上市商业银行内部控制与盈余管理相关性分析

发布时间：2018-05-07 08:48

本文选题：商业银行 + 内部控制质量　；参考：《广西师范大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：自上个世纪到现在,世界各地上市企业财务舞弊、会计信息失真情况多有出现,奥林巴斯案例、绿大地案例、万福生科案例更是不断刺激我们的神经,监管机构更是不断更新内部监控法规以强化各行各业公司的内部控制机制,学者们对内部控制的研究层出不穷。有些悲剧事件的发生是因为违反相关法规造成的,有些则不然,而是公司高管为了内部利益过度的盈余管理行为导致的。盈余管理行为一直是财务管理理论和实务的热门话题,有些学者认为盈余管理合法合规,在国家允许范围之内无可厚非；而有些学者则认为过度的盈余管理行为势必导致财务信息质量的下降,误导财务报表使用者,影响投资者合理决策,久而久之将企业引入歧途而不知返。因此企业应该建立一种能够规范企业行为、引导员工合规操作、监督交易业务的制度,即内部控制制度,有效防止企业不合理行为。上个世纪,国内外学者纷纷通过理论和实证研究来验证内部控制质量和盈余管理是否存在相关性的问题,一些学者如Doyle (2007)通过搜集数据进行研究验证,推出内部控制质量越低将导致会计信息质量越差的结论。不过大量的数据分析和实证研究都局限于非银行机构,可能由于上市商业银行在证监会和相关监管机构的监管之下能够具有较高的内控质量,因而使得银行业内控质量不具有研究性。但是我们看到商业银行在经济发展中发挥着不可限量的作用,是经济发展的纽带。《中国金融稳定报告2013》的颁布实施标志着我国“存款保险制度”和“银行破产法”的即将出台,这无疑是对我国银行业一次巨大挑战和更高希望。同时商业银行由于其特殊性,具有超出一般工商企业的风险,受经济环境影响较大,属于高风险行业。而且外部投资者或者社会大众由于自身的能力局限和信息的不对称对商业银行的考量都是“雾里看花”,并不能深入银行进行相关了解；外部审计机构只有在受委托情况下才会对商业银行进行审查,而委托-代理的关系势必给审计的独立性蒙上一层纱。在人们都“仰望”商业银行的时候,英国巴林银行因为内部控制缺陷带来的倒闭轰动了世界,也打破了银行不倒的神话,引起各界对银行内部控制的思考。而银行盈余管理的行为也始见报端,需要强有力的内部控制制度进行约束,防止悲剧的再次发生。不过商业银行内部控制能否抑制其盈余管理行为还是一个亟待考证的问题,本文正是通过搜集相关数据进行实证分析,对这一假设进行验证。本论文划分为五部分内容,第一部分内容对选题意义和相关文献进行描述；第二部分分别从商业银行盈余管理、内部控制和二者相关性三个角度分析了理论基础；第三部分研究假设与设计,提出假设并对数据和模型的选取；第四部分进行实证分析；最后一个部分针对实证结论给出相关建议。本文在衡量商业银行盈余管理程度时候借鉴各界学者模型,针对商业银行盈余管理的特殊性,选择了在陆建桥的扩展Jones模型基础上进行适当改进,将应收账款的增加额改成应收利息来度量盈余管理程度。内部控制质量的度量按照信号传递理论选择ICQ作为为指标。本文搜集了2007-2012年我国16家上市商业银行的相关数据进行整理,通过加入总资产净利率、资产负债率等数据进行回归分析,从而揭示上市商业银行内控质量与盈余管理行为是否具有关系。研究结果证明：第一,上市商业银行内部控制质量的高低会影响其盈余管理水平；第二,上市商业银行盈余管理程度的高低受公司治理结构合理与否的影响。
[Abstract]:From the last century to the present, the financial fraud of the listed companies in the world and the distortion of accounting information have appeared. The OLYMPUS case, the green land case, and the case of the Wanfu department are constantly stimulating our nerves, and the regulators are constantly updating the internal control laws and regulations to strengthen the internal control mechanism of all walks of life. Some of the tragic events are caused by the violation of relevant laws and regulations, and some are not the result of the excessive earnings management behavior of the company's executives for internal interests. The earnings management behavior has always been a hot topic in the theory and practice of financial management, and some scholars believe that the earnings management is legal compliance, Some scholars believe that excessive earnings management will lead to the decline in the quality of financial information, mislead the users of financial statements, affect the rational decision of the investors, and lead the enterprise into the wrong way for a long time, so the enterprise should establish a kind of ability to standardize the behavior of the enterprise and guide the staff. In the last century, scholars at home and abroad have verified the problem of whether the quality of internal control and the management of earnings are relevant. Some scholars, such as Doyle (2007), have done research and verification through collecting data. The lower the quality of internal control, the worse the quality of accounting information will be.
However, a large number of data analysis and empirical research are limited to non bank institutions, which may cause the quality of internal control of the listed commercial banks under the supervision of the Securities Regulatory Commission and the relevant regulatory agencies. Therefore, the quality of the internal control of the banking industry is not of research. But we see that the commercial banks are playing an important role in the economic development. The effect of limited quantity is the bond of economic development. The promulgation and implementation of China's financial stability report 2013> marks the upcoming introduction of the "deposit insurance system" and "Bank Bankruptcy Law" in China. This is undoubtedly a great challenge and higher hope for our banking industry. At the same time, the commercial bank is more special than the general business enterprise. Risk is highly affected by the economic environment, and it belongs to high risk industry. Besides, the external investors or the social masses are "looking at the flowers" for commercial banks because of their own limitations and information asymmetry, which can not be deeply understood by the banks; the external audit institutions will only have commercial Silver under the circumstances of entrustment. When people are looking up to the commercial banks, the Bank of Bahrain, when people are all "looking up" to commercial banks, caused the collapse of the world because of the failure of the internal control defects. It also breaks the myth of the bank's failure and causes the thinking of the internal control of the banks in all circles. And the bank surplus management. A strong internal control system needs a strong internal control system to prevent the tragedy from happening again. However, whether the internal control of commercial banks can restrain its earnings management is still an urgent problem. This paper is to verify the hypothesis through the collection of relevant data.
This paper is divided into five parts. The first part describes the significance of the topic and the related literature; the second part analyses the theoretical basis from three angles: the earnings management of commercial banks, the internal control and the correlation of the two parties; the third part studies the hypothesis and design, and the selection of the data and the model, and the fourth part. Empirical analysis is carried out; the last part gives relevant recommendations for empirical conclusions.
In this paper, when measuring the degree of earnings management of commercial banks, we use the model of scholars from all walks of life. In view of the particularity of the earnings management of commercial banks, we choose the appropriate improvement on the basis of the extended Jones model of Lu Jian bridge to measure the increase of accounts receivable to the interest rate to measure earnings management. The measurement of the quality of internal control is based on the letter. The number transfer theory selects ICQ as the index. This paper collects the relevant data of 16 listed commercial banks in China for 2007-2012 years. The data of total assets net interest rate and asset liability ratio are analyzed by regression analysis to reveal whether the internal control quality of the listed commercial banks is related to the earnings management behavior. First, the quality of the internal control of the listed commercial banks will affect the level of earnings management; second, the degree of earnings management of the listed commercial banks is affected by the reasonable or not the corporate governance structure.

【学位授予单位】：广西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F830.42;F832.33

【参考文献】