产业集群中企业间合作创新行为分析

发布时间：2018-10-30 16:09

【摘要】：随着经济全球化的迅速发展，产业集群在区域经济中扮演着越来越重要的角色。它将相同或相似产业的企业聚集起来，产生巨大的规模经济效应与范围经济效应。产业集群中企业间合作创新所产生的知识溢出效应以及企业聚集所产生的区域品牌效应为产业集群内企业带来了众多优势，为提升区域核心竞争力做出了巨大的贡献。因此，，无论是发达国家还是发展中国家对产业集群的发展都给予了高度的重视。技术创新是产业集群发展的不竭动力。因此，如何提高技术创新能力便成为如何加快产业集群发展的关键。随着产业全球化布局的深入、社会分工的细化，技术创新的形式也发生了改变。企业出于控制研发风险、缩短研发周期的目的，逐渐将研发方式从组织内部独立研发转向组织内外部协同研发。企业间合作创新逐渐成为技术创新的主要方式。因此，探寻企业间合作创新行为的内在规律，避免合作中机会主义行为成为研发合作的成功与否的关键。文章通过对以往学者的集群理论和合作创新理论研究成果进行回顾，为集群中企业间合作创新行为的研究提供理论基础；建立基于根植性以及互惠性假设的产业集群中企业间合作创新行为机制，探索根植性在企业间合作创新行为机制中发挥的作用；运用演化博弈方法对集群中企业间合作创新行为进行研究分析，探索知识溢出效应、根植性以及知识产权保护力度对均衡策略的影响；并运用Mat lab对不同条件下的博弈模型进行了数值模拟。演化博弈分析的结果表明：知识溢出效应、知识保护力度以及集群根植性对集群演化方向产生重要的影响。①当集群根植性、知识溢出效应、知识产权保护力度产生的正面收益低于机会主义行为产生的额外收益时，集群内的成员会避免合作研发转而独立研发或者停止研发，集群内合作创新将会进入“囚徒困境”模式；②当集群根植性、知识溢出效应、知识产权保护力度产生的正面收益高于机会主义行为产生的额外收益时，集群内的成员会积极参与到合作研发中，集群内合作创新会走出“囚徒困境”、实现共赢；③当知识效应、知识产权保护力度以及集群根植性介于上述两者之间时，集群演化的方向取决于博弈双方的初始策略分布。最后，文章从政府层面、产业集群层面以及企业层面为如何促进产业集群内企业间技术创新合作提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization, industrial clusters play a more and more important role in regional economy. It gathers enterprises of the same or similar industries to produce huge economies of scale and economies of scope. The knowledge spillover effect caused by inter-firm cooperative innovation and the regional brand effect caused by enterprise agglomeration have brought many advantages to the enterprises in the industrial cluster and have made great contributions to the promotion of regional core competitiveness. Therefore, both developed and developing countries attach great importance to the development of industrial clusters. Technological innovation is the inexhaustible power of industrial cluster development. Therefore, how to improve the ability of technological innovation has become the key to accelerate the development of industrial clusters. With the deepening of industrial globalization and the refinement of social division of labor, the form of technological innovation has also changed. For the purpose of controlling R & D risk and shortening R D cycle, enterprises gradually change their R & D mode from internal and external R & D to internal and external collaborative R & D. Cooperative innovation between enterprises has gradually become the main way of technological innovation. Therefore, it is the key to the success of R & D cooperation to explore the inherent law of cooperative innovation behavior and avoid opportunism in cooperation. This paper reviews the previous researches on cluster theory and cooperative innovation theory in order to provide a theoretical basis for the research of cooperative innovation behavior among enterprises in clusters. To establish the cooperative innovation behavior mechanism among enterprises in industrial clusters based on the assumption of grounding and reciprocity, and to explore the role of grounding in the cooperative innovation behavior mechanism among enterprises; By using the evolutionary game method, this paper studies and analyzes the cooperative innovation behavior among enterprises in clusters, and explores the effects of knowledge spillover effect, grounding and intellectual property protection on the equilibrium strategy. Mat lab is used to simulate the game model under different conditions. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that: knowledge spillover effect, knowledge protection and cluster root have important influence on the evolution direction of cluster. 1 when the cluster is rooted, knowledge spillover effect, knowledge spillover effect. When the positive benefits of IPR protection are lower than the additional benefits from opportunistic behavior, the members of the cluster will avoid cooperating R & D to develop independently or stop R & D. Intra-cluster cooperative innovation will enter the "prisoner's dilemma" mode; (2) when the positive benefits of cluster root, knowledge spillover and intellectual property protection are higher than those of opportunistic behavior, the members of the cluster will actively participate in cooperative R & D. The cooperative innovation in the cluster will go out of the "prisoner's dilemma" and realize the win-win situation; 3When the knowledge effect, intellectual property protection and cluster root are between them, the direction of cluster evolution depends on the initial strategy distribution of game players. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to promote technological innovation cooperation among enterprises in industrial clusters from the government level, industrial cluster level and enterprise level.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1

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