基于在线评分和网络效应的应用软件定价策略

发布时间：2018-06-29 03:48

本文选题：在线评分 + 网络效应　；参考：《管理科学》2013年04期

【摘要】：在线评分可以为用户提供更多的产品信息,同时评分人数的多少也会影响用户效用。以APP Store、Android Market等平台上的应用软件为研究对象,以信息产品定价理论和博弈论为理论基础,通过建立两阶段的经济学模型,研究在线评分机制和信息产品网络效应的共同作用下垄断应用软件开发者的最优产品定价策略。研究结果表明,当软件质量低于用户事前期望、评分传递的质量信号较真实时,若网络效应强度较小,则软件定价应先高后低;若网络效应强度较大,则前期应该低价,甚至免费,以吸引更多用户,后期高价获利。当软件质量不低于用户事前期望、评分会限制高质量软件的信号传递时,用户只能通过评分推测软件质量等于其期望质量,因此最优质量策略等于用户期望质量。最后,探讨评分区间的局限性和弊端,软件开发者需要通过平台推广等策略提高用户的支付意愿,达到利润最大化。
[Abstract]:Online rating can provide users with more product information, and the number of ratings will also affect the utility of users. Based on the information product pricing theory and game theory, a two-stage economic model is established with the application software of app Storeen Android Market as the research object, and the information product pricing theory and game theory as the theoretical basis. This paper studies the optimal pricing strategy of monopolized application software developers under the joint action of online scoring mechanism and information product network effect. The results show that when the software quality is lower than the user's prior expectation, the quality signal transmitted by the score is true and real time. If the network effect intensity is small, the software pricing should be high first and then low, and if the network effect intensity is high, the early stage should be low. Even free to attract more users, late high-priced profit. When the software quality is not lower than the user's prior expectation and the score will restrict the signal transmission of the high-quality software, the user can only speculate that the software quality is equal to its expected quality by scoring, so the optimal quality strategy is equal to the user's expected quality. Finally, the limitations and drawbacks of the scoring interval are discussed. Software developers need to improve the user's willingness to pay through platform promotion to maximize the profit.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71132005)~~
【分类号】：F426.672;F406.72

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