基于不对称信息的产学研合作创新博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-11 20:59

本文选题：产学研合作 + 博弈论　；参考：《天津大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：20世纪末期以来,随着知识经济的初见端倪和创新活动的日益频繁,科技创新逐渐成为我国经济社会发展的不竭动力,产学研合作创新正是应这一背景发展而来,它能有效配置整合创新资源,促进各要素之间的有效结合和创新主体间的优势互补,加速技术成果商业化、市场化。从国家层面来看,有助于提升国家自主创新能力,这也符合我国建设创新型国家的目标要求。良好的产学研合作模式能实现各方形成能够满足利益需求、在能力上相互匹配的保证机制,使合作创新主体实现博弈中的共赢。因此,产学研合作创新是我国当前环境下实现经济社会发展的重要途径,已成为我国技术创新体系的重要组成部分。但现在我国有限的科技资源仍处于相互封闭、分散孤立、整体效率不高等状态,各方的动力和能力难以对接,企业和学研方之间的合作创新缺乏长效的机制。并且,政府对企业如何使用财政补贴、创新投入的具体信息等,无从知晓,也就说政府创新补贴的过程中信息也是不对称的。由于信息不对称导致的产学研创新主体间掌握信息不平衡,沟通不畅,无法深入了解彼此需求,将对产学研合作创新效率产生严重的制约作用。从微观个体来说,这种信息不对称造成的问题将会使每个参与合作创新的主体自身的创新能力不足,而从宏观来看,将会使区域甚至整个国家的创新能力降低。因此,有必要从不对称信息的角度对产学研合作创新进行分析。因此,本文查阅相关文献,梳理基础理论,应用了博弈论分析方法,从产学研合作创新的不对称信息特性出发,分析其产生的原因,继而通过两阶段序贯博弈分析产学研过程中企业与学研方在合作创新中的策略,在实现各自利益的最大化情况下的不同选择。之后又通过建立学研方、企业和政府三者结合的博弈模型,探讨政府对产学研合作创新实行资金补贴行为与产学研主体创新行为二者之间存在的博弈,以此角度为切入点,分析政府补贴的产学研报酬激励问题,政府和企业、学研方的动态博弈是最大限度实现创新的预期绩效的结果,并试图做出数据模拟,为产学研合作提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the 20th century, with the emergence of knowledge economy and the increasing frequency of innovation activities, scientific and technological innovation has gradually become the inexhaustible motive force for the economic and social development of our country.It can effectively allocate and integrate innovative resources, promote the effective combination of various elements and complement the advantages of innovation subjects, accelerate the commercialization and marketization of technological achievements.From the national level, it is helpful to promote the national independent innovation ability, which is also in line with the goal of building an innovative country in China.A good model of cooperation between industry, university and research can realize the guarantee mechanism which can satisfy the interests of all parties and match each other in the ability, so that the main body of cooperation and innovation can realize the win-win situation in the game.Therefore, the cooperative innovation of industry, university and research is an important way to realize the economic and social development under the current environment of our country, and has become an important part of the technological innovation system of our country.However, the limited scientific and technological resources of our country are still in the state of mutual closure, dispersion and isolation, low overall efficiency and so on, the power and ability of all parties are difficult to connect, and the cooperative innovation between enterprises and researchers is short of long-term effective mechanism.Moreover, the government has no way to know how enterprises use financial subsidies and the specific information of innovation input, that is to say, the information in the process of government innovation subsidies is also asymmetric.Because the information asymmetry causes the information imbalance among the innovation subjects of industry, education and research, the communication is not smooth, and they can not understand each other deeply, which will restrict the innovation efficiency of the industry, college and research cooperation seriously.From the microcosmic point of view, the problem caused by this information asymmetry will make the innovation ability of the main body participating in cooperative innovation insufficient, but from the macro point of view, it will reduce the innovation ability of the whole region and even the whole country.Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the innovation of industry, college and research cooperation from the angle of asymmetric information.Therefore, this paper looks up the relevant literature, combs the basic theory, applies the game theory analysis method, starting from the asymmetric information characteristic of the cooperation innovation of industry, college and research, analyzes the reason of its emergence.Then, through two-stage sequential game analysis, the strategies of enterprises and researchers in cooperative innovation are analyzed in the process of production, education and research, and different choices are made to realize the maximization of their respective interests.Then through the establishment of the game model of the combination of research, enterprise and government, the paper discusses the game between the capital subsidy behavior of government and the innovation behavior of the main body of industry, college and research, so as to take this angle as the breakthrough point.The dynamic game between government and enterprise is the result of maximizing the expected performance of innovation and trying to make the data simulation to provide the theoretical basis for the cooperation between industry, university and research.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F124.3;F224.32

【参考文献】