资源丰裕区域寻租性腐败现象及其治理研究
发布时间：2018-09-19 07:09
【摘要】：自然资源作为大自然赋予人类的财富，本应给资源丰裕区域的民众带来“福音”，但现实中资源丰裕区域却被受困于“资源诅咒”。“资源诅咒”如何形成、如何规避和治理？学术界从多个角度探讨，其中，资源丰裕区域存在的寻租性腐败现象，被认为是引致“资源诅咒”的主要原因之一。已有文献多集中于某个国家的案例分析，或者是政治、制度视角等。 本文基于经济学视角，运用委托—代理理论和博弈论方法，，尝试构建资源丰裕区域政府官员、资源开采企业和民众相互之间的博弈模型，分析国外资源丰裕国家/区域寻租性腐败现象的表现，探讨其成因，比较其治理实践，并针对我国资源丰裕区域的寻租性腐败现象的特点及成因，提出治理的对策建议。本研究有助于丰富“资源诅咒”、寻租腐败等理论，对我国资源丰裕区域的寻租性腐败现象治理也具有一定的借鉴价值。论文的主要结论如下： 第一，资源丰裕区域寻租性腐败现象的产生，是由于资源丰裕区域政府官员、资源开采企业与民众相互之间的博弈过程，所导致的公共权力委托—代理关系的失效。对资源丰裕区域进行透明化管理，有助于弥补资源丰裕区域经济主体之间的信息不对称，以起到治理该区域的寻租性腐败现象的目的。 第二，通过比较国外资源丰裕区域寻租性腐败现象的产生环节、形成原因以及治理寻租性腐败现象的透明化管理方式，进而得出：治理资源丰裕区域寻租性腐败现象，必须构建民众监督、企业自律和政府管制的监管体系，并严格将这一监管体系应用到对资源丰裕区域经济和社会事务中去。 第三，我国资源丰裕区域的寻租性腐败现象的产生，主要集中于资源开采企业资格的审批环节、基础设施及相关设施的建设环节、资源开采企业的安全生产监管环节、资源开采企业的产品运输与销售环节。治理我国资源丰裕区域寻租性腐败现象，需要企业加强内部监督机制、激励与处罚机制建设；加强社会监督建设，发挥民众的社会监督职能；建立政府官员诚信记录建设及加强对腐败官员的查处与惩治力度等。
[Abstract]:Natural resources, as the wealth given by nature to human beings, should bring "good news" to the people in resource-rich areas, but in reality, resource-rich areas are trapped by "resource curses". How does the "resource curse" form, how to circumvent and govern? Among them, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is considered to be one of the main causes of "resource curse". The literature has focused on the case study of a country, or political, institutional perspective and so on. Based on the perspective of economics, using the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper attempts to build a game model between government officials, resource mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. This paper analyzes the manifestations of rent-seeking corruption in countries / regions with abundant resources abroad, probes into its causes, compares its governance practice, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the governance of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich regions in China. This study is helpful to enrich the theory of "resource curse" and rent-seeking corruption, and also has some reference value to the governance of rent-seeking corruption in the resource-rich areas of our country. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: first, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is caused by the game process between government officials, resource-mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. The invalidation of the principal-agent relationship of public power. The transparent management of resource-rich regions is helpful to make up for the asymmetry of information among the economic subjects in resource-rich regions, so as to control the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in this region. Secondly, by comparing the producing links of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources abroad, the causes of the phenomenon, and the transparent management mode of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption, it is concluded that the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources can be controlled. It is necessary to establish a regulatory system of public supervision, self-discipline of enterprises and government regulation, and strictly apply this regulatory system to regional economic and social affairs with abundant resources. Third, the emergence of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas in China is mainly focused on the examination and approval of the qualifications of resource mining enterprises, the construction of infrastructure and related facilities, and the safety production supervision of resource-mining enterprises. The product transportation and sale link of resource mining enterprise. To deal with the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in China's resource-rich areas, enterprises should strengthen the internal supervision mechanism, encourage and punish the construction of mechanism, strengthen the construction of social supervision, and give full play to the social supervision function of the people. To establish the honest record of government officials and strengthen the investigation and punishment of corrupt officials.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D630.9
本文编号：2249401
[Abstract]:Natural resources, as the wealth given by nature to human beings, should bring "good news" to the people in resource-rich areas, but in reality, resource-rich areas are trapped by "resource curses". How does the "resource curse" form, how to circumvent and govern? Among them, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is considered to be one of the main causes of "resource curse". The literature has focused on the case study of a country, or political, institutional perspective and so on. Based on the perspective of economics, using the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper attempts to build a game model between government officials, resource mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. This paper analyzes the manifestations of rent-seeking corruption in countries / regions with abundant resources abroad, probes into its causes, compares its governance practice, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the governance of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich regions in China. This study is helpful to enrich the theory of "resource curse" and rent-seeking corruption, and also has some reference value to the governance of rent-seeking corruption in the resource-rich areas of our country. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: first, the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas is caused by the game process between government officials, resource-mining enterprises and people in resource-rich regions. The invalidation of the principal-agent relationship of public power. The transparent management of resource-rich regions is helpful to make up for the asymmetry of information among the economic subjects in resource-rich regions, so as to control the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in this region. Secondly, by comparing the producing links of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources abroad, the causes of the phenomenon, and the transparent management mode of the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption, it is concluded that the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in the regions with abundant resources can be controlled. It is necessary to establish a regulatory system of public supervision, self-discipline of enterprises and government regulation, and strictly apply this regulatory system to regional economic and social affairs with abundant resources. Third, the emergence of rent-seeking corruption in resource-rich areas in China is mainly focused on the examination and approval of the qualifications of resource mining enterprises, the construction of infrastructure and related facilities, and the safety production supervision of resource-mining enterprises. The product transportation and sale link of resource mining enterprise. To deal with the phenomenon of rent-seeking corruption in China's resource-rich areas, enterprises should strengthen the internal supervision mechanism, encourage and punish the construction of mechanism, strengthen the construction of social supervision, and give full play to the social supervision function of the people. To establish the honest record of government officials and strengthen the investigation and punishment of corrupt officials.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D630.9
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