府际目标治理、权力配置结构与地区经济增长

发布时间：2018-01-24 13:11

本文关键词： 目标治理权力配置结构经济发展行为模式经济增长　出处：《清华大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国地区经济增长呈现出了地方政府“强干预、高增长、低质量”的绩效特征,这种绩效特征给理论界带来了不少的困惑,基于对这种困惑的质疑和思考,本文在预调研所了解的情况的基础上,通过对相关解释中国地区经济增长的文献进行梳理,认为嵌套于央地制度关系情境中的纵向府际治理因素对地方政府行为的选择存在较大的影响,而地方政府的行为选择极有可能对地区经济增长的绩效造成影响。基于这样的思考,本文提出了3个研究问题:即分别是影响地区经济增长的府际治理因素是什么?这些因素通过什么样的内在联系机制影响地区经济的增长?这些因素在多大程度上影响了地区经济增长?为回答上述三个问题,本文以府际目标治理作为解释变量、府际权力配置结构作为调节变量、地方政府经济发展行为模式作为中介变量、地区经济增长作为被解释变量,采用定性和定量相结合的混合性研究方法,先通过对三个县市的地区经济增长案例深入比较研究得出初步结论的基础上,再通过对208位由在任县委书记、县长、乡镇书记和乡镇长组成的调查样本进行问卷调查的基础上做定量实证分析,得出的研究结论发现:改革开放以来在地方各级政府之间经由目标责任制所演化而来的府际目标治理形式直接决定影响地方政府具体所采取的地区经济发展行为模式,并与地区经济增长之间存在显著性的影响,而且这种影响深受府际权力配置结构安排的调节。同时,府际权力配置结构安排本身也对地区经济增长的绩效存在一定程度的影响,但与府际目标治理对地区经济增长的直接影响作用相比,府际权力配置结构更多的是通过发挥其在府际目标治理形式与地方政府所采取的地区经济发展行为模式之间的调节性作用来影响地方经济增长的绩效。这一研究结论的发现,清楚地界定了府际权力配置结构对地区经济增长所发挥的作用机制。另外,本研究中的府际目标治理这个解释变量包括了府际目标任务因子和府际目标激励因子两个维度,它弥补了仅以政治集权、官员职业治理或官员晋升激励作为单一维度解释变量来解释中国地方经济所带来的解释力不足的缺陷,更为真实地反映了地方政府在府际目标治理压力下推动地区经济增长的政府过程,同时更能揭示出地方政府推动地区经济增长的行为发生机制和约束强化机制。
[Abstract]:China's regional economic growth shows the local government "strong intervention, high growth, low quality" performance characteristics, this performance characteristics to the theoretical circle brought a lot of confusion, based on this confusion and thinking. On the basis of preliminary investigation, this paper combs the relevant literature on economic growth in China. It is believed that the vertical inter-governmental governance factors nested in the context of the institutional relationship between central and local governments have a greater impact on the choice of local government behavior. The behavior choice of local government is likely to have an impact on the performance of regional economic growth. Based on this thinking. This paper puts forward three research questions: namely, what are the inter-governmental governance factors that affect the regional economic growth? Through what kind of internal mechanism do these factors affect regional economic growth? To what extent do these factors affect regional economic growth? In order to answer the above three questions, this paper takes the governance of inter-governmental objectives as the explanatory variable, the inter-governmental power allocation structure as the regulating variable, and the behavior model of local government economic development as the intermediary variable. Regional economic growth as an explanatory variable, using qualitative and quantitative combination of mixed research methods, through the three counties and cities of regional economic growth cases in-depth comparative study on the basis of preliminary conclusions. Based on the questionnaire survey of 208 county party committee secretaries, county secretaries, township secretaries and township chiefs, the quantitative empirical analysis was made. The findings of the study found that:. Since the reform and opening up between the local governments at all levels through the goal responsibility system evolved from the inter-governmental-goal governance form directly determines the specific impact of local governments to adopt the regional economic development behavior model. And there is a significant impact on regional economic growth, and this impact is deeply regulated by the arrangement of inter-governmental power allocation structure. At the same time. The arrangement of inter-governmental power allocation structure has a certain degree of influence on the performance of regional economic growth, but compared with the direct effect of inter-government target governance on regional economic growth. The inter-governmental power allocation structure affects the performance of local economic growth by exerting its moderative role between the governance form of inter-governmental objectives and the behavior model of regional economic development adopted by local governments. The findings. Clearly defined the inter-government power allocation structure on the role of regional economic growth mechanism. The explanatory variable of inter-governmental goal governance in this study includes two dimensions: inter-governmental goal task factor and inter-governmental goal incentive factor, which make up for only political centralization of power. Official career governance or official promotion incentive as a single dimensional explanatory variable to explain the lack of explanatory power brought about by the local economy in China. It reflects the local government process of promoting regional economic growth under the pressure of intergovernmental-target governance, and at the same time, it can reveal the mechanism of the local government's behavior and the restraint strengthening mechanism of promoting the regional economic growth.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F124.1;D630

【共引文献】