中国城市群内部竞合行为分析与机制设计研究

发布时间：2018-06-28 01:46

本文选题：城市群内部 + 竞合行为　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：城市群区域的全面、协调、可持续发展对优化国土空间开发结构、完善城镇体系建设、促进区域经济协调发展乃至全面推进中国新型城镇化战略进程具有重大的战略意义。《国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》明确指出,未来我国城镇建设必须遵循城市发展客观规律,以大城市为依托,以中、小城市为重点,逐步形成福射带动作用大的城市群,促进大、中、小城市和小城镇协调发展。依托主体功能区规划完善城市布局、促进城市群发展、加强城镇化科学管理,已成为有效推进中国城镇化进程的重大战略选择。数据表明,城市群在国民经济和社会发展中的关键作用日益突出,已成为我国区域经济发展的基本承载平台和主体空间格局,随着大量的经济资源逐步聚集到城市群区域,其内部各地区如何有效配置资源、化解经济冲突、实现协调发展显得尤为重要。我国现行的管理体制机制,如官员绩效考核以及财政分权等,在促进地区经济增长的同时,也加剧了地区间竞争,特别是一定空间范围内存在多个城市的城市群区域,竞争更加激烈,产业结构趋同、恶性竞争加剧、区域合作减少、资源配置效率降低的发展态势已成为城市群发展理论研究面临的严峻挑战,城市群内部次区域间竞合无序问题及如何进行有效的机制设计已成为城市群发展实践中的重大课题。论文从梳理世界五大城市群发展历程入手,分析了世界主要城市群的发展特点,着重探讨了不同发达国家的城市群治理模式,归纳出对我国城市群治理具有一定指导意义的经验做法。在本文提到的五大城市群中,作者同样发现地区间存在着大量邻近区域间竞合问题,比如美国各城市间的税率策略互动问题、欧洲城市间竞争不平衡问题、英国伦敦自治市恶性竞争问题、日本国土空间开发问题等等。通过深入研究这些城市群发展与治理模式,发现这些城市群在处理城市间竞合问题时,采取的一些措施和方法对我国具有一定的借鉴和启示意义：一是充分发挥市场的作用,让市场成为资源配置的主导力量；二是加强区域发展规划；三是强调区域错位发展；四是设立特殊机构,协调区域利益；五是适度调整行政区划等。本文同样对我国几个主要城市群的发展历程与竞合行为现状进行了梳理。总体来看,我国地区间竞争可划分为四个阶段：改革开放前的“兄弟竞争”、80年代的“地方保护主义”、90年代后期的“政策竞争”以及现阶段的“全方位、多层次”竞争。文章还归纳总结了现阶段一些较为常见的城市群内部竞争行为,包括外商投资竞争、劳动力资源竞争、发展定位竞争、税收竞争、地方保护主义等。在城市群区域内合作方面,改革开放后,我国原有的经济体制被打破,区域合作机制需要重新确立。开始于80年代的“区域经济技术合作组织”对促进地区间横向经济联合起到了重要作用。经过多年发展,我国区域间合作水平也在不断提高。本文也对目前我国城市群内部地区间的典型合作行为进行了归纳总结,其主要表现形式有：区域间基础设施建设、区域产业分工协作、经济合作区建设等。总体看,我国城市群内部地区间既存在大量的竞争行为,也存在一些合作,但由于我国存在的,诸如官员考核选拔、财政分权等体制机制,使得城市群内部次区域间的恶性竞争数不胜数,合作却少之又少。为此,我国部分城市群相继建立了区域协调组织,对地区间竞合行为加以协调,如“环渤海区域合作市长联席会”、“长三角城市经济协调会”、“泛珠三角9+2”区域合作组织等。但不容乐观的是,现阶段城市群内部邻近地区“以邻为壑”、市场分割、地方保护主义等问题仍然严重,这些区域协调组织并未实现其成立初衷。为研究我国城市群内部次区域间的竞合无序问题,本文构建了城市群内部两中心晋升博弈模型,通过求解对称性纳什均衡,并进行比较静态分析,提出了城市群内部次区域间的“积极竞争,消极合作”行为推论,即：随着地区间竞争行为对本城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府竞争趋于激烈；而随着地区间合作行为对其他城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府合作更趋消极。为验证该推论,本文使用2000--2011年北京等10个城市的面板数据,并选取区域专业化水平、城市间交通便捷程度等变量代表合作行为；选取区域劳动力增长、外商直接投资等变量代表竞争行为,验证这4个变量对本城市经济增长的促进作用是否显著,同时,还选取这4个变量的空间滞后项进入模型,检验这些变量对城市群其他城市经济增长的作用,并用以匹配政府行为表现,以此来验证本文提出的推论。结果显示,政府在资本竞争、劳动力竞争以及城市间交通设施建设等方面的行为能够与本文三种不同设定的模型估计结果进行很好地匹配,而政府在区域分工方面的行为也能够与时点固定效应模型实证结果相匹配。总体而言,实证结果和现有的数据分析能够较好的支撑本文提出的“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为推论。我国城市群内部次区域间普遍存在的“积极竞争,消极合作”行为会产生何种后果呢?本文在第六章以城市群内部两城市争夺外商投资为案例基础,对“积极竞争,消极合作”行为所产生的后果,进行了福利经济学分析。通过构建由两个地方政府和一个外商投资企业参与的多阶段动态博弈模型,发现在产业转移过程中,地方政府的这种“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为产生了“租金耗散”的后果。本文认为,产生“租金耗散”后果的直接原因在于,城市群内各地方政府并没有从区域分工和比较优势角度进行产业承接,而是从自身利益最大化出发,参与竞争,进而使得外商投资企业掌握主导权,并利用这种同质化竞争,迫使两个地方政府不断提高优惠条件,最终导致“产业转移租金”全部被外商投资企业获得。同时本文也认为产生“租金耗散”的根本原因在于,地方政府目标选择与地区发展利益并不完全一致。“租金耗散”的形式一般表现为地方政府对外商投资企业的各种税收、土地优惠条件、财政转移支付或财政补贴,其缺口只能由地方财政承担,所以城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”行为的最终利益受损者是参与竞争的城市的普通居民。为避免由“积极竞争,消极合作”行为所造成的社会福利损失,促使城市群内部形成“积极合作,良性竞争”的态势,本文认为应从以下几个方面构建城市群内部竞合机制：一是建设法律基础机制：推进城市群发展公约制订和出台、鼓励城市群内部地方政府合作协议签订、推动城市群发展规划编制和实施等；二是建立内部协调机制：未来城市群区域的管理应在不同层面设置不同管理机构,在国家层面应设置中央城市群统筹协调小组、在跨地区层面应设置城市群综合协调管理委员会和专业性协调委员会,同时还应该进一步完善补充性协调管理组织；三是形成财政保障机制：理顺中央与地方财权事权关系、建立纵向与横向转移支付体系、确立“税收法定”等原则、改革财政预算体制等；四是完善激励约束机制：应从激励约束的的实施主体、参与客体、环境条件、预期目标、实施途径等方面入手,尽快建立激励相容的激励约束体制。本文以现有官员考核选拔体制为依据,构建晋升博弈模型,研究我国城市群内部次区域间竞合问题,提出了城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为推论,并加以实证研究。随后,建立了多阶段动态博弈模型,探讨城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”行为的社会福利影响,得出了“租金耗散”结论。为促使我国城市群内部次区域形成“积极合作,良性竞争”的新秩序,以上述分析结果为依据,本文从法律基础、内部协调、财政保障、激励约束等几方面构建城市群内部竞合行为机制。根据本文对我国城市群内部次区域间竞合行为的研究,结合世界城市群治理实践经验,提出了促进我国城市群内部各区域协调发展的政策建议,主要包括：理顺政府与市场的关系,以市场为主导,更好发挥政府宏观调控作用；加强城市群区域内基础设施网络建设,深化内部一体化进程；构建现代产业体系,加强区域产业分工；制定城市群发展规划,实现区域错位发展；引入绿色GDP,加强经济成本核算,完善官员考核体系；打破条块分割,设置具有权威性的区域协调管理机构等。
[Abstract]:The comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of the urban agglomeration is of great strategic significance to optimizing the structure of land space development, improving the construction of the urban system, promoting the coordinated development of the regional economy and even promoting the new urbanization strategy in China. The Twelfth Five Year Plan of national economy and social development clearly points out that the future of China Urban construction must follow the objective law of urban development, take large cities as the support, focus on the middle and small cities, gradually form a large urban agglomeration with great futile effect, and promote the coordinated development of large, middle, small cities and small towns. Relying on the main function area, the layout of cities, the development of urban agglomeration and the scientific management of urbanization have been established. The important strategic choice of China's urbanization process is effective. The data show that the key role of the urban agglomeration in the national economy and social development has become increasingly prominent, and has become the basic bearing platform and the main spatial pattern of the regional economic development in our country. With a large number of economic resources gathering in the urban agglomeration area, how effective the internal areas are effective It is particularly important to allocate resources to dissolve economic conflicts and achieve coordinated development. The current management system mechanisms in China, such as performance assessment and fiscal decentralization, have promoted regional economic growth as well as regional competition, especially in a certain range of cities, and the competition is more intense. With the convergence of the industrial structure, the aggravation of the malignant competition, the reduction of regional cooperation and the decreasing of the efficiency of the allocation of resources, the development of the urban agglomeration development theory has become a severe challenge. The problem of competition and disordering in the inner subregion of the urban agglomeration and how to carry out effective mechanism design have become a major issue in the development practice of urban agglomeration.
This paper, starting with the development of the five largest urban agglomeration in the world, analyzes the development characteristics of the major urban groups in the world, focuses on the management patterns of urban agglomeration in different developed countries, and sums up the empirical practices that have certain guiding significance for the governance of urban agglomeration in China. Among the five major urban groups mentioned in this article, the author also finds regional storage. In a large number of neighbouring regions, such as the interaction of tax rate strategies among cities in the United States, the imbalance of European cities, the vicious competition in the city of London, the problem of land space development in Japan, and so on. Through in-depth study of the development and governance patterns of these urban clusters, these cities are found to be dealing with the cities. Some measures and methods will be of certain reference and Enlightenment to our country: first, give full play to the role of the market, make the market become the dominant force in the allocation of resources; two is to strengthen the regional development planning; the three is to emphasize the regional dislocation development; four is to set up special institutions, coordinate regional interests; five is appropriate. Degree adjustment of administrative division and so on.
This paper also combs the development process of several major urban groups in China and the current situation of competing behavior. In general, the inter regional competition in China can be divided into four stages: "brothers competition" before the reform and opening up, "local protectionism" in 80s, "policy competition" in the late 90s, and "all directions, more" at the present stage. The article also summarizes some of the more common urban agglomeration internal competition behavior at the present stage, including foreign investment competition, labor resources competition, development positioning and competition, tax competition, local protectionism, and so on. In the area of regional cooperation in urban agglomeration, the original economic system of our country has been broken and regional cooperation is broken. The mechanism needs to be reestablished. The regional economic and Technical Cooperation Organization (regional economic and Technical Cooperation Organization), which began in 80s, has played an important role in promoting interregional horizontal economic union. After years of development, the level of interregional cooperation in China has also been increasing. The main manifestations are: infrastructure construction, regional industrial division and cooperation, economic cooperation zone construction. In general, there are a lot of competitive behaviors and some cooperation among the inner regions of the urban agglomeration in China, but because of our country, such as the system mechanism such as the election and selection of officials, financial decentralization, and so on, make the urban agglomeration internal. The vicious competition among regions is innumerable, but there are few cooperation. For this reason, some urban groups in China have established regional coordination organizations one after another to coordinate the interregional competing behavior, such as "the mayor joint meeting of Bohai regional cooperation", "the city economic coordination meeting of the Yangtze River Delta", the "Pan Pearl River Delta 9+2" regional cooperation organization, etc. At the present stage, the inner neighbourhood of the urban agglomeration is "beggar thy neighbour", the market segmentation, and the local protectionism are still serious, and these regional coordination organizations have not realized their original intention.
In order to study the concurrence disorder between subregional groups in the urban agglomeration of China, this paper constructs a two center promotion game model within the urban agglomeration. By solving the symmetry Nash equilibrium and comparing static analysis, the "positive competition and negative cooperation" between the inner subregions of the urban agglomeration is put forward, that is, with the regional competition line. In order to improve the impact of the urban economic growth, the government competition tends to be fierce, and with the increase of the influence of inter regional cooperation on the economic growth of other cities, the cooperation of the government is more negative. In order to verify this inference, this paper uses the panel data of 10 cities such as Beijing and other cities in 2000--2011, and selects the level of regional specialization. The variables of inter - traffic convenience represent cooperative behavior, and select regional labor growth, foreign direct investment and other variables to represent competitive behavior, verify whether these 4 variables promote the economic growth of the city significantly, and select the spatial lag items of these 4 variables into the model, and test these variables to other cities of Urban Agglomeration The effect of economic growth, which is used to match the performance of government behavior, is used to verify the inference proposed in this paper. The results show that the government's behavior in capital competition, labor competition and urban transportation facilities can be well matched with the three different models of this article, while the government is in the regional division of labor. The behavior of the surface can also be matched with the empirical results of the time point fixed effect model. In general, the empirical results and the existing data analysis can support the behavioral inference of "positive competition and negative cooperation" proposed in this paper.
What are the consequences of "positive competition, negative cooperation" in the inner subregions of urban agglomeration in China? In the sixth chapter, we take two cities within the urban agglomeration to compete for foreign investment as a case base, and analyze the consequences of "positive competition and negative cooperation". A multi-stage dynamic game model involving a local government and a foreign invested enterprise has found that in the process of industrial transfer, the local government's "active competition and negative cooperation" have produced the consequences of "rent dissipation". This paper holds that the direct reason for the consequences of "rent dissipation" lies in the local administration within the urban agglomeration. The government does not undertake industrial undertaking from the perspective of regional division of labor and comparative advantage, but starts from the maximization of its own interests and participates in the competition, and then makes the foreign investment enterprises master the dominant power, and makes use of this homogenization competition to force two local governments to continuously improve the preferential conditions, and ultimately lead to the investment of "industrial transfer rent" by foreign investment. The basic reason for the "rent dissipation" is that the choice of the local government is not exactly the same as the regional development interests. The form of "rent dissipation" is generally manifested by the various taxes of local governments on foreign invested enterprises, the favorable conditions for land, the financial transfer payment or the financial subsidy. The mouth can only be borne by local finance, so the ultimate interests of the "positive competition and negative cooperation" in the urban agglomeration are the ordinary residents of the cities participating in the competition.
In order to avoid the loss of social welfare caused by "positive competition and negative cooperation", the situation of "positive cooperation and good competition" is formed in the urban agglomeration. This paper believes that the internal competition mechanism should be constructed from the following aspects: first, the construction of legal basic machine system: promoting the development and promulgation of the urban agglomeration development convention. The local government cooperation agreement within the city group is signed to promote the development planning and implementation of urban agglomeration. Two is the establishment of internal coordination mechanism: the management of the future urban agglomeration should set different management institutions at different levels, and the central urban agglomeration coordination group should be set up at the national level, and the urban agglomeration should be set up at the cross regional level. At the same time, the comprehensive coordination management committee and the professional coordination committee should further improve the supplementary coordination management organization; three is to form the financial security mechanism: straighten out the relationship between the central and local financial power, establish the vertical and horizontal transfer payment system, establish the principle of "tax legality", reform the financial budget system, and so on; four To improve the incentive and constraint mechanism, the incentive and compatible incentive and constraint system should be established as soon as possible from the aspects of the subject, the object, the environment, the expected goal and the way of implementation of the incentive constraints.
Based on the examination and selection system of the existing officials, this paper constructs a promotion game model, studies the interregional competition among the urban agglomeration in China, and puts forward the behavior inference of "positive competition and negative cooperation" within the urban agglomeration, and makes an empirical study. Then, a multi stage dynamic game model is set up to explore the "positive competition" within the urban agglomeration. In order to promote the new order of "positive cooperation and good competition" in the inner subregion of urban agglomeration in China, the new order of "positive cooperation and good competition" in the inner subregion of China's urban agglomeration is based on the results of the above analysis. This paper constructs the internal competition of Urban Agglomeration from the legal basis, internal coordination, financial security and incentive constraints. According to the study of the inter regional competing behavior in the urban agglomeration of our country and the practice experience of the world city group management, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to promote the coordinated development of the inner regions of the urban agglomeration in China, which mainly includes: straightening out the relationship between the government and the market, taking the market as the leading role, and giving full play to the government's macro regulation and control role. We should strengthen the construction of infrastructure network in the urban agglomeration area, deepen the process of internal integration, construct modern industrial system, strengthen regional industrial division of labor, formulate urban agglomeration development planning, realize regional dislocation development, introduce green GDP, strengthen economic cost accounting, improve official examination system, break the division and set authority. Regional coordination management institutions, etc.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F299.2

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