地方政府政绩考核对上市公司盈余管理影响实证研究
发布时间:2018-01-01 20:18
本文关键词:地方政府政绩考核对上市公司盈余管理影响实证研究 出处:《石河子大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:改革开放以来,地方政府的工作模式从“命令一执行”转变为财政分权,其对地方资源配置拥有政治和经济上的权威。上市公司通过资本市场进行资源配置的功能有助于地区经济的发展。因此,地方政府部门从追求政绩的视角出发,有动机也有能力通过财政税收等手段来帮助辖区内的上市公司进行盈余管理行为,另一方面,上市公司迫于地方政府索取政绩的压力,在正常经营不能完成任务的情况下,是否也会以盈余管理的方式主动迎合政府的需求。所以,本文认为,地方政府政绩考核对上市公司盈余管理的影响这一话题值得深入探讨。 本文以我国A股市场2007-2011年的地级市上市公司为样本,基于相关的理论和实证分析,得出以下主要结论:以GDP增长率为地方政府政绩衡量指标对企业真实盈余管理程度的确存在着显著影响。当地方政府面临政绩考核压力时,上市公司更倾向于进行采用异常现金流和异常可操纵性费用的方式进行真实盈余管理活动。一个地区的GDP增长越慢,该区居民对就业、收入和福利等相关的满意度也就越低,而这些指标的提升大都取决于本地区企业的发展水平,期望越高压力越大,然而,地方政府为追求政绩往往会把这些期望和压力转移给辖区内的企业尤其是效益较好的上市公司,若企业在该地区的经济影响力越低则相应的盈余管理程度越高。进一步考虑产权性质,虽然非国有企业更有动机进行正向的盈余管理,但是国有企业具有更好的条件进行盈余管理,因此综合发现,两者就进行盈余管理的倾向性来看并无显著差别。随后,按政府控制层级进一步划分国有企业,较之中央政府控制企业而言,地方政府在面临增长压力时,地方政府将其增长压力层层解压至其管辖区域的地方国有企业,进而使得GDP增长率与地方企业真实盈余管理程度显著相关。另外,由于区域经济发展不平衡,按东中西部行政区域进行划分,,经回归分析发现中部和东部地区影响更为显著。 在此基础上,本文对地方政府政绩考核体系提出了规范和改进的建议,同时认为加强上市公司信息披露监管的力度、完善相关的法律制度是控制盈余管理攫取私有收益的基本举措。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the local government work mode from "command execution" for the fiscal decentralization, the allocation of resources has the political and economic authority. The development of listed companies, the function of resource allocation is conducive to regional economy through the capital market. Therefore, the local government departments from the pursuit of perspective. Have the motivation and ability through the tax means to help within the jurisdiction of the listed company earnings management behavior of listed companies, on the other hand, under the local government for political pressure in normal operation can not be task conditions, will by means of earnings management initiative to meet the government's needs. So, this paper that influence of local government performance evaluation on earnings management of listed companies. This topic is worth discussing.
Based on China's A stock market listed companies in 2007-2011 city as samples, based on the theoretical and empirical analysis, the main conclusions are as follows: according to the growth rate of GDP for local government performance indicators on corporate real earnings management does exist significant influence. The local government is facing pressure performance evaluation, real earnings the management activities of listed companies are more inclined to adopt the abnormal cash flow and abnormal handling costs. An area of slower growth in GDP, residents in the area of employment, income and welfare related satisfaction is also lower, and these indicators depend mostly on local enterprises to enhance the level of development, expected the higher the pressure is, however, the local government for the pursuit of performance will tend to these expectations and pressure is transferred to the area of enterprise especially the benefit of listed companies, if the enterprise in the The higher the degree of earnings management in the economic impact of the lower accordingly. Further consideration of the nature of property rights, while non state-owned enterprises more motivation for earnings management is positive, but the state-owned enterprises have better conditions for earnings management, so that there is no significant difference between the two tendencies of view into earnings management. Then, according to the government control level are further divided into state-owned enterprises, the central government is the control of enterprises, the local government in the face of increasing pressure, the local government will increase its pressure upon decompression to its jurisdiction of local state-owned enterprises, thus making the growth rate of GDP was significantly associated with local enterprises real earnings management. In addition, due to the unbalanced development of regional economy, divided according to the administrative area of the eastern Midwest, by regression analysis found that the influence of the central and eastern regions is more significant.
On this basis, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improving and improving local government performance appraisal system. At the same time, it is considered that strengthening the supervision of information disclosure of listed companies and improving related legal systems are the basic measures to control earnings management and seize private benefits.
【学位授予单位】:石河子大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F275;D630
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