控制权与现金流权分离对盈余稳健性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-06 07:36

本文选题：盈余稳健性　切入点：控制权与现金流权分离　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2008年美国次贷危机爆发，进而引发全球性的金融危机。公允价值计量属性受到质疑，稳健性原则在会计学界引起广泛的关注。在我国，稳健性原则经历了从无到有，由弱到强的过程，但是我国上市公司采用激进的会计政策来粉饰利润的现象仍然比较常见。尽管国外就稳健性原则展开了深入广泛的研究，并取得了一系列研究成果，但我国经济体制和制度环境与国外存在较大的不同，我国资本市场上各方面的制度设计还很不完善，，比如投资者法律保护程度偏低，企业内部治理结构不合理等等。在我国特殊的制度背景下，探讨集中股权结构下两权分离——控制权和现金流权分离对盈余稳健性的影响，可以进一步深化盈余稳健性的动因解说，为集中股权结构下控股股东侵占中小股东利益，并可能进一步损害会计信息质量提供实证依据，也有利于我们正确认识我国新企业会计准则适度引入公允价值的前提下，进一步强化稳健性原则应用的原因，为评价我国会计制度变迁提供客观依据。本文首先介绍了不完全契约理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和公司治理理论等理论基础和金字塔集中股权结构、股权分置改革、新企业会计准则发布等制度背景。其次，从理论角度深入探讨了两权分离对盈余稳健性的影响、现金流权的激励作用以及控股股东性质不同对盈余稳健性的不同影响，并根据理论分析提出研究假设。再次，采用盈余/股价反向回归模型，以2007~2011年我国沪深A股主板上市公司为样本，实证检验了两权分离、现金流权和控股股东性质对盈余稳健性的影响。实证研究结果表明：控股股东的两权分离显著地降低了盈余稳健性，而现金流权具有激励效应，能够显著增强企业的盈余稳健性；从控股股东性质来看，较之非国有控股上市公司而言，国有控股上市公司的盈余稳健性更弱；进一步研究发现，国有控股上市公司的两权分离对盈余稳健性的损害作用更强，现金流权的激励作用也更强。最后，根据实证结果，本文从优化上市公司股权结构、加强债务治理功能和完善会计盈余为基础的监管和评价制度三个方面提出相应的政策建议，以期促进上市公司提供更稳健的会计信息。
[Abstract]:In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis broke out in the United States, which led to the global financial crisis. The fair value measurement property was questioned, and the conservatism principle aroused widespread concern in the accounting field. In China, the conservatism principle has experienced from scratch to existence. The process from weak to strong, but the phenomenon that listed companies in our country use radical accounting policies to whitewash profits is still quite common. Although abroad has carried out in-depth and extensive research on the principle of conservatism, and has made a series of research results. However, the economic system and institutional environment of our country are quite different from those of foreign countries. The institutional design in various aspects of our capital market is not perfect, for example, the degree of legal protection of investors is on the low side. Under the special system background of our country, this paper discusses the influence of the separation of two rights on the stability of earnings under the structure of concentrated ownership, that is, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, and so on. It can further deepen the explanation of the motivation of earnings conservatism, and provide an empirical basis for controlling shareholders to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders under the structure of concentrated equity, and may further damage the quality of accounting information. It is also helpful for us to correctly understand the reasonable introduction of fair value to the accounting standards of new enterprises in our country, further strengthen the reasons for the application of conservatism, and provide an objective basis for evaluating the changes of accounting system in our country. This paper first introduces the theories of incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, as well as pyramid centralized ownership structure, split share structure reform, etc. Secondly, it discusses the influence of the separation of two rights on earnings conservatism, the incentive function of cash flow right and the different influence of controlling shareholders' nature on earnings conservatism. And put forward the research hypothesis according to the theoretical analysis. Thirdly, using the earnings / stock price reverse regression model, taking China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares main board listed companies as the sample from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically tests the separation of the two rights. The empirical results show that the separation of the two rights of the controlling shareholder significantly reduces the earnings robustness, while the cash flow right has the incentive effect. From the perspective of the nature of controlling shareholders, the earnings robustness of state-owned holding listed companies is weaker than that of non-state-owned holding listed companies. The separation of the two rights of state-owned holding listed companies has a stronger damage to the robustness of earnings and a stronger incentive to the right of cash flow. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper tries to optimize the equity structure of listed companies. Strengthening the function of debt management and perfecting the supervision and evaluation system based on accounting earnings, this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions in order to promote the listed companies to provide more stable accounting information.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F233

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