非对称信息下退耕还林生态补偿契约设计研究

发布时间：2018-07-23 15:25

【摘要】：基于农户行为信息是否对称的视角,对退耕还林生态补偿契约设计及效率进行研究.结果显示,当农户行为信息对称时,不管造林产量高低,基层地方政府支付的生态补偿只能达到农户的保留效用.当农户行为信息不对称时,如果造林产量高,则农户获得超过保留效用的生态补偿;如果如果造林产量低,则农户获得低于保留效用的生态补偿.并且,基层地方政府需要支付比对称信息下更多的成本才能激励农户付出正努力水平.当农户付出正努力水平时,获得高造林产量的概率越高,则基层地方政府支付的生态补偿越接近对称信息下的补偿额度;当农户付出零努力水平时,获得高造林产量的概率越高,则基层地方政府支付的生态补偿越偏离对称信息下的补偿额度.
[Abstract]:Based on whether the farmer behavior information is symmetrical or not, this paper studies the design and efficiency of ecological compensation contract for returning cropland to forest. The results show that when the farmers' behavior information is symmetrical, the ecological compensation paid by the local governments at the grass-roots level can only achieve the reserve utility of the farmers, regardless of the afforestation yield. When the farmers' behavior information is asymmetric, if the afforestation yield is high, the farmers can get ecological compensation which exceeds the reserve utility, and if the afforestation yield is low, the farmers will get the ecological compensation which is lower than the reserved utility. Moreover, local governments need to pay more costs than under symmetrical information to encourage farmers to pay the positive level of effort. When farmers are paying positive efforts, the higher the probability of obtaining high afforestation yield, the closer the ecological compensation paid by grass-roots local governments is to the amount of compensation under symmetrical information; when farmers pay zero effort level, The higher the probability of obtaining high afforestation yield, the more offset the ecological compensation paid by grass-roots local government from the compensation under symmetrical information.
【作者单位】：丽水学院商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重点项目(15AJY004) 浙江省社科规划课题(14NDJC051YB) 丽水市高层次人才培养资助项目(2015RC17)
【分类号】：F323.22;F326.2;F812.8

【相似文献】