首都圈省际经济利益协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 12:37

本文选题：省际经济利益　切入点：协调机制　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：区域协调发展,既包括区域内部诸要素(资源、环境、人口、产业等)之间的可持续发展,即区域协调；也包括减少区域间发展差距,消除区域间利益冲突,即区际协调(魏后凯2009,范恒山,孙久文2011)。本文的研究属于区际协调。区际协调要以区际利益协调为主线(陈秀山,杨艳2008)。为简化研究,本文站在政府的层面,仅研究不同省(直辖市)之间的经济利益协调。如无特殊说明,本文所涉及的省际协调均指省际经济利益协调。首都圈范围界定为：北京市、天津市、河北省全境,即京津冀三省市全域(李国平2004；谭维克,赵弘2011；祝尔娟2012)。本文所提首都圈均指京津冀三省市全域。省际经济利益非均衡是首都圈区域协同发展面临的核心矛盾,具体表现为：产业同构与恶性竞争、区域市场分割与地方保护、省际公共物品供给不足、贫富分化与生态恶化、政绩竞争与重复建设等若干方面。造成首都圈省际经济利益非均衡的直接原因是区域经济一体化的客观要求同行政边界刚性约束的矛盾,根本原因是地方政府的有限理性和市场的不完全性。基于上述原因,省际经济利益协调机制的建立显得尤为必要。省际经济利益协调机制是一种区域利益再分配机制。这种机制不仅对于缩小省际差距十分重要,还是化解省际经济利益矛盾,推进区域经济一体化必不可少的工具。本文的理论意义旨在突破行政边界刚性约束的羁绊,冲破地方政府利益固化的藩篱,破除制约首都圈区域协同发展的机制障碍,以经济的内在联系为基石,进行省际经济利益协调。本文使用空间计量经济学局域自相关(Moran指数Ii)方法,通过实证分析发现：2004年至2012年间,首都圈地区经济空间溢出效应明显。首都圈的经济空间溢出效应已经突破了省际行政边界,如果再基于行政边界研究省际利益协调,可能并不十分合理,而是亟需建立能够突破行政边界羁绊的省际协调机制。经济的空间溢出是经济的客观规律。它说明了省际协调需要突破行政边界羁绊的必要性。省际经济利益强调区际关系,它侧重于经济利益的再分配。省际经济利益是指特定的省(直辖市)从其他省(直辖市)或国家获得的排他性收益,属于社会福利再分配范畴；是生产要素不完全流动性,市场不完全竞争性,地方政府不完全理性所表现出的空间优势。省际经济利益具体表现为产业省际转移税收分享、省际基础设施共建成本分摊、省际生态补偿等。省际经济利益协调机制是以专门联合委员会制度为协调形式的一种省际经济利益让度与分配的长效机制,是解决省际经济利益冲突的规则,是地方政府间的合同,是一类利益分配函数,是一个省际经济利益再分配的过程；在此过程中,区域经济协调权威机构被国家授权对各区域利益主体的立场加以评定,并作出对各方在执行过程中具有法律约束力的量化仲裁决定。省际经济利益协调是一场博弈,是策略依存的。首都圈省际经济利益博弈主体是京津冀三地政府。省际经济利益协调机制不需要每个博弈主体的策略在任何情况下均是最优的,只要博弈主体的策略是针对对手采取策略基础上的最优策略即可,则省际纳什均衡是省际经济利益协调机制突破行政边界刚性约束的理论基础。省际纳什均衡是指省际经济利益协调中每个博弈主体都不能也不想单方面改变自己的策略而增加收益；每个博弈主体所选策略均是对其他区域所选策略的最佳利益分配。省际纳什均衡是各省间相互让渡利益的结果；区域考核指标一体化是省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态的前提条件；当且仅当区域考核指标一体化时,省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的顶层设计包括五个分机制,分别是协商机制、仲裁机制、分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制。基于经济空间溢出效应的视角,京津冀三地政府可以通过市长联席会议进行跨界横向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即协商机制；基于地方政府有限理性和市场不完全性的视角,当地方政府自组织式的横向协调无法达到省际纳什均衡时,中央政府通过设立超越地方行政区划的权威仲裁机构进行纵向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即仲裁机制；基于财税机制改革的视角,首都圈产业转移的省际纳什均衡是横向分税制,即分享机制；基于投资机制改革的视角,首都圈跨界基础设施共建的省际纳什均衡是横向成本分摊制,即分摊机制；基于自然资源资产产权制度改革的视角,首都圈生态联防联控的省际纳什均衡是财政横向转移支付制,即补偿机制。五个分机制中,协商机制、仲裁机制体现协调的形式和程序,而分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制体现协调的具体内容。仲裁机制属于纵向协调,保证了协调的公平；协商机制属于横向协调,保证了协调的效率。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的路径选择是纵横结合。五个分机制共同作用发挥合力,才能突破行政边界羁绊,促进区域协同发展。
[Abstract]:Coordinated regional development, including regional internal factors (resources, environment, population, industry etc.) for sustainable development, regional coordination; including the development gap between regions to reduce and eliminate conflicts of interest between regions, namely the interregional coordination (Fan Hengshan, Wei Houkai 2009, Sun Jiuwen 2011). This study belongs to interregional coordination. Interregional coordination to interregional coordination as the main line (Chen Xiushan, Yang Yan 2008). In order to simplify the research, this paper stands at the government level, only on different provinces (municipalities) coordination between economic interests. If no special instructions, inter provincial coordination involved in this thesis refer to inter provincial coordination of economic interests.
Metropolitan area is defined as: Beijing City, Tianjin City, Hebei Province, the three provinces of Beijing Tianjin Hebei region (Li Guoping 2004; Zhao Hong 2011; Tan Weike, Juan Zhu Er 2012). The capital circle refer to the three provinces of Beijing Tianjin Hebei region.
Provincial economic interests is the core contradiction facing the unbalanced coordinated development of metropolitan area, the specific performance: industry structure and vicious competition, regional market segmentation and local protectionism, lack of regional public goods supply, polarization and deterioration of ecological environment, some aspects of political competition and repeated construction. The provincial capital circle caused by economic benefits of non balanced direct cause is the objective requirement of regional economic integration with the administrative boundary of the rigid constraints of contradiction, the fundamental reason is not completely limited rational local government and market. Based on the above reasons, the provincial economic benefit coordinating mechanism is necessary. The inter provincial economic interests coordination mechanism is a regional redistribution mechanism. This mechanism is not only important for narrowing the gap between provinces, provincial or resolve conflicts of economic interests, to promote regional economic integration essential tool. This The theoretical significance of this article is to break through the rigid constraints of administrative boundaries, break through the barriers of local governments' interests, and break away from the institutional obstacles that restrict the coordinated development of the capital area, and coordinate the inter provincial economic interests based on the internal relationship of the economy.
In this paper, using spatial econometrics local autocorrelation (Moran index Ii) method, through empirical analysis found that from 2004 to 2012, the capital economic circle space area spillover effect is obvious. The economic spatial spillover effect of the capital circle has exceeded the provincial administrative boundaries, if based on the administrative boundary of inter provincial coordination of interests, may not be very reasonable, but the establishment of the administrative boundary to break through the fetters of the inter provincial coordination mechanism needs. Spatial spillover economy is the objective economic rules. It explains the necessity of inter provincial coordination needs to break the fetters of the administrative boundary.
Provincial economic benefits emphasize the relationship between regions, it focuses on the redistribution of economic interests. Economic interest refers to a specific province (municipality) from other provinces (municipalities) exclusive income or country gained, belong to the social welfare redistribution category; the factor of production and incomplete liquidity, market competition, space the advantage of the local government is not completely rational shows. The provincial economic benefits embodied in industry inter provincial transfer of tax sharing, provincial infrastructure construction and cost sharing, inter provincial ecological compensation.
Provincial economic interests coordination mechanism is the long-term mechanism to a special joint committee system as a provincial economic interests coordination form to degree and distribution, is to solve the conflict of economic interests of provincial rules, is the contract between the local government, is a kind of benefit distribution function, is a process of interprovincial redistribution of economic interests in this process; in the Regional Economic Coordination Authority is authorized by the state of the regional interests of the main position to assess, and make a decision to quantify the arbitration the parties legally binding in the implementation process.
Provincial economic interests coordination is a game of strategy is dependent. The metropolitan area is the main economic interests of the game three of Tianjin government. The provincial economic interests coordination mechanism does not require each of the main game strategy in any case are the best, as long as the main game strategy is the optimal strategy can be based on the the opponent, is provincial Nash equilibrium is the theoretical basis of regional economic coordination mechanism of interests beyond administrative boundaries of the rigid constraints of Nash equilibrium. The provincial refers to each provincial economic interests coordination in the main game can also do not want to unilaterally change their strategies and increase revenue; each player selected strategy is the best strategy for the selection of other profit distribution area. The Nash equilibrium is the mutual interests of provincial transfer between provinces results; regional integration is the provincial assessment index reached the Nash equilibrium, tired The precondition of the optimal state is supported; when and only when the regional assessment index is integrated, the inter provincial Nash equilibrium reaches the Pareto optimal state.
The top-level design of inter provincial economic interests coordination mechanism of the capital circle including five sub mechanisms, respectively is the negotiation mechanism, arbitration mechanism, sharing mechanism, sharing mechanism and compensation mechanism. The economic spatial spillover effect from the perspective of three of Tianjin government through the joint meeting of mayors of provincial cross-border horizontal coordination to achieve the Nash equilibrium, namely the negotiation mechanism local government; limited rationality and incomplete markets based on the perspective, when the local government since the coordination organization cannot reach the provincial Nash equilibrium, the central government vertical coordination to achieve the provincial Nash equilibrium through the establishment of arbitration institutions beyond the local administrative division of authority, namely the arbitration mechanism; tax system reform based on the perspective of the capital circle the Nash equilibrium is the provincial industrial transfer horizontal tax system, share mechanism; investment mechanism reform based on the perspective of the capital circle base Infrastructure to build the provincial Nash equilibrium is transverse cost allocation system, the allocation mechanism; reform of property right system of natural resources assets based on the perspective of Nash equilibrium provincial capital ecological joint prevention and control of the horizontal financial transfer payment system and the compensation mechanism. The negotiation mechanism five mechanism, and reflect the form of coordination and arbitration mechanism the program, and sharing mechanism, sharing mechanism and compensation mechanism of the specific content of coordination. The arbitration mechanism belongs to the vertical coordination, to ensure coordination of fairness; negotiation mechanism belongs to the horizontal coordination, ensure the coordination efficiency. Path provincial economic interests coordination mechanism of the capital circle is the choice of vertical and horizontal integration. The five sub mechanisms play together in order to break the administrative boundaries, fetters, promote regional coordinated development.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F127;F812.0

【引证文献】