终极所有权结构、投资者法律保护与会计稳健性

发布时间：2018-08-21 10:55

【摘要】：会计稳健性是财务会计的一项重要惯例,是会计确认和计量的一项基本原则,它存在并影响会计实践已经有几百年的历史。终极所有权的出现始于La Port et al.(1999),他们用终极控制股东的投票权和所有权来分别代表其控制权和现金流权,并指出控股股东可以通过金字塔结构、交叉持股和多重股份等控制权安排来实现控制权与现金流权的分离,并以小股东利益为代价来获得私有收益,其侵占行为加剧了控股股东和小股东的代理冲突。从此以后,关于终极所有权结构的相关研究拉开了帷幕。我国是一个处于转轨时期的新兴市场国家,具有股权高度集中、两权分离严重、法制环境和监管机制不完善等特点,会计做假频频出现,盈余信息含量不高。在如此特殊的制度背景下考察终极所有权结构、投资者法律保护与会计稳健性的关系在理论上和实践中都具有深远意义。本文运用2008～2011年在沪深A股上市公司的3788个样本的面板数据,从终极所有权结构视角研究了终极所有权结构与会计稳健性的关系,并引入外部治理环境即投资者法律保护,进一步分析了在中国特殊制度背景下投资者法律保护对会计稳健性的影响,以及我国上市公司的终极控股股东的两权分离度与投资者法律保护对会计稳健性的交互影响。研究发现：(1)终极控股股东的现金流权与会计稳健性之间不存在显著的关系；(2)终极控股股东的控制权和现金流权分离度与会计稳健性显著负相关；(3)国有控股的上市公司会计稳健性比非国有控股的上市公司会计稳健性更高；(4)投资者法律保护水平越高,会计稳健性越高；(5)有效的投资者法律保护可以削弱终极控股股东控制权与现金流权分离度对会计稳健性的负面影响。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important convention of financial accounting and a basic principle of accounting recognition and measurement. It has existed and influenced accounting practice for hundreds of years. The emergence of ultimate ownership began in La Port et al. (1999. They used the voting rights and ownership rights of ultimate controlling shareholders to represent their control rights and cash flow rights, respectively, and pointed out that controlling shareholders could pass through the pyramid structure. The separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private gains at the expense of minority shareholders' interests have aggravated the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders through the arrangement of control rights such as cross-shareholding and multiple shares. Since then, the relevant research on the ultimate ownership structure has begun. China is an emerging market country in the transitional period, with the characteristics of high concentration of stock rights, serious separation of two rights, imperfect legal environment and supervision mechanism, frequent accounting fraud and low information content of earnings. Under such a special institutional background, the relationship between investor legal protection and accounting conservatism is of profound significance both in theory and in practice. Using the panel data of 3788 samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2011, this paper studies the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and accounting conservatism from the perspective of ultimate ownership structure, and introduces the external governance environment, that is, investor legal protection. This paper further analyzes the influence of investor legal protection on accounting conservatism under the background of Chinese special system, and the interaction between the separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in China and the legal protection of investors on accounting conservatism. The results show that: (1) there is no significant relationship between the cash flow right and accounting conservatism of the ultimate controlling shareholder; (2) the separation of the control right and cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholder is negatively related to the accounting conservatism. (3) the accounting conservatism of the state-owned holding listed company is higher than that of the non-state-owned holding company, (4) the higher the level of investor legal protection, the higher the accounting conservatism; (5) effective legal protection of investors can weaken the negative influence on accounting conservatism caused by the separation of controlling right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F275;F276.6

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