公允价值变动对高管薪酬的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 16:13

本文选题：公允价值变动　切入点：会计业绩　出处：《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：2007年1月1日我国财政部颁布了与国际会计准则(IFRS)实质趋同的《企业会计准则》(2006),其中特别引人关注的就是积极、谨慎地引入公允价值计量属性,其中17项具体准则都应用到了公允价值计量属性,以提高会计信息质量,增强会计相关性。本文以契约观为出发点,旨在研究公允价值变动对高管薪酬的影响。文章的理论部分首先界定了相关概念,评述了现有文献,接着以委托代理理论、会计契约理论以及激励理论为基础构建分析框架：公允价值计量属性的应用,方面增加了会计业绩信息的契约有用性,能够更好地反映出高管能力与努力程度,提高了高管薪酬契约的激励作用；另一方面,也可能加剧高管怠惰行为,增加高管薪酬与会计业绩的不对称性,降低高管薪酬契约的约束作用。文章的实证部分选取2009年—2012年受公允价值计量属性影响的A股非金融保险行业上市公司为样本,通过“薪酬—业绩”相关性模型和不对称性模型,检验公允价值变动的高管薪酬业绩相关性及不对称性。实证结果表明,公允价值计量在增量意义上提高了会计业绩与高管薪酬之间的契约相关性,对高管薪酬契约的激励效果起到了积极的促进作用：在资本市场较为稳定的条件下,公司业绩与高管薪酬的不对称性在以公允价值计量的会计业绩层面同样存在。相比以往研究,本文存在三个创新点：第一,在研究视角的选取上,本文通过研究现行准则中公允价值的运用对于企业高管薪酬契约的影响,从契约观的角度探究公允价值会计的经济后果；第二,在研究对象的选取上,本文不但研究“公允价值变动损益”,也将“直接计入资本公积的公允价值变动”纳入研究范围；第三,在研究样本的选取上,本文选取2009—2012年四年的数据进行分析,更准确全面地评价公允价值引入对高管薪酬契约的影响。
[Abstract]:On January 1, 2007, the Ministry of Finance of our country promulgated the "Accounting Standards for Enterprises" that converge substantially with the International Accounting Standards (IFRSs). Among them, what attracts special attention is the positive and careful introduction of fair value measurement attributes. 17 of them are applied to fair value measurement to improve the quality of accounting information and enhance accounting relevance. Based on the contract view, this paper aims to study the influence of fair value change on executive compensation. In the theoretical part of the article, we define the relevant concepts, comment on the existing literature, and then use the principal-agent theory. On the basis of accounting contract theory and incentive theory, this paper constructs an analytical framework: the application of fair value measurement attribute increases the contractual usefulness of accounting performance information, and can better reflect the executive ability and effort. On the other hand, it may aggravate executive idleness and increase the asymmetry between executive pay and accounting performance. The empirical part of this paper selects A-share non-financial insurance industry listed companies affected by fair value measurement attribute as samples from 2009 to 2012. The correlation model of compensation and performance and asymmetry model are used to test the correlation and asymmetry of executive compensation performance with fair value change. Fair value measurement improves the contractual correlation between accounting performance and executive compensation in incremental sense, and plays a positive role in promoting the incentive effect of executive compensation contract: under the condition of stable capital market, The asymmetry between corporate performance and executive compensation also exists at the level of accounting performance measured at fair value. Compared with previous studies, there are three innovations in this paper: first, in the perspective of the study, this paper studies the impact of fair value on the executive compensation contract in the current standards. This paper explores the economic consequences of fair value accounting from the point of view of contract. Secondly, in the selection of research objects, this paper not only studies the "gains and losses of changes in fair value", but also brings "the change of fair value directly into the capital reserve" into the scope of the study. Thirdly, in the research sample selection, this paper selects the 2009-2012 four years data to carry on the analysis, more accurately and comprehensively evaluates the fair value introduction to the executive compensation contract influence.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F233

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