创新集群主体创新协同收益分配研究

发布时间：2018-02-14 02:05

本文关键词： 创新集群主体创新协同 Shapley值 Nash谈判解因子调整系数　出处：《燕山大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：伴随着经济全球化和区域化的飞速发展，全球竞争日趋激烈，国家之间的竞争也开始从传统的经济、政治、军事等方面的竞争转型为国家核心竞争力的竞争，而一个国家的自主创新能力便是这个国家的核心竞争力的最集中体现。2008年全球金融危机之后，各国政府逐渐将提升创新能力途径的目光汇聚到了创新集群这一区域组织形式。随着各国政府的大力支持，各国创新集群如雨后春笋般不断涌现出来。随之而来的如何协调集群内部主体之间的互动关系，如何协调主体创新协同的收益分配问题，从而保证创新集群可以健康、稳定、可持续的发展，已经成为创新集群发展关注的下一个方向和目标。本文研究的思路以创新集群理论、合作创新理论、三螺旋理论、协同论和博弈论为依据，建立一个科学、合理、公平、持续的创新集群主体创新协同收益分配模型，为保证创新集群稳定和创新协同有效实现提供现实意义。本文介绍了创新集群主体创新协同的研究背景和理论意义，总结了目前国内外有关创新集群和创新集群主体协同的研究现状，分析了本课题所包含的知识体系，指出了当前对于创新协同收益分配问题研究的缺失，阐述了本文的研究思路与方法。本文分析了对创新集群主体协同效应存在的基本问题，确立了创新集群的主体在协同中的角色及功能定位，研究了主体创新协同的类型和方式，指出政府在集群主体协同中的作用。针对创新协同收益分配问题，本文建立了创新集群主体，即产学研主体的创新协同收益分配模型，提出了基于Shapley值的集群主体创新协同收益分配模型和基于Nash谈判解的集群主体创新协同收益分配模型，并针对模型进行了算例分析，实验结果表明创新集群各主体在创新协同中获得的收益高于主体单独创新获得的收益。针对创新集群主体创新协同收益分配模型的不足，本文改进了基于Shapley协同收益分配和Nash谈判解的协同收益分配模型，该模型考虑了在政府因素下对创新协同收益分配的影响，对该模型中的相关参数给出了合理详细的确定方法，并进行了算例分析，，实验结果表明政府对于集群主体创新协同收益分配构成了重大的影响。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization and regionalization, the global competition is becoming more and more fierce, and the competition between countries has begun to transform from the traditional economic, political, military and other aspects of competition to the core competitiveness of the country. And the ability of a country to innovate independently is the most central manifestation of its core competitiveness. In 2008, after the global financial crisis, Governments are gradually turning their attention to innovative clusters as a form of regional organization. With the strong support of governments, The innovation clusters of different countries are springing up continuously, and how to coordinate the interaction among the main bodies in the clusters, and how to coordinate the income distribution of the innovation coordination between the main bodies, so as to ensure that the innovation clusters can be healthy and stable. Sustainable development has become the next direction and goal of the development of innovation cluster. Based on the theory of innovation cluster, the theory of cooperative innovation, the theory of triple helix, the theory of synergy and the theory of game, this paper establishes a science, which is based on the theory of innovation cluster, the theory of cooperative innovation, the theory of triple helix and the theory of game. A reasonable, fair and sustainable model of innovation synergy benefits allocation for innovation clusters provides practical significance for ensuring the stability of innovation clusters and the effective realization of innovation coordination. This paper introduces the research background and theoretical significance of innovation collaboration of innovation cluster, summarizes the current research situation of innovation cluster and innovation cluster agent coordination at home and abroad, and analyzes the knowledge system included in this subject. This paper points out the deficiency of the current research on innovation cooperative income distribution, and expounds the research ideas and methods of this paper. This paper analyzes the basic problems existing in the synergy effect of the main body of the innovation cluster, establishes the role and function orientation of the main body of the innovation cluster in the collaboration, and studies the types and ways of the main body innovation collaboration. This paper points out the role of the government in the coordination of the main body of the cluster. Aiming at the problem of innovation cooperative income distribution, this paper establishes the innovation cluster main body, that is, the innovation cooperative income distribution model of industry, university and research body. In this paper, the cooperative income allocation model of cluster agent innovation based on Shapley value and the model based on Nash negotiation solution are put forward, and an example is given to analyze the model. The experimental results show that the benefit of innovation synergy is higher than that of individual innovation in innovation cluster. Aiming at the deficiency of innovation cooperative income distribution model of innovation cluster, this paper improves the cooperative income distribution model based on Shapley cooperative income allocation and Nash negotiation solution. This model considers the influence of government factors on innovation cooperative income distribution. A reasonable and detailed method for determining the relevant parameters in the model is given, and a numerical example is given. The experimental results show that the government has a significant influence on the distribution of cooperative benefits of innovation among the main bodies of the cluster.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F113.2;F224

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