中央政府-地方政府博弈框架下去产能政策效果研究

发布时间：2018-04-13 04:26

  本文选题：去产能 + 产业政策　； 参考：《上海金融》2017年08期

【摘要】："去产能"作为供给侧结构性改革五大任务之首,是我国经济转型升级的关键所在。虽已经过近二十年的治理,综合运用了行政、财税、金融、法律等各方面措施,但产能过剩问题不仅未得到明显改善反而显得愈发严重,使得我们不得不反思相关产业政策的有效性。从现有文献来看,大多是从"市场失灵"、"体制扭曲"等方面讨论产能过剩的形成原因,但对去产能政策在实施过程中的影响因素及其执行效果缺乏系统性分析。中央政府和地方政府作为产业政策的制定主体和执行主体,二者的博弈直接影响产业政策的实施效果。本文建立了中央政府和地方政府的演化博弈模型,用以研究分析影响地方政府执行去产能政策效果的相关因素,并对提高去产能政策的执行效果提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:As the top five Ren Wuzhi of supply-side structural reform, "deproductivity" is the key to China's economic transformation and upgrading.Although administrative, fiscal, financial, legal and other measures have been comprehensively applied in the past 20 years, the problem of overcapacity has not been significantly improved, but has become increasingly serious.So that we have to reflect on the effectiveness of relevant industrial policies.According to the existing literature, the causes of overcapacity are mostly discussed from the aspects of "market failure" and "system distortion", but there is a lack of systematic analysis of the influencing factors and the effect of the implementation of the policy of deproductivity in the process of implementation.The game between central government and local government, as the main body of industrial policy formulation and execution, directly affects the effect of industrial policy implementation.In this paper, the evolutionary game model of central government and local government is established to study and analyze the relevant factors that affect the effect of local government to implement the policy of deproductivity, and to put forward some policy suggestions to improve the effect of implementing the policy of deproductivity.
【作者单位】： 中国人民银行石家庄中心支行;
【分类号】：F124
，

本文编号：1742934