is big, the construction cycle is long, often has the public facility nature, has the great influence to the national economic and social development; Road passenger transport industry has its own high-risk, multi-faceted and long-term characteristics, leading to the difficult work of safety supervision of enterprises and so on. Clear property right is the key to establish modern enterprise system and improve enterprise performance. The reason for the low efficiency of road traffic passenger transport enterprises lies in the unclear property rights such as vehicle, line operation and so on. Due to historical reasons and capital constraints, the hanging vehicles in our country's road traffic passenger transport enterprises account for a large proportion in the operation of the vehicles. Depend on the business model to a certain extent is the industry safety accidents occur frequently, road transportation market chaos inducement. The reform of vehicle property rights involves the economic interests of road traffic passenger transport enterprises and vehicle owners, and it is of great significance to the quality and level of passenger service accepted by passengers. Therefore, the reform of road traffic passenger transport enterprises should focus on clarifying the property rights, improve the utilization rate of resources through the reform of property rights, and then improve the efficiency of enterprises and establish the modern enterprise system. Through the review of the relevant literature, it is found that the domestic scholars' research literature on vehicle property rights of passenger transport enterprises is more empirical summary and policy recommendations, lack of theoretical and empirical analysis; However, due to different systems, there seems to be no property rights problems in foreign road traffic passenger transport enterprises, such as vehicle, line operation, etc. At present, there is no foreign research literature in this direction. Based on the tutor's research project "Research on the Construction of Modern Management system and Innovation Mechanism of Road Traffic passenger Transport Enterprises"-the sub-topic of property right system reform of Zhaojiao Group, this paper constructs the optimization scheme of the property right structure of Zhaojiao Group. Based on the theory of property rights, this paper analyzes the related property rights and property rights game phenomena involved in road traffic passenger transport enterprises, and emphatically analyzes the problems of vehicle property rights which need to be reformed in passenger transport enterprises and the obstacles that the reform of vehicle property rights system may face. The game theory is used to analyze the related actors involved in the reform of vehicle property rights and their interest orientation. The dynamic game model of complete information under the assumption of complete rationality and the evolutionary game model of game party with finite rationality are constructed respectively. According to the actual situation of Zhaojiao Group's vehicle property right, the relevant parameters involved in the evolutionary game model are estimated in the case analysis, and the range of benefit distribution ratio between passenger transport enterprise and owner in the property right reform scheme is obtained. According to this, the paper designs the vehicle property right reform plan which accords with the actual situation of Zhaojiao Group, including: the financing profit scheme, the property right transfer scheme, the eight-year transition period, and the unattached scheme, hoping to provide useful reference for the vehicle property right reform of other passenger transport enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：昆明理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F512.6
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