基于演化博弈的区域突发事件组织合作治理策略分析

发布时间：2018-02-28 15:33

本文关键词： 演化博弈区域突发事件合作治理社会资本　出处：《中国管理科学》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：伴随我国区域经济一体化进程的推进,区域性突发事件日益增多,组织合作治理成为区域地方政府的必然选择。本文针对区域突发事件合作治理,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了区域地方政府组织行为的演化过程,建立了考虑组织决策固定成本和组织社会资本的地方政府组织行为演化博弈模型,得到地方政府组织合作的行为演化规律和演化稳定策略,分析了地方政府组织行为演化路径的初始敏感性。研究结果表明,区域突发事件组织合作治理的演化博弈系统具有复杂的演进路径,演化稳定状态取决于地方政府组织策略选择的初始状态和区域内政府组织的社会资本存量及固定成本。研究结论可以为区域突发事件组织合作治理机制优化提供指导。
[Abstract]:With the development of regional economic integration in China, the number of regional emergencies is increasing day by day. Organization and cooperation governance has become the inevitable choice of regional local government. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary process of regional local government organizational behavior is discussed, and a game model of local government organizational behavior evolution considering fixed cost of organizational decision and organizational social capital is established. The behavior evolution law and evolutionary stability strategy of local government organization cooperation are obtained, and the initial sensitivity of local government organization behavior evolution path is analyzed. The evolutionary game system of regional emergency organization cooperative governance has a complex evolution path. The evolutionary stability depends on the initial state of the local government organization strategy selection, the stock of social capital and the fixed cost of the regional government organization. The conclusion of the study can provide guidance for the optimization of the cooperative governance mechanism of the regional emergency organization.
【作者单位】：浙江师范大学经济与管理学院;同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(91224003,71403186)
【分类号】：D63

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