我国旅游业上市公司股权结构与代理成本关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 16:12

本文选题：代理成本 + 股权结构　；参考：《海南大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权结构一直是公司治理研究的核心问题,由股权结构引发的两类利益侵害也是学术界备受关注的重要论题。一类是股权结构高度分散的情况下,Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为代理成本是经营者与股东利益不完全一致造成的利益损失。二是股权结构较为集中的情况下,Shleifer与Vishny(1997)在前人的成果上明确指出大股东侵害中小股东的可能性。我国独特的制度背景致使这两种利益侵占即经理人代理成本(第一类代理成本)与控股股东代理成本(第二类代理成本)同时存在于一个上市公司,这使得综合研究股权结构与两类代理成本的关系成为可能。我国经济体制向市场经济转化的过程中,垄断行业改革必然要引入竞争机制,我国的相关政策也明确指出要进行市场化改革并积极引入竞争,旅游业作为垄断竞争行业,能为我国公司治理机制改革提供一些借鉴与启示。本文基于1998-2011年我国32家旅游业上市公司数据,分别研究股权结构对两类代理成本的作用机制和效果,并考虑两类代理问题的整合。研究发现：有控股股东的旅游业上市公司其代理成本显著低于无控股股东的旅游业上市公司；控股股东持股比例与代理成本存在显著的负相关关系；国有控股上市公司比私人控股上市公司的代理成本低；而对于董事会性质,董事长与经理人两职分离能起到降低代理成本的作用,但是董事会规模却对代理成本起支持作用。
[Abstract]:Ownership structure has always been the core issue in the research of corporate governance. The two kinds of interest infringement caused by ownership structure are also an important topic in academic circles. One is that when the ownership structure is highly dispersed, Jensen and Mecklinglinger think that agency cost is the loss of interest caused by the incongruity of the interests of managers and shareholders. The second is that Shleifer and Vishny1997 clearly point out the possibility of large shareholders encroaching on minority shareholders on the basis of previous achievements. Because of the unique institutional background of our country, these two kinds of interests usurpation, that is, the agent cost of the manager (the first kind of agency cost) and the agency cost of the controlling shareholder (the second kind of agency cost) exist simultaneously in a listed company. This makes it possible to study the relationship between ownership structure and two kinds of agency cost. In the process of transforming our country's economic system to market economy, the reform of monopoly industry is bound to introduce competition mechanism. The relevant policies of our country also point out clearly that we should carry out market-oriented reform and actively introduce competition, and that tourism is the monopolistic competition industry. It can provide some reference and inspiration for the reform of corporate governance mechanism in China. Based on the data of 32 listed tourism companies in China from 1998 to 2011, this paper studies the mechanism and effect of equity structure on the two types of agency costs, and considers the integration of the two types of agency problems. It is found that the agency cost of tourism listed companies with controlling shareholders is significantly lower than that of tourism listed companies without controlling shareholders, and there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of controlling shareholders and agency costs. The agency cost of the state-owned listed company is lower than that of the private listed company. For the nature of the board of directors, the separation of the chairman and the manager can reduce the agency cost, but the size of the board of directors plays a supporting role in the agency cost.
【学位授予单位】：海南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F592.6

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