市场认证影响下农产品供应商生产行为的演化分析

发布时间：2018-03-07 11:22

本文选题：信任品　切入点：农产品　出处：《江南大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：信任属性是指消费者无论是在购买前,还是购买后都无法确切知道产品质量的一种产品特性。农产品的健康安全特性具备明显的信任属性,作为信任品的一种,农产品市场上存在的信息不对称问题尤为严重。认证制度作为一种有效的信号传递机制,在解决农产品供应商和消费者二者之间的信息不对称问题上,扮演着重要的角色。但是,在实际的生活中,认证市场上充斥着违规认证和合谋认证现象,认证农产品频频爆出质量安全事故。农产品质量安全关乎每一位公众的切身利益,近年来,国内外的专家学者对农产品认证市场领域进行一系列研究,本文基于认证机构存在违规认证和合谋认证行为的现实问题,对以下问题开展研究:认证机构的违规认证行为以及合谋认证行为产生的原因是什么?认证制度如何才能有效制约农产品供应商的投机主义行为?在认证制度失效的情况下,引进政府规制政策是否能够有效地改善市场失灵现象?规制有效的市场条件是什么?本文针对认证机构存在违规认证和合谋认证的现实,一方面通过构建演化博弈模型,分析认证机构的认证选择影响农产品供应商生产行为的机理;另一方面将政府规制手段引入认证市场,探讨政府补贴和罚款两种政策手段在改善认证市场失灵过程中的适用条件以及作用机理。研究得到以下管理启示:(1)当伪劣农产品认证花费的伪装成本相对较高时,在政府不干预的情况下,即使认证机构选择违规认证,农产品供应商也会选择生产合格产品,但是如果伪装成本较低,即使认证机构严格认证,认证制度无法起到制约农产品供应商机会主义行为的作用;(2)要确保市场上的认证机构合法履职,必须降低认证机构的认证成本,保证认证机构实现盈利。同时,认证制度要想起到制约农产品供应商机会主义行为的作用,必须辅助相关的规制措施,加大农产品供应商的期望损失,规避农产品供应商投机行为。(3)在存在自愿性认证制度的基础上,无论认证机构存在违规认证行为,还是合谋认证行为,政府通过进一步设立针对伪劣农产品供应商(合格农产品供应商)的罚款政策(补贴政策),当罚款额度(补贴额度)处于一个合理的范围内时,市场上所有的农产品供应商都会选择生产合格农产品。本文的研究旨在为政府在治理认证市场失效问题中提供有益的决策参考,从而有效地防范认证机构的违规认证和合谋认证行为,实现我国认证市场的发展与完善,避免农产品供应商提供伪劣农产品,最终保障消费者的健康安全。
[Abstract]:Trust attribute is a kind of product characteristic that consumers can not know exactly the product quality before or after purchase. The health and safety characteristics of agricultural products have obvious trust attribute, as one kind of trust products. The problem of information asymmetry in agricultural products market is especially serious. As an effective signal transmission mechanism, authentication system solves the problem of information asymmetry between agricultural product suppliers and consumers. However, in the actual life, the certification market is full of illegal certification and collusion certification phenomenon, certified agricultural products frequently burst out quality and safety accidents. The quality and safety of agricultural products is of vital interest to every public. In recent years, experts and scholars at home and abroad have carried out a series of studies in the field of agricultural product certification market. Conduct research on the following questions: what are the reasons for the illegal certification of certification bodies and the collusion certification behavior? How can the certification system effectively restrict the speculative behavior of agricultural product suppliers? In the case of the failure of the certification system, can the introduction of government regulation policies effectively improve the market failure? What are the market conditions for effective regulation? This paper aims at the reality that certification organization exists illegal certification and collusion certification. On the one hand, by constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the mechanism that certification selection of certification body affects the production behavior of agricultural product suppliers. On the other hand, it introduces the means of government regulation into the certification market. This paper discusses the applicable conditions and mechanism of government subsidies and fines in the process of improving the failure of certification market. The following management enlightenment is obtained: 1) when the cost of fake and inferior agricultural products certification is relatively high, In the case of non-intervention by the government, even if the certification body chooses the illegal certification, the agricultural product supplier will also choose to produce qualified products, but if the camouflage cost is lower, even if the certification body strictly authenticates, In order to ensure the legitimate performance of certification bodies in the market, it is necessary to reduce the certification costs of certification bodies and ensure that the certification bodies are profitable. At the same time, In order to think of the role of certification system in restricting the opportunistic behavior of agricultural product suppliers, it is necessary to supplement relevant regulatory measures and increase the expected losses of agricultural product suppliers. On the basis of the existence of voluntary certification system, regardless of whether the certification body has illegal certification behavior or collusion certification behavior, Through the further establishment of a fine policy (subsidy policy) for suppliers of fake and inferior agricultural products (qualified agricultural product suppliers), when the amount of fines (subsidies) is within a reasonable range, All agricultural products suppliers in the market will choose to produce qualified agricultural products. The purpose of this study is to provide a useful decision reference for the government in the governance of certification market failures. Therefore, it can effectively prevent the illegal certification and collusive certification of the certification agencies, realize the development and perfection of the certification market in China, avoid the supply of fake and inferior agricultural products by agricultural product suppliers, and finally ensure the health and safety of consumers.
【学位授予单位】：江南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F302.2;F307

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