我国地方政府间财政支出竞争的经济效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 02:11

本文选题：财政支出竞争　切入点：经济效应　出处：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,我国经济保持着年均10%左右的增长速度,在世界各国中被认为是增长奇迹。市场经济体制的改革,尤其是财政体制的变革始终贯穿于这一进程之中。我国财政体制的改革一直是以财政分权为中心,即逐步下放中央的部分财政权益,给予地方政府更多的财政自主权,调动地方政府发展经济的积极性。在此背景之下,地方政府出于地方经济利益和官员个人的政治利益在税收和财政支出方面展开了激烈的竞争。随着地方政府税收竞争的空间逐步减小,地方政府财政支出竞争演变成地方政府竞争的主要手段,其主要表现形式为提供优质的公共产品和公共服务吸引经济资源。基于此,本文力图在财政分权的框架下研究我国地方政府财政支出竞争问题,从空间的视角探究我国地方政府财政支出竞争的存在性,并从理论和实证的角度论证其与我国区域经济的关系。最后,在此基础上为改善财政支出竞争格局,促进全国资源合理配置,保证经济健康稳定发展提供政策参考。本文利用1997-2012年我国各省区的数据进行空间计量分析发现,相邻地区财政支出每提高1个百分点,会直接导致本地人均财政支出上升0.37405个百分点,相邻地区间的策略反应是直接的。接着,本文通过面板门限回归模型验证了笔者的猜想：财政支出竞争经济效应在我国各地区之间的表现不一致。更为具体地,在经济发展处于较低水平的地区,财政支出竞争对区域经济的影响并不显著；在经济发展处于中高水平的地区,财政支出竞争的积极效应大于消极效应,有助于促进地方经济增长。最后,本文据此提出了相关的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has maintained an average annual growth rate of about 10 percent, which is regarded as a growth miracle in all countries of the world. In particular, the reform of the financial system has always been running through this process. The reform of our financial system has always focused on fiscal decentralization, that is, gradually devolving part of the central government's financial rights and interests, giving local governments more financial autonomy. Mobilize the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy. In this context, Local governments compete fiercely in tax and fiscal expenditure for the sake of local economic interests and the political interests of individual officials. As the space for local governments to compete for tax revenue gradually decreases, The competition of local government fiscal expenditure has evolved into the main means of local government competition. The main form of competition is to provide high-quality public goods and public services to attract economic resources. This paper tries to study the competition of local government fiscal expenditure in China under the framework of fiscal decentralization, and probes into the existence of local government fiscal expenditure competition in China from the perspective of space. Finally, it provides a policy reference for improving the competitive pattern of fiscal expenditure, promoting the rational allocation of national resources and ensuring the healthy and stable development of economy. Based on the spatial analysis of the data from 1997 to 2012, it is found that the increase of fiscal expenditure by 1 percentage point in adjacent regions will directly lead to an increase of 0.37405 percentage points in local per capita fiscal expenditure. The strategic response between adjacent regions is direct. Then, this paper verifies the author's conjecture by using the panel threshold regression model: the performance of the competitive economic effect of fiscal expenditure in different regions of China is not consistent. In areas where economic development is at a low level, the impact of fiscal expenditure competition on regional economy is not significant, and the positive effect of fiscal expenditure competition is greater than that of negative effects in areas where economic development is at a medium and high level. It is helpful to promote local economic growth. Finally, this paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45

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