会计师事务所财务尽职调查业务刍议

发布时间：2018-05-15 01:15

本文选题：会计师事务所 + 财务尽职调查　；参考：《财政部财政科学研究所》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着社会主义市场经济的逐步建立和完善,我国企业并购重组等投资行为越来越普遍,而投资运作顺利进行的基础是对商业市场、资本市场和企业经营的全方位周密考察,所有这些考察的内容归根结底都是属于被投资公司的一种信息。如果投资双方在对包括财务信息在内的目标公司有关情况存在理解上的偏差,无疑会面临很高的风险。财务尽职调查作为投资活动中一项重要的工作,对减少投资双方的信息不对称至关重要。从目前已有的案例来看,当前我国投资运作的成功率并不算高。这背后的原因有很多,但在投资运作时,缺乏有效的财务尽职调查却是一个不容忽视的原因。纵观国内外已有的财务尽职调查研究,多是从实务角度对财务尽职调查的流程方法改进和存在合理性进行探究。这是因为会计师事务所的财务尽职调查业务本身就是一项具有很强实践性的工作,所以从理论上对其分析具有一定的难度。本文试图将微观信息经济学的有关理论与财务尽职调查业务相联系,运用非合作博弈分析方法证明在财务尽职调查缺失的情形下投资双方财务信息不对称出现的必然性。并论证财务尽职调查对缓解投资过程中的财务信息不对称影响所具有的重要意义,以期加快会计师事务所财务尽职调查业务在我国的发展。本文首先回顾了与财务尽职调查相关的基础理论,然后从整体财务报表和具体会计事项的维度对企业并购重组等投资过程中信息不对称出现的必然性进行考察。并运用非合作博弈的有关分析方法,考察了投资双方和被投资者之间两个维度在财务尽职调查缺失的情形下的占优策略,证明财务尽职调查所导致的信息不对称将产生柠檬问题,引起市场失灵,从而造成经济福利的减少。本文的研究证明了,会计师事务所财务尽职调查业务可以缓解整体财务报表和具体会计事项所造成的财务信息不对称问题,并影响投资双方在非合作博弈中的占优策略,产生帕累托改进。所以在企业进行并购重组等投资活动时,会计师事务所的财务尽职调查可以帮助投资方减少与被投资方之间的信息不对称劣势。财务尽职调查对帮助投资方做出恰当合理的投资决策意义重大。
[Abstract]:With the gradual establishment and improvement of the socialist market economy, investment activities such as mergers and acquisitions and reorganization of enterprises in our country are becoming more and more common. The basis for the smooth operation of investment is a comprehensive and thorough examination of the commercial market, the capital market and the operation of enterprises. The content of all these investigations is ultimately a kind of information belonging to the invested company. If there is a deviation in understanding the situation of the target company, including financial information, there is no doubt that the investors will face a high risk. As an important part of investment activities, financial due diligence is very important to reduce the information asymmetry between investors. From the current existing cases, the current investment operation success rate is not high. There are many reasons behind this, but the lack of effective financial due diligence is an important reason for investment operations. Most of the researches on financial due diligence at home and abroad are focused on the improvement of financial due diligence process and the rationality of its existence from the practical point of view. This is because the financial due diligence of the accounting firm itself is a very practical work, so it is difficult to analyze it theoretically. This paper attempts to link the relevant theories of micro-information economics with the financial due diligence business, and uses the non-cooperative game analysis method to prove the inevitability of asymmetric financial information between investors and investors in the absence of financial due diligence. It also demonstrates the importance of financial due diligence in alleviating the asymmetric influence of financial information in the process of investment in order to accelerate the development of financial due diligence in China. This paper first reviews the basic theories related to financial due diligence, and then examines the inevitability of asymmetric information in the process of investment such as M & A from the perspective of the overall financial statements and specific accounting items. Using the analysis method of non-cooperative game, the dominant strategy of the two dimensions between the investor and the investor in the absence of financial due diligence is investigated. Proving that the information asymmetry caused by financial due diligence will lead to lemon problem, market failure, and thus reduce economic welfare. The research in this paper proves that the financial due diligence business of accounting firms can alleviate the asymmetry of financial information caused by the overall financial statements and specific accounting events, and affect the dominant strategy of both parties in non-cooperative game. Produce Pareto improvements. So the financial due diligence of accounting firms can help the investors to reduce the disadvantage of information asymmetry between them. Financial due diligence is of great significance to help investors make appropriate and reasonable investment decisions.
【学位授予单位】：财政部财政科学研究所
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F233

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