CEO权利及变更、事务所行业专长与真实盈余管理

发布时间：2018-06-24 01:40

  本文选题：真实盈余管理 + 事务所行业专长　； 参考：《财会通讯》2013年24期

【摘要】：真实盈余管理是一种相对比较隐蔽的盈余管理方式,本文采用2008年至2011年上市公司的数据,研究上市公司CEO权利、CEO非正常变更和会计师事务所行业专长对于上市公司真实盈余管理的影响。结果显示:CEO变更与真实盈余管理显著正相关,CEO权利与上市公司真实盈余管理显著正相关,会计师事务所行业专长能够抑制上市公司的管理层的真实盈余管理行为。
[Abstract]:Real earnings management is a relatively hidden way of earnings management. This paper uses the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2011 to study the influence of CEO rights of listed companies, abnormal changes of CEO and professional expertise of accounting firms on the real earnings management of listed companies. The results show that the changes of CEO and real earnings management are significant positive. The CEO rights are positively related to the real earnings management of the listed companies, and the professional expertise of the accounting firms can inhibit the real earnings management behavior of the listed companies' management.
【作者单位】： 中南财经政法大学会计学院;
【分类号】：F233
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本文编号：2059402