市场化进程下高管薪酬差距与在职消费关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-05 15:09

本文关键词：市场化进程下高管薪酬差距与在职消费关系的实证研究　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：一边是悬殊的薪酬差距,一边是天价的在职消费,高管薪酬差距与在职消费的治理问题吸引学术界的广泛研究。根据契约不完备理论,高管激励契约不可能事无巨细地规定清楚,在职消费等隐性激励契约内生于两权分离的现代企业制度。高级管理人才是一种稀缺资源,有依据个人才能和贡献获取高于普通员工薪酬的理由。高管薪酬差距与在职消费都应该被纳入激励契约组合中联动看待。在当今全面深入市场化改革的背景下,从市场化进程的层面来研究高管薪酬差距与在职消费在激励契约组合中应用的多寡,具有非常重要的现实意义。本文运用理论分析与实证研究相结合的研究方法,在运用委托代理理论、不完备契约理论、信息不对称理论、锦标赛理论等对市场化进程下高管薪酬差距与在职消费的关系进行理论分析梳理,提出研究假设。进而通过设计统计模型,实证检验了研究假设。在此基础上对本文的研究结论进行探讨并提出政策建议,指出本研究的不足与未来可能的研究方向。本文选取2013-2015年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,共获得1690个公司样本的5070个观测值,通过研究本文得出以下结论:高管薪酬差距与在职消费存在替代效应。分产权性质研究的结论表明在国有企业中高管薪酬差距对在职消费的替代效应更强;在非国有企业中的高管薪酬差距与在职消费的替代效应不明显。从市场化进程层面,动态考察高管薪酬差距与在职消费的关系,可以发现,随着市场化进程的提高,高管薪酬差距与在职消费的替代效应减弱。分产权性质研究的结论表明在国有企业中,随着市场化进程的提高,高管薪酬差距与在职消费的替代效应减弱得较少;非国有企业中,随着市场化进程的提高,高管薪酬差距与在职消费的替代效应减弱得较多。为此,本文从优化激励契约组合、深化国有企业改革、全面推进市场化进程等方面提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:One side is the salary gap, while the price of service consumption, extensive research on governance issues of executive pay gap and perks to attract academic. According to incomplete contract theory, incentive contract may not share contract clearly specified, within the separation of two rights of the modern enterprise incentive system recessive perquisiteconsumption senior management. Talent is a scarce resource, on the basis of individual talents and contributions to obtain higher than ordinary staff salary reasons. Executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption should be incorporated into the incentive contract combination in view of linkage. In the background of the comprehensive deepening of the market-oriented reform, to study the gap between executive compensation and perquisite consumption in the combined application of incentive contract the amount from the marketization level, has very important practical significance. This paper uses the theory research and empirical analysis In the method, using the principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory, asymmetric information theory, the theoretical analysis about the relationship between the theory of championship executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption under the process of the market, put forward the research hypothesis. Then through the design of statistical model, an empirical test of the hypothesis. The conclusion of this paper on the basis of study and put forward policy recommendations, pointed out the deficiencies of this study and future research directions. This paper selects 2013-2015 A two years in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, the company obtained a total of 1690 samples of 5070 measurements, this paper draws the following conclusions: the Executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption has a substitution effect research. The conclusion shows that the nature of property rights in state-owned enterprise executive compensation gap on the job consumption substitution effect is stronger; in non state-owned enterprises in executive pay gap and service The substitution effect of consumption is not obvious. From the marketization level, the relationship between the dynamic study, executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption can be found, along with the improvement of the marketization process, weaken the substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption. Research results show that the nature of property rights in state-owned enterprises, with the improvement of the marketization process. The substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption decreased less; the non state-owned enterprises, with the improvement of the marketization process, the substitution effect of executive pay gap and on-the-job consumption weakened more. Therefore, this article from the optimization of the incentive contract combination, deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, and comprehensively promote the marketization process and put forward the policy recommendations.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F126.1

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